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Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST
18 April 1973

Nixon Finds 'Major Developments' in Probe of Watergate

By Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Nixon announced yesterday that there were "major developments" in the Watergate case and, in a reversal of his earlier position, he has agreed to allow his aides to testify under oath before a Senate committee that is investigating the affair.

The President said he personally "began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter" on March 21 and that "real progress has been made in finding the truth."

Where previously the President had stated that no members of the White House staff were involved in the bugging of Democratic headquarters, yesterday he told reporters:

"If any person in the executive branch or in the government is indicted by the grand jury, my policy will be to immediately suspend him. If he is convicted, he will of course, be automatically discharged."

The President's statement was in sharp contrast to 10 months of White House denials of involvement of presidential aides in the Watergate bugging and other political espionage and sabotage activities.

Following Mr. Nixon's brief talk, presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler met with reporters and said that all previous White House statements about the bugging were "inoperative," Ziegler emphasized: "The President's statement today is the operative statement."

Meanwhile, reliable government sources said yesterday that two or three former presidential aides and administration officials are currently the focus of the Justice Department's criminal investigation and will probably be indicted by the federal grand jury investigating the Watergate espionage.

At the same time, White House and Justice Department sources said developments in the case are likely to lead to the resignation of at least two high White House officials believed by the President to be either directly or indirectly responsible for the Watergate bugging and other political espionage and sabotage.

One White House aide said yesterday that the President's language about the possible indictment of persons in the executive branch was carefully chosen and based on knowledge of impending indictments.

Until yesterday, the President was adamant in his refusal to allow his aides to testify before a "formal session" of a congressional committee. He said last month they had "executive privilege" to refuse to disclose confidential White House business, and that he would welcome a court test on the issue.

The Senate Watergate committee, led by its chairman, Sen. Sam J. Ervin

Jr. (D-N.C.), was just as insistent in demanding that presidential aides testify under oath and in public.

Ervin said that executive privilege could not be invoked in investigations of wrongdoing and threatened to arrest presidential aides and try them for contempt of the Senate if they refused subpoenas.

"All members of the White House staff will appear voluntarily when requested by the committee," the President said yesterday. "They will testify under oath and they will answer fully all proper questions." Mr. Nixon said that his aides could still invoke executive privilege—but only on individual questions. Ervin has not disputed this.

The President presented his statement during a meeting with reporters. It followed weeks of demands by leading Republicans that he speak out about the Watergate and came on a day when the Los Angeles Times reported that the President was about to make a dramatic admission of high-level responsibility for the Watergate-type espionage.

The first reaction by Republicans to the President's statement was favorable.

Sen. Howard Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.), the vice chairman of the Senate investigating committee, said of Mr. Nixon's announcement, "We now have the biggest hurdle behind us."

"I'm highly pleased with the President's decision," Baker said, "I think it was a good one. I can't resist saying that I've always contended that we would have White House aides testify, along with everyone else who knows anything about this matter. I am delighted that that optimism now seems justified. The President has made the determination to re-evaluate the entire situation, and I commend him for it."

Mr. Nixon said he began his own investigation March 21 "as a result of serious charges which came to my attention."

Ziegler said the President was referring in part to sworn testimony by Watergate conspirator James W. McCord, who has said superiors told him that at least three presidential associates had advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging: former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, presidential counsel John W. Dean III and former presidential assistant Jeb Stuart Magruder, now a Commerce Department official.

Ziegler repeatedly refused to discuss the possibility of whether individual members of the White House staff were involved in the bugging or whether they plan to resign. On numerous occasions he refused to discuss specific inquiries about Dean, who conducted an investigation for President Nixon that cleared all then-current members of the White House staff of involvement in the bugging.

He added that since March 21, the President has conducted White House inquiries into the matter with the as-

sistance of Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen, who has headed the Justice Department's criminal investigation of the Watergate case.

Ziegler indicated yesterday that Dean had effectively been removed from any further assignment to investigate the Watergate case, stating that the President "felt it was not appropriate that any member of the White House staff be involved in further investigation."

Earlier, the President had told reporters that he met Sunday with Petersen and Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst "to review the facts which had come to me in my investigation and also to review the progress of the Department of Justice investigation."

Mr. Nixon added: "I can report today that there have been major developments in the case concerning which it would be improper to be more specific now, except to say that real progress has been made in finding the truth."

The President then announced that he will suspend any person in the executive branch who might be indicted in the case.

"I have expressed to the appropriate authorities my view that no individual holding, in the past or at present, a position of major importance in the administration should be given immunity from prosecution," the President said.

Ziegler told reporters that the President has had "extensive discussions with members of the (White House) staff about the situation," but stressed that Mr. Nixon now "has looked to Mr. Petersen"—not his own staff—to assist in further investigation.

Ziegler was repeatedly asked if he stood by his earlier denials that Dean and White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman had advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging. He declined to answer on grounds that he would not discuss individuals.

When asked specifically about the President's Aug. 29 statement that no one then on the White House staff was involved in the Watergate matter, Ziegler said, "That was a statement prior to today's . . . The statement today is the operative statement."

When pressed on the reliability of his own statements, Ziegler said they were based on information available at the time, prior to when the President began his own "intensive new inquiries into this whole matter."

Ziegler was reminded that President Nixon called White House counsel Dean on March 26, and expressed confidence in him. Ziegler, on the same day, had said that Dean was innocent of any involvement in the Watergate bugging. Asked if he stands behind his statement, Ziegler said:

"I think, because of the scope of the

President's statement, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss any individual."

Asked whether the White House duties of either Haldeman or Dean had been altered because of recent developments in the Watergate case, Ziegler said: "I'm not going to focus on any individual today" and warned reporters that "my refusal to do so should not imply anything."

Later, the press secretary said that "everyone in the White House staff is in their jobs as previously," and that their duties remain unchanged except for the President's directive that no White House aides be involved in further investigation of the Watergate case.

Ziegler refused to say whether the President's statement about possible criminal action against members of the executive branch applied only to the Watergate bugging or to related allegations of widespread political espionage and sabotage activities as well.

Expanding on a previous White House statement that President Nixon did not meet with former Attorney General Mitchell at the White House last Saturday, Ziegler said Mitchell had met with John Ehrlichman, the President's principal adviser on domestic affairs.

Mr. Nixon said that Ehrlichman and Leonard Garment, a special assistant to the President, had been designated by the White House to negotiate with the Senate's Watergate investigating committee.

The President's announcement that his assistants would be allowed to testify before the Senate committee was a major departure from a past, hard-line White House policy that held the doctrine of executive privilege prevented the aides from appearing. Only last week Attorney General Kleindienst asserted that the President's

right to invoke executive privilege is virtually unlimited — that he could prevent any employee of the executive branch from appearing before any congressional hearing, up to and including impeachment proceedings.

The doctrine of executive privilege is an outgrowth of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, in which the three branches of the federal government function somewhat independently of one another and are designed to act as checks on one another.

In a press conference March 15, Mr. Nixon invoked both executive privilege and separation of powers in defending his decision not to allow presidential counsel Dean to appear before the Senate committee.

The White House announcement yesterday said means had been found both to protect the principle of separation of powers and allow the presidential assistants to testify.

"I believe now an agreement has been reached which is satisfactory to both sides," the President said in his statement. "The committee ground rules as adopted totally preserve the doctrine of separation of powers. They provide that the appearance by a witness may, in the first instance, be in executive (closed) session, if appropriate.

"Second, executive privilege (the right not to answer certain questions) is expressly reserved and may be asserted during the course of the questioning as to any questions.

"All members of the White House staff will appear voluntarily when requested by the committee. They will testify under oath and they will answer fully all proper questions."

Last week during the negotiations between the White House and the committee that led up to yesterday's

announcement, Sen. Baker mentioned specifically that the committee was willing to protect presidential aides against their testimony being turned into "a long and extended television spectacular."

In his statement yesterday, the President noted that "much has been made of the issue as to whether the proceedings could be televised."

"To me, this has never been a central issue, especially if the separation of powers problem is otherwise solved, as I now think it is," Mr. Nixon said.

The President also said the first appearance by his aides before the Senate Watergate committee might, "if appropriate," be in a closed-door executive session.

Ervin has said in the past that he would favor the appearance of some witnesses in an initial closed-door session.

The night before Kleindienst met with the President to discuss the case, the Attorney General said that the "Watergate case is going to blow up."

In a brief interview with a reporter Saturday night at the White House Correspondents' Association dinner, Kleindienst told a reporter who has been covering the Watergate case "to follow the courage of your convictions."

While declining to elaborate Kleindienst invited two Watergate reporters to his house in Virginia for breakfast Sunday morning.

When the two reporters showed up Mrs. Kleindienst told the reporters that her husband had been called to the White House and could not discuss the Watergate case with them.

Kleindienst called the reporters Monday and apologized for canceling the breakfast, adding that he still could not discuss the case or elaborate on his statements of Saturday night.

NEW YORK TIMES

18 April 1973

Text of Nixon's Statement

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, April 17—Following is the text of President Nixon's announcement today concerning the Watergate investigation:

I have two announcements to make. Because of their technical nature, I shall read both of the announcements to the members of the press corps.

The first announcement relates to the appearance of White House people before the Senate Select Committee, better known as the Ervin Committee.

For several weeks, Senator Ervin and Senator Baker and their counsel have been in contact with White House representatives John Ehrlichman and Leonard Garment. They have been talking about ground rules which would preserve the separation of powers without suppressing the fact.

I believe now an agreement has been reached which is satisfactory to both sides.

The committee ground rules as adopted totally preserve the doctrine of separation of powers. They provide that the appearance by a witness may, in the first instance, be in executive session, if appropriate.

Expressly Reserved

Second, executive privilege is expressly reserved and may be asserted during the course of the questioning as to any questions.

Now, much has been made of the issue as to whether the proceedings could be televised. To me, this has never been a central issue, especially if the separation of powers problem is otherwise solved, as I now think it is.

All members of the White House staff will appear voluntarily when requested by the committee. They will tes-

tify under oath and they will answer fully all proper questions.

I should point out that this arrangement is one that covers this hearing only in which wrongdoing has been charged. This kind of arrangement, of course, would not apply to other hearings. Each of them will be considered on its merits.

My second announcement concerns the Watergate case directly.

On March 21, as a result of serious charges which came to my attention, some of which were publicly reported, I began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter.

Last Sunday afternoon, the Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General Petersen and I met at length in the E.O.B. [Executive Office Building] to review the facts which had come to me in my investigation and also to review the progress of the Department of Justice investigation.

Major Developments

I can report today that there have been major developments in the case concern-

ing which it would be improper to be more specific now, except to say that real progress has been made in finding the truth.

If any person in the executive branch or in the Government is indicted by the grand jury, my policy will be to immediately suspend him. If he is convicted, he will, of course, be automatically discharged.

I have expressed to the appropriate authorities my view that no individual holding, in the past or at present, a position of major importance in the Administration should be given immunity from prosecution.

The judicial process is moving ahead as it should; and I shall aid it in all appropriate ways and have so informed the appropriate authorities.

As I have said before and I have said throughout this entire matter, all Government employees and especially White House staff employees are expected fully to cooperate in this matter. I condemn any attempts to cover up in this case, no matter who is involved.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 1973

Watergate: Inept Burglary With Widening Political Ramifications

By WALTER RUGABER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 17—As a public issue, the Watergate affair began with a brazen but inept burglary exactly 10 months ago today. It came to embrace a highly complex range of covert and questionable political activity.

The precise dimensions of each facet of the scandal are far from clear. Most official investigation so far has concentrated on the three weeks of wiretapping at the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee.

Seven men, including three onetime employees of the White House and the Committee for the Re-election of the President, were convicted of that conspiracy in January. Six of them are now in jail and the seventh is telling what he knows to investigators.

At least a year before the Watergate burglary of June 17, agents who said they were acting on behalf of President Nixon's re-election effort were in the field, financed by campaign funds in Republican hands.

Sabotage Drive Indicated

These agents appear to have spied on the Democratic opposition and, as the campaign began to heat up, they planned and apparently carried out various acts of disruption and sabotage against major Democratic contenders.

The most prominent of these operatives — others have been named, but he has come to symbolize pre-Watergate disruption efforts — is a young Southern California lawyer named Donald Henry Segretti.

There is no comprehensive picture of what Mr. Segretti and his colleagues intended to do, and did, and some experts once expressed doubts that their plans, however clandestine and unfair, were actually illegal.

But Mr. Segretti, according to numerous official and unofficial reports, had been hired

by Dwight L. Chapin, the President's appointments secretary, and paid by Herbert W. Kalmbach, Mr. Nixon's personal lawyer.

Mr. Chapin, who left the White House after the campaign to become an executive with United Air Lines, and Gordon C. Strahan, a onetime White House aide also linked to the Segretti operation, were recently called before a Federal grand jury that has resumed its investigation of the case.

Segretti Testified

Mr. Segretti also testified before the 23-member panel, and a Senate committee investigating the affair has served a subpoena on Mr. Kalmbach to obtain financial and other records held by the lawyer.

The term Watergate also came to cover a series of financial transactions involving President Nixon's campaign organization. Sooner or later, most of them reached a cash-stuffed safe in the offices of Maurice H. Stans.

Mr. Stans, the former Secretary of Commerce who served as the President's chief fundraiser, is understood to have given the Watergate grand jury a written statement during its original investigation. He is not known to have testified during the resumed inquiry.

Hugh W. Sloan Jr., the finance unit's treasurer until soon after the burglary occurred, passed about \$200,000, most of it in \$100 bills, to G. Gordon Liddy, for what the Republicans described as a legitimate intelligence operation.

Some of the money was recovered from the five men arrested in the Watergate break-in. Some of it was also passed through a bank account controlled by one of the seven men involved, Bernard L. Barker, who pleaded guilty.

Mr. Sloan testified at Liddy's trial that he had never known what the former White House and re-election committee official was doing with the money — an assertion that the president

judge openly doubted.

The re-election committee's financial transactions drew into the case not only Mr. Stans and Mr. Sloan but also a number of prominent officials who had been in some way associated with it.

These included such ranking figures as John N. Mitchell, the former Attorney General, and H. R. Haldeman, the White House chief of staff, and Mr. Kalmbach. Mr. Mitchell was called before the grand jury last year.

Also linked to the secret-fund aspect of the case were such middle-ranking figures as Jeb Stuart Magruder, deputy director of the campaign; Herbert L. Porter, the scheduling director, and Frederick C. Larue, a committee aide.

Aside from the activities within the re-election committee, the financial dealings involved a series of big-business men and industrial interests who were found to have sent huge sums clandestinely to the re-election committee.

Out of the trial in January came another prime feature of the affair: the feeling, expressed increasingly and finally urgently by Republicans in Congress, that the White House looked as though it had something to hide.

The "cover-up" issue took on a definite edge with allegations by one of the convicted conspirators, James W. McCord Jr., that he and the other defendants had been under pressure to plead guilty and keep silent.

There were assertions that five of the wiretappers had been paid for their guilty pleas and that other moves had been made to prevent further disclosures. Both steps would be Federal crimes.

The White House difficulties were heightened also by the revelations by L. Patrick Gray 3d during hearings on his nomination to be director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation — a nomination Mr. Nixon was finally forced to withdraw.

Mr. Gray provided evidence that John W. Dean 3d, counsel to the President, had kept close track of virtually every important step in the extensive F.B.I. investigation of the Watergate wire tapping.

Mr. Gray said that Mr. Dean had "probably lied" when he told agents he was unaware of whether one conspirator, E. Howard Hunt Jr., had a White House office. Mr. Dean had in fact searched Hunt's office several days before.

It was learned from trial testimony that Mr. Dean, later assigned by the President to conduct a White House investigation of the case, had personally recommended Liddy to the re-election committee.

Also, McCord told the Senate Watergate committee in secret session that he had been told by Liddy that Mr. Dean was one of the men who took part in a February, 1972, meeting at which bugging operations had been discussed in detail.

Others said to have been Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Magruder, present at the meeting were Mr. Magruder was the ranking re-election committee official to testify at the trial of the seven men.

He made it clear that he and others at the committee had organized and assigned Liddy to lead a political intelligence operation to deal with the protection of prominent Republican campaigners and convention security problems.

It was recently reported that Mr. Haldeman, at a private meeting with Republican Senators and Representatives, had taken ultimate responsibility for the so-called intelligence gathering. He denied, however, that the program had been improper.

NEW YORK TIMES

18 April 1973

Mr. Nixon Turns Around

President Nixon's complete about-face on the Watergate affair—from a stance of belligerent resistance to the promise of full White House cooperation with both a Federal grand jury and the select Senate committee—is as welcome as it is belated.

Obviously stung by the mounting waves of criticism and by the dire warnings of some of his strongest supporters that continued intransigence could lead to political disaster, the President has now, in the late President Johnson's phrase, "bitten the bullet." He now states, quite properly, that no executive branch employee should claim immunity from prosecution and that all White House staff members will appear voluntarily before Senator Sam Ervin's committee to testify under oath and provide complete answers to "all proper questions."

These pledges represent a 180-degree turn from the all-pervasive doctrine of Executive privilege that Mr. Nixon had previously embraced and that Attorney General Richard Kleindienst had restated so emphatically before two Senate subcommittees only last week. There have clearly been some sensible second thoughts about the Attorney General's bizarre interpretation that any cooperation in the Watergate investigation by any present or past members of the White House staff would do violence to the constitutional separation of powers.

In his brief press conference yesterday announcing the switch, Mr. Nixon spoke of "major developments" that had come about as the result of a new White House inquiry. Whatever the weight of the various factors involved, the important thing is that the President has moved away from an indefensible position to one of full cooperation. Now the grand jury and Senator Ervin's committee will doubtless proceed without interference to clear up this sordid affair.

WASHINGTON POST
19 April 1973

Mitchell, Dean Linked to Watergate

By Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein
Washington Post Staff Writers

Former Attorney General John N. Mitchell and White House counsel John W. Dean III approved and helped plan the Watergate bugging operation, according to President Nixon's former special assistant, Jeb Stuart Magruder.

Mitchell and Dean later arranged to buy the silence of the seven convicted Watergate conspirators, Magruder has also said.

Magruder, the deputy campaign manager for the President, made these statements to federal prosecutors Saturday, according to three sources in the White House and the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

The sources said that Magruder is scheduled to testify before the Watergate grand jury today and is expected to repeat the statements under oath.

One of the sources went so far as to say that Magruder's statements and other information developed by the prosecutors—especially regarding the payments of cash to the conspirators to remain silent—are expected to result in the criminal indictment of both Mitchell and Dean.

Dean's resignation as counsel to the President is considered imminent, according to sources in the White House.

Two sources in the executive branch said yesterday that White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman also may resign as a result of recent Watergate disclosures. There is no known evidence to link Haldeman to criminal involvement in the bugging, the sources said.

Magruder, who served at the White House as a deputy to Haldeman and later as Mitchell's principal assistant at the President's re-election committee, "chose to talk because he felt the walls were coming in on him," one source said yesterday.

Magruder will not be granted immunity from prosecution, the sources said yesterday, but he hopes to receive some sort of favorable treatment.

President Nixon was briefed on the Justice Department's recent findings Sunday, a day after Magruder spoke to the prosecutors. On Tuesday, Mr. Nixon, in his statement announcing "major developments" in the Watergate case, said: "I have expressed to the appropriate authorities my view that no individual holding, in the past or present, a position of major importance in the administration should be given immunity from prosecution."

The details of Magruder's visit to the prosecutors became known less than 24 hours after President Nixon made his remarks.

The President said he personally "began intensive new inquiries into this whole matter" on March 21, partly as a result of "serious charges" that had come to his attention.

After 10 months of White House denials of involvement of presidential aides in the Watergate bugging and other political espionage and sabotage, the President said Tuesday he will suspend "any person in the executive branch who might be indicted by the grand jury."

Magruder could not be reached for comment yesterday. His attorney, James J. Bierbower, would not comment last night on the contents of The Washington Post story. "I will confirm that he will testify before the grand jury when he is called," Bierbower said.

Informed of the contents of the story last night, Gerald Warren, deputy White House press secretary, issued the following statement: "The White House is not prepared to react to a story based on sources. At a (future) time when the rights of individuals would not be jeopardized by a comment, an appropriate comment will be made."

Earlier yesterday, Ronald L. Ziegler, White House press secretary, told reporters, "I'm not going to answer any questions on the subject (Watergate) no matter how they are phrased."

A spokesman for Mitchell, who has previously denied advance knowledge of the bugging, said the former

Attorney General would have no comment on the story.

According to The Post's sources, Magruder provided the prosecutors with a first-hand account of a February, 1972, meeting in Attorney General Mitchell's office to discuss and approve the illegal electronic eavesdropping operation at the Watergate. At the time, Mitchell was the nation's chief law enforcement officer.

Those who attended the meeting were Mitchell, Dean, Magruder and convicted Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy, according to the sources' account of Magruder's statements.

Convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. testified before the grand jury and Senate Watergate committee that he was told by Liddy that there was such a meeting in February at which the bugging was planned and discussed.

McCord's testimony was based on hearsay, but Magruder's statements to the prosecutors provide evidence that can be used to obtain convictions, the sources said.

The prosecutors also have received statements from other persons who can testify that Mitchell and Dean were involved in the arrangements to pay the seven Watergate conspirators for their silence, the sources said.

Dean has acknowledged to others that he was involved in arranging the payments, one of the sources said, but he has maintained that he was acting on orders.

Frederick C. LaRue, a former White House aide and one of Mitchell's most intimate assistants for years, was also involved in the payments—reportedly totalling well over \$100,000—the sources said.

LaRue, who investigators have said helped direct a "housecleaning" at the re-election committee in which documents were destroyed after the Watergate bugging, was subpoenaed by the grand jury yesterday, the Associated Press reported.

The Post reported earlier this month that following the Watergate bugging, LaRue received \$70,000 in Nixon campaign funds from the same account that financed the illegal electronic eavesdropping. Federal investigators are now attempting to learn if that money was used to pay the Watergate conspirators for their silence.

Meanwhile, The New York Times reported in its editions today that Attorney General Richard Kleindienst has disqualified himself from further participation in the Watergate inquiry because the investigation is focused on some of his

past associates. Jack Hushen, a Justice Department spokesman, said "no comment" when asked about the report last night. Hushen added: "If it happened, it is a common, everyday occurrence around the Justice Department" in cases involving potential conflicts of interest.

The Times quoted Mitchell as saying that Kleindienst's withdrawal is an "entirely appropriate and correct decision for Dick to have taken."

In addition, The Times said that Dean is reported by associates to be ready to implicate others in the Watergate affair if he is indicted.

Magruder, 38, was chosen by the White House to coordinate President Nixon's 1972 inauguration. He has been a target of the federal grand jury investigation since it reopened its inquiry last month.

He testified on Jan. 23 at the Watergate trial that he had no knowledge of the Watergate bugging, but said that he helped establish what was supposed to be a "legal" and "ethical" intelligence-gathering operation.

Magruder testified that he authorized the payment of at least \$235,000 to Watergate conspirator Liddy to run the operation.

Liddy, who is serving a jail sentence of at least six years and eight months for his conviction, has repeatedly refused to cooperate with the federal investigation.

Government investigators considered Liddy's silence a roadblock to the new effort to answer the many questions that remained after the Watergate trial.

Mitchell, the pipe-smoking former attorney general, was a senior partner in a prestigious New York law firm that Mr. Nixon joined after his defeat in the 1962 California gubernatorial campaign. The two men soon became close friends, and Mitchell was said to be Mr. Nixon's most trusted adviser.

Mitchell was Mr. Nixon's campaign manager in 1968 and assumed the post of attorney general in the first Nixon administration.

Mitchell resigned as attorney general on March 1, 1972, to assume command of the Nixon re-election effort. The director of the successful 1968 campaign, Mitchell was then considered the President's

NEW YORK TIMES
19 April 1973

Text of Ervin Panel Guidelines

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 18—Following is the text of guidelines issued today by the Senate Watergate committee dealing with witnesses who appear before the panel:

In investigating the matters mentioned in S. Res. 60, the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities will observe its standing rules, its previously established procedures for staff interviews of prospective witnesses, and these guidelines:

1. The committee will receive oral and documentary evidence relevant to the matters S. Res. 60 authorizes it to investigate and matters bearing on the credibility of the witnesses who testify before it.

2. All witnesses shall testify before the committee on oath or affirmation in hearings which shall be open to the public and the news media. This guideline shall not abridge, however, the power of the committee to take the testimony of a particular witness on oath or affirmation in an executive meeting if the committee would otherwise be unable to ascertain whether the witness knows anything relevant to the matters the committee is authorized to investigate.

TV Coverage Allowed

3. All still and motion picture photography will be completed before a witness actually testifies, and no such photography shall occur while the witness is testifying. Television coverage of a witness and his testimony shall be permitted, however, under the provisions of the standing rules of the committee.

4. In taking the testimony of a witness, the committee will endeavor to do two things: First, to minimize inconvenience to the witness and disruption of his affairs; and, second, to afford the witness a fair opportunity to give him testimony without undue interruption.

To achieve the first of these objectives, the committee will honor the request of the witness to the extent feasible for advance notice of the time and place appointed for taking his testimony, complete the taking of his testimony with as much dispatch as circumstances permit, and release

the witness from further attendance on the committee as soon as circumstances allow, subject, however, to the power of the committee to recall him for further testimony in the event the committee deems such action advisable.

To afford the witness a fair opportunity to present his testimony, the committee will permit the witness to make an opening statement not exceeding 20 minutes, which shall not be interrupted by questioning and a closing statement summarizing his testimony, not exceeding five minutes, which will not be interrupted by questioning. Provided, however, questions suggested by the closing statement may be propounded after such statement is made.

Right to Counsel

5. The committee respects and recognizes the right of a prospective witness who is interviewed by the staff of the committee in advance of a public hearing as well as the right of a witness who appears before the committee to be accompanied by a lawyer of his own choosing to advise him concerning his constitutional and legal rights as a witness.

6. If the lawyer who accompanies a witness before the committee advises the witness to claim a privilege against giving any testimony sought by the committee, the committee shall have the discretionary power to permit the lawyer to present his views on the matter for the information of the committee, and the committee shall thereupon rule on the validity of the claim or its application to the particular circumstances involved and require the witness to give the testimony sought in the event its ruling on the claim is adverse to the witness.

Neither the witness nor any other officer or person shall be permitted to claim a privilege against the witness testifying prior to the appearance of the witness before the committee, and the committee shall not rule in respect to the claim until the question by which the testimony is sought is put to the witness.

7. The committee believes that it may be necessary for it to obtain the testimony of some White House aides if

the committee is to be able to ascertain the complete truth in respect to the matters it is authorized to investigate by S. Res. 60.

Testify in Open Hearings

To this end, the committee will invite such White House aides as it has reason to believe have knowledge of information relevant to the matters it is authorized to investigate to appear before the committee and give testimony on oath or affirmation in open hearings respecting such matters.

In this connection, the committee will extend to such aides the considerations set forth in detail in Guideline No. 4 and the right to counsel set forth in detail in Guidelines Nos. 5 and 6.

In addition to these considerations and rights, the committee will permit the White House to have its own counsel present when any White House aide appears before the committee as a witness, and permit such counsel to invoke any claim that a privilege available to the President forbids a White House aide to give the testimony sought by the committee, and the committee shall thereupon rule on validity of such claim or its application to the particular testimony sought in the manner and with the effect set forth in Guideline No. 6 in respect to a claim of privilege invoked by a witness or his counsel.

The committee will not subpoena a White House aide to appear before it or its staff unless such aide fails to make timely response to a invitation to appear.

8. The committee may require the sergeant-at-arms of the Senate, or any of his assistants or deputies, or any available law-enforcement officer to eject from a meeting of the committee any person who willfully disrupts the meeting or willfully impedes the committee in the performance of its functions under S. Res. 60.

9. Whenever the committee takes testimony through the agency of less than the majority of the members of the committee as authorized by its standing rules, the member or members of the committee taking the testimony shall be vested with the powers set forth in these guidelines and shall be deemed to act as the committee in exercising such powers.

chief political adviser.

Mitchell's reign as head of the Nixon re-election campaign lasted exactly four months and one day. He resigned from the post last July 1—two weeks after the Watergate break-in—citing a desire to spend more time with his wife, Martha. Mitchell denied any link between his resignation and the Watergate affair.

A week before the resignation, Mrs. Mitchell had issued a public ultimatum to her husband to choose between "politics and me."

"I'm not going to stand for all those dirty things that go on," Mrs. Mitchell said.

Last Sept. 29, The Washington Post reported that Mitchell—while Attorney General—controlled a secret cash fund that was used to finance political sabotage against the Democrats. Reached by telephone at his home in New York at the time, the former Attorney General called the story "all that crap."

A month later, however, Clark MacGregor, who succeeded Mitchell as Mr. Nixon's campaign director, acknowledged that a cash fund existed, although he said it was not used for illegal or improper activities. MacGregor named Mitchell as one of the officials who had access to the fund.

Increasingly in recent weeks, Mrs. Mitchell has complained bitterly that her husband was being made a scapegoat in the Watergate affair.

In an interview with The New York Times published Tuesday, she repeated her conviction that her husband is innocent of any wrongdoing in the Watergate affair. She said she insisted he leave Washington because of "the dirty things going on there" and that now "they're all trying to pin this on him."

Asked by the Times' reporter, "Did you get him out in time?" Mrs. Mitchell said, "I don't know. I really don't know."

Asked if the President's friendship with the former attorney general could "save him," she said, "That's a good question, isn't it? That's what I keep asking myself."

The White House has said that Mitchell met there Sunday with presidential assistant John Ehrlichman, but Mrs. Mitchell has continued to insist that her husband saw the President. The purpose of the White House visit has not been disclosed by either Mitchell or the White House.

Dean, 34, worked for the House Judiciary Committee and for two years as associate director of the National Commission on Reform of Criminal Law. Shortly after Mr. Nixon's first inauguration in January, 1969, he was named an as-

sociate deputy attorney general in the Justice Department headed by Mitchell.

The next year, Mr. Nixon brought Dean to the White House, installing him as counsel to the President.

Last Aug. 29 the President announced that, based on an investigation by Dean, "no one in the White House staff, no one in this administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre incident."

The Dean investigation was cited repeatedly in the following months by White House spokesmen when asked whether presidential assistants were involved in the Watergate affair.

Dean's name emerged again last March, during Senate confirmation hearings on the President's nomination of L. Patrick Gray III to be permanent director of the FBI.

turned over secret FBI files on the Watergate case to Dean, and in response to questioning, agreed that the presidential counsel "probably" lied when he told FBI investigators that he would "have to check" on whether Hunt had a White House office.

On March 26, it was reported that McCord—quoting Liddy—had named Dean and Magruder as having advance knowledge of the bugging. The case denied the sub-

WASHINGTON POST
19 April 1973

Mitchell Linked to Attempts To Settle Suit on Watergate

By George Lardner Jr. and Jules Witcover
Washington Post Staff Writers

Former Attorney General John N. Mitchell made an effort earlier this month to persuade Democratic officials to drop their lawsuit over the Watergate break-in of party headquarters.

Democratic National Chairman Robert S. Strauss yesterday confirmed Mitchell's entry into the negotiations which have been aimed at an out-of-court settlement of the Democrats' \$6.4 million complaint against the Committee to Re-Elect the President. As former head of the committee, Mitchell is listed as one of the defendants in the suit for damages.

"We are not in accord," Strauss said yesterday, "but we have talked both in person and on the telephone within the last couple of weeks."

The Democratic chairman, however, said he had not had any conversations with Mitchell during the past week. Mitchell, who was at the White House last weekend while a campaign deputy was reportedly incriminating him in interviews with federal prosecutors, could not be reached for comment.

The Republicans have reportedly offered \$525,000 for settlement of the suit, including \$25,000 for former Democratic National Committee official Spencer Oliver, whose telephone was tapped. Strauss confirmed this as a "rather precise, but not exactly" correct description of one of the proposals that have been made.

The presidential re-election committee's attempts to secure out-of-court settlements of civil lawsuits touching on the Watergate break-in and its possible financing appeared to be crumbling in any event.

In a second suit, officials of Common Cause, which is demanding disclosure of the Nixon campaign's contributions and expenditures last spring, said they intend to press their case despite an effort by the President's 1972 finance chairman, Maurice Stans, to secure settlement.

Common Cause Chairman John Gardner said after a meeting with Stans yesterday afternoon that Stans insisted on keeping secret the names of big contributors who wish to remain anonymous.

Democratic Chairman Strauss, meanwhile, has been

facing stiff resistance from state Democratic Party chairmen to an out-of-court settlement of that lawsuit. He reiterated yesterday during an appearance at the National Press Club that he would not want to "impair in any way" a full and complete disclosure of the Watergate scandal.

Oliver, who was fired by Strauss last week as executive director of the Democratic State Chairmen's Association, is known to be opposed to a negotiated settlement. He had no immediate comment, but said through a spokesman that he would hold a press conference at 2 p.m. today.

Strauss told newsmen at the Press Club, however, that Oliver's dismissal "had absolutely nothing to do with the Watergate whatsoever." He said he simply "wanted to rebuild a staff of my own that I could work with and have confidence in."

Massachusetts Democratic Chairman Charles Flaherty, one of those present at a meeting last week when Strauss demanded Oliver's dismissal, said he had no quarrel with Strauss' desire for a loyal staff. But he predicted that most state Democratic chairmen, having lost their fight to keep Oliver, would vigorously oppose any effort to drop the lawsuit.

"We have a responsibility to make sure that every last fact and figure involved in the Watergate case be paraded before the American people," Flaherty said. "To cooperate in an attempt to negate that is, to me, beyond belief."

Both Strauss and former Democratic Party Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien, who initiated the lawsuit last June, were believed to be amenable to a settlement of the case, which alleges that O'Brien's civil rights, and those of Democratic officials generally, were violated.

"It really depends on the confidence people have in the facts ultimately seeing the light of day," DNC general counsel Sheldon S. Cohen said yesterday of the fears of some Democrats that the Senate's Watergate investigation will not be thorough enough. Cohen, who has had talks with Republican lawyers about a possible settlement, said he is proceeding for now on the assumption that the civil suit will come to trial.

Speaking for Common Cause, Gardner told reporters that nothing less than com-

plete disclosure of the Nixon campaign's financing and spending could resolve that litigation without a full-dress trial.

Stans said it was Gardner's attitude on that score that made yesterday's meeting with the Common Cause chairman and his attorneys fruitless.

The Finance Committee to Re-Elect the President, which Common Cause is suing, "is not seeking to preserve anything for itself," Stans insisted afterward.

He said his committee was only trying to defend "the constitutional right" of Nixon campaign contributors during the period in question—from last March 10 to April 7, when a new campaign financing disclosure went into effect.

Declaring that there was no federal law requiring disclosure during that period, Stans said the finance committee was prepared to take the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court if necessary. "Those contributors have rights which we're not prepared to give away," Stans said.

Common Cause lawyer Mitchell Rogovin derided that notion and charged that Stans and the finance committee had themselves abandoned it last fall "to sweep this (suit) under the rug" until after the presidential election.

Rogovin was alluding to an agreement reached shortly before the election under which Common Cause agreed to postpone the suit in return for disclosure of Nixon campaign contributors between Jan. 1, 1971, and March 10, 1972, the date of the last report required under the old Corrupt Practices Act. Rogovin said Common Cause still has not been supplied with all the details promised in that agreement.

Asked to comment about President Nixon's announcement of "major developments" coming in the Watergate case, Stans said: "Well, they certainly don't involve me. . . . I'm not involved in the Watergate." He said Mr. Nixon was to be "commended" for his efforts which "certainly are aimed at getting at the truth and getting at the responsible people."

Just as he was preparing to drive off with his attorneys, Stans was then asked whether he had approved the disbursement of \$199,000 to Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy as alleged during Liddy's recent criminal trial by Hugh

stance of the allegation and said the President had "absolute, total confidence" in Dean. Late yesterday afternoon President Nixon went to his mountain retreat, Camp David, accompanied by Halde- man and Ehrlichman. The White House said the President was expected to return to Washington this morning.

NEW YORK TIMES
10 April 1973

C.I.A. SAYS IT ERRED ON FORD FUND ROLE

The Central Intelligence Agency says it was wrong when it suggested that a representative of the Ford Foundation had initiated the suggestion that the New York Police Department go to the intelligence agency for training.

The C.I.A. admitted the mistake in a letter from the agency's legislative counsel, John M. Maury, to Representative Edward I. Koch, Manhattan Democrat. Mr. Maury said the agency's assertion that the Ford Foundation had been responsible had been based on a misunderstood conversation between a C.I.A. representative and an official of the Police Department.

The president of the Ford Foundation, McGeorge Bundy, issued a statement several weeks ago denying that the foundation had played a role in the department's decision to ask the C.I.A. for training assistance.

In an earlier response to a previous inquiry from Mr. Koch, the C.I.A. conceded that in the last two years it provided training to about a dozen police departments, including New York's, but it said that except in unusual situations it was discontinuing such training.

W. Sloan, the Nixon campaign treasurer at the time of the Watergate break-in.

"That's an insulting question," Stans replied, "and the answer is no."

WASHINGTON POST
20 April 1973

Dean Vows He Won't Be 'Scapegoat'

By Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

Presidential counsel John W. Dean III declared yesterday that he will not allow himself to become a scapegoat in the Watergate case.

Immediately following his statement, there were reliable reports that Dean is prepared to tell a federal grand jury all he knows about the Watergate bugging and that he will allege there

was a coverup by White House officials, including H. R. Haldeman, President Nixon's principal assistant.

Dean's assertion came less than 12 hours after The Washington Post quoted sources as saying that former presidential aide Jeb Stuart Magruder had implicated both Dean and former Attorney General John N. Mitchell in the bugging of Democratic Party headquarters and in payoffs to buy the silence of the Watergate defendants. Mitchell yesterday called the report "nonsense."

The New York Times reported in its editions today, however, that former Attorney General Mitchell has told friends he was aware of plans to bug the Democratic opposition, and that he participated in three meetings at which these proposals were discussed. But Mitchell insists that he rejected the scheme on each occasion," the Times said it had been told.

Previously the former attorney general has maintained that he was totally ignorant of any plans to conduct illegal electronic surveillance against the Democrats and only last week said he could not recollect attending a February, 1972, meeting in his office at which Magruder has told federal prosecutors the bugging was discussed.

It was learned that Mitchell has been subpoenaed to appear before the Watergate grand jury today and that federal prosecutors turned down a request by the former attorney general to have his appearance delayed.

Presidential Counsel Dean has also acknowledged to asso-

ciates that he attended a February, 1972, meeting in Mitchell's office at which bugging was discussed, but—apparently like Mitchell—has contended that he rejected plans to place the Democrats under illegal electronic surveillance.

A Dean associate, who made it clear he was seeking to have the Presidential counsel's version of events made public, told The Post yesterday that Dean will implicate people "above and below" himself when he tells the grand jury what he knows about the bugging and a subsequent coverup.

Two associates said that Dean intends to swear under oath that White House chief of staff Haldeman and other high White House officials actively participated in a coverup to hide the involvement of presidential aides in the bugging.

Informed of the comments by Dean's associates, Gerald Warren, deputy White House press secretary, last night issued the following statement: "Mr. Haldeman denies the allegation regarding him as stated in the story as read to the press office."

Warren said the White House press office also contacted Dean last night about the comments of his associates. "Mr. Dean said to the press office that at no time did he ever tell any associate any such thing about Mr. Haldeman," Warren said.

There were also these additional developments yesterday related to the escalating Watergate affair:

• A Washington attorney said that, a day after the Watergate break-in, an unnamed client took eight cartons of materials—including plans to bug the Democrats

headquarters—from the White House office of convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. and hid them.

• The head of the Justice Department's criminal division, Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Peterson, was placed in charge of the federal Watergate investigation as Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst disqualified himself from further involvement. Kleindienst said he withdrew because of "close personal and professional relationships" with new suspects in the case.

• Sen. Sam J. Ervin (D-N.C.), chairman of the Senate's Watergate investigating committee, said the panel's hearings may have to be delayed if key witnesses are indicted in the near future.

Dean's declaration that he will not become a scapegoat in the Watergate case came in a statement issued through his office, apparently without the knowledge or consent of superiors in the White House.

Afterward, presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler delivered what was regarded by some White House reporters as a rebuke to Dean, stating that President Nixon is searching for the truth in the Watergate case, not scapegoats.

At a news conference, Ziegler for the first time made no effort to defend Dean and, to the contrary, appeared to say that the presidential counsel was no longer engaged in important work at the White House, Washington Post Staff Writer Carroll Kilpatrick reported.

Pressed as to whether Dean was carrying on his regular duties, Ziegler said that "he's in his office . . . attending to business, of some sort."

The associates and two other sources insisted that Dean is being made a sacrificial lamb and contended that President Nixon began his personal investigation of the Watergate case only after Dean came to him last month and said there had been a coverup.

In his statement telephoned to newspapers at 11:45 a.m. yesterday, Dean said:

"To date I have refrained from making any public comment whatsoever about the Watergate case. I shall continue that policy in the future because I believe the case will be fully and justly handled by the grand jury and the Ervin select committee. It is my hope, however, that those truly interested in seeing that the Watergate case is completely aired and that justice is done will be careful in drawing any conclusions as to the guilt or involvement of any person until all the facts are known and until each person has had an opportunity to testify under oath in his behalf. Finally, some may hope or think that I will become a scapegoat in the Watergate case. Anyone who believes this does not know

me, know the true facts, nor understand our system of justice."

One close associate of Dean said yesterday that Dean is prepared to tell a federal grand jury that whatever role he might have played in the Watergate case came as a result of orders from superiors in the White House. The associate insisted that, despite allegations to the contrary, Dean had no advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging.

"The truth of the matter is fairly long and broad," this associate said, "and it goes up and down, higher and lower. You just can't make a case that . . . this was John Mitchell and John Dean"—an apparent reference to statements by Jeb Magruder implicating the two.

"John welcomes the opportunity to tell his side of the story to the grand jury," the associate continued, adding: "He's not going to go down in flames for the activities of others."

According to two associates of Dean, the presidential counsel intends to swear under oath that his reported "investigation" of the bugging for President Nixon was designed by superiors to hide the involvement of presidential aides in the Watergate bugging.

Citing Dean's inquiry, the President said on Aug. 29 that "I can say categorically that his investigation indicates that no one in the White House staff, no one in this administration, presently employed, was involved in this very bizarre incident. . . ."

One associate of Dean yesterday said that the presidential counsel himself never personally discussed the investigation with Mr. Nixon before Aug. 29 and that "the so-called report of the investigating was more or less wholecloth, a concept or a theory that was passed on to the President."

The same associate said that in mid-March, Dean went to President Nixon, told him all he knew about the Watergate bugging "and said, in effect, 'there has been a cover-up and it's worse than you think it is, Mr. President.'" At that point, the associate contended, Mr. Nixon decided to undertake his own investigation of the bugging, leading to his announcement this week that there had been "major developments" in the Watergate case and that "real progress has been made in finding the truth."

An independent source with close ties to the White House—but not to Dean—has given The Post a similar account.

According to one of Dean's associates, the current White House strategy for dealing with the Watergate problem is "to cut their losses and shore up by implicating John Mitchell and John Dean" while

other high officials in the White House and former presidential aides remain untainted. "It's wishful thinking on the part if they think they can get away with that," the associate said.

Another associate described Dean's statement that he will not be a scapegoat as "just the first salvo from John."

In its editions yesterday, The Washington Post reported that former presidential assistant Magruder had provided federal prosecutors with a first-hand account of a February, 1972, meeting in then-Attorney General Mitchell's office to discuss and approve the bugging operation at the Watergate. Those who attended the meeting were Mitchell, Dean, Magruder and convicted Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy, according to several sources' accounts of Magruder's statements to the prosecutors.

Yesterday, one associate of Dean said the presidential counsel had confirmed that he attended such a meeting at which the bugging was discussed, but contended that Dean argued against the illegal eavesdropping operation and refused to have anything to do with it.

Afterwards, the associate said, Dean was ordered by superiors in the White House to handle arrangements for paying the seven indicted Watergate conspirators to remain silent.

Magruder, according to White House sources, has said that both Dean and Mitchell made the arrangements to buy the conspirators' silence in addition to approving plans for the bugging.

Mitchell, asked in New York about yesterday's story in The Post, told the Associated Press:

"This gets a little sillier as it goes along, doesn't it? I've had a good night's sleep and haven't heard any of this nonsense."

Magruder, the deputy director of the Nixon re-election campaign, was scheduled to testify yesterday before the federal grand jury investigating the case, but reporters at the U.S. Courthouse did not see him there. Federal prosecutors last night refused to discuss whether Magruder had appeared before the grand jury, or when he is scheduled to testify.

It is known that, in addition to the bugging itself, the grand jury is investigating allegations of obstruction of justice and perjury by present and former presidential aides.

Meanwhile, Washington attorney Peter H. Wolf added new mystery to the Watergate investigation yesterday by saying that a client of his had taken eight cartons of materials from convicted Watergate conspirator Hunt's office the

day after the Watergate break-in last June and had held on to them until just before the election.

Wolf said, that included in the boxes were the "plans to 'bug' the Watergate" as well as contributors' lists that were later "turned over by the Committee (for the Re-election of the President) in the litigation instituted by Common Cause."

In his motion filed in U.S. District Court, Wolf said he was attempting to determine whether he has a lawyer-client relationship or whether he must testify before the grand jury. Wolf did not identify his client, other than to say he "worked for the Committee for Re-election of the President."

The lawyer also did not disclose who had given his client the orders to pick up the materials and hide them.

Wolf said the client had come to him to ask "whether he was in danger of violating any law if he had hidden in his possession approximately eight cardboard cartons containing, among other things, the contents of Hunt's desk in the White House before the FBI got there, including plans to 'bug' the Watergate."

The attorney said he had urged his client to "turn over these documents to people conducting investigations of the Watergate matter."

Wolf said that his client came to him late last summer and "very shortly after this . . . I telephoned principal assistant U.S. Attorney Earl J. Silbert and received from him an opinion that he did not think my client was committing any crime."

Silbert responded yesterday that Wolf's motion was "preposterous." Silbert said Wolf's "implication that evidence of this nature would be ignored (by me) is incredible."

Silbert said the conversation last summer involved the propriety of Wolf's client turning over materials relevant to the Common Cause suit and that no mention was made of where the materials came from.

"It was only a few days ago that Mr. Wolf disclosed to us that his anonymous client had obtained these documents from Mr. Hunt's office," Silbert said.

Wolf said his client "had been asked" by an unnamed party to pick up the cartons from Hunt's office in the Executive Office Building and "that a pass would be waiting for him at the guard entrance, that no questions would be asked when the cartons were removed from the building, and none were."

Hunt's attorney, William O. Bittman, said yesterday that Hunt "to the best of my knowledge, didn't have any

documents in his office except in the safe." He said he was unaware of Wolf's allegations.

In another development, an aide to Sen. Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., (R-Conn.) said yesterday that a locked filing cabinet in his (the aide's) office containing records of investigations into the Watergate case and related matters

Washington Post

11 April 1973

U.S. Spying Cost Put at \$6.2 Billion

Associated Press

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) said yesterday the U.S. intelligence community employs about 148,000 persons and spends about \$6.2 billion each year.

Renewing his call for drastic cuts in the cost of American spying and covert activities overseas, Proxmire urged James Schlesinger, new Central Intelligence Agency Director, to make public the government's entire intelligence budget, which has always been secret.

Proxmire said he is not opposed to a first-rate American intelligence operation but does believe that the intelligence establishment has swollen out of proportion to national defense needs and that congressional controls and restraints on it have eroded.

He said his cost and manpower estimates are not based on classified or official sources and noted that they

apparently was opened during the night.

William Wickens, a counsel to Weicker, said it was impossible to determine immediately whether anything was missing from the cabinet but that it was possible some of the records might have been photographed or copied. A Xerox machine is located about 5 feet from the cabinet, Wickens said.

depict the CIA as smaller in both personnel and budget than at least three other U.S. intelligence groups.

Proxmire's estimates show the CIA with a work force of 15,000 and an annual budget of \$750 million. These are his other estimates:

National Security Agency, 20,000 and \$1 billion; Defense Intelligence Agency, 5,016 and \$100 million; Army Intelligence, 38,500 and \$775 million; Navy Intelligence, 10,000 and \$775 million; Air Force Intelligence, 60,000 and \$2.8 billion, and State Department Intelligence, 335 and \$8 million.

Proxmire said his estimates are "not without error," but nevertheless are "in the ballpark."

"These figures do not reflect, however, the coordination that is involved from one organization to another," Proxmire said. "The Air Force, for example, supplies the launch boosters and satellites for the highly successful reconnaissance program and this is one reason the budget is so high."

Proxmire has said previously that secret missions by intelligence agencies overseas are needlessly involving the United States in the political affairs of other countries at a period when the need for the missions has been greatly reduced by modern techniques of electronic and aerial surveillance.

WASHINGTON POST

20 April 1973

Correction

In a story in yesterday's editions, The Washington Post erroneously said that John N. Mitchell, former chairman of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, is a defendant in the \$6.4 million Democratic lawsuit over the Watergate break-in of Democratic Party headquarters.

The defendants are James W. McCord Jr., and the six other men convicted of conspiracy in the Watergate case; the Committee for the Re-election of the President; the Finance Committee to Re-elect the President and its chairman, Maurice H. Stans; McCord Associates, James McCord's firm; Jeb Stuart Magruder, former deputy director of CRP; Herbert L. Porter and Hugh W. Sloan Jr., CRP aides.

WASHINGTON POST

12 April 1973

Mitchell Got Bug Results, McCord Says

By Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

James W. McCord Jr. has testified before a federal grand jury that his principal superior in the Watergate conspiracy told him that the transcripts of the wiretapped conversations of Democratic Party officials were hand-carried to former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, according to reliable sources.

The sources reported that McCord also testified that his superior in the conspiracy, former White House aide G. Gordon Liddy, told him that Mitchell had ordered a "list of priorities" in establishing electronic eavesdropping operations against the Democrats.

McCord, according to the sources, said the first priority was to bug the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate, then the campaign headquarters of Sen. George McGovern and, finally, rooms in the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami to be occupied by presidential candidates and party officials at the Democratic National Convention.

McCord, the former security coordinator for the Committee for the Re-election of the President, was reached by telephone late yesterday and confirmed the sources' account of his grand jury testimony. He declined to elaborate, saying: "I don't like to talk about it on the phone."

Mitchell, through a spokesman at the re-election committee, denied that he ever received transcripts or logs of wiretapped conversations, and denied once more that he had prior knowledge of any plans for illegal electronic eavesdropping.

In related developments yesterday:

- Three principal figures in an alleged campaign of political espionage and sabotage conducted against the Democrats appeared before the same grand jury as McCord yesterday. They are former presidential appointments secretary Dwight L. Chapin, former White House aide Gordon Strachan, and alleged political saboteur Donald H. Segretti.

- Reliable investigative sources said that Mitchell and former Commerce Secretary Maurice H. Stans, the chief Nixon campaign fund-raiser, appeared earlier this month before a federal grand jury in New York City investigat-

ing a \$200,000 cash contribution to the Nixon committee by Robert L. Vesco. Vesco is the central figure in a Securities and Exchange Commission suit alleging that investors were swindled out of \$224 million. The grand jury in New York reportedly is considering possible obstruction of justice in Vesco's dealings with Nixon campaign officials.

- Philip S. Hughes, head of the Federal Elections Office in the General Accounting Office, said that an investigation of the Nixon campaign's finances will be expanded to include an apparent violation of the law in the disbursement of at least \$70,000 in cash to Frederick C. LaRue, one of Mitchell's closest aides. Reliable investigative sources have said the money came from the same fund that financed the Watergate bugging and was not properly reported under the new campaign finance disclosure law.

According to reliable accounts of McCord's appearance before the grand jury, he testified that Liddy showed him final typed transcripts of wiretapped conversations on several occasions and said: "These are for the (former) attorney general." On at least one occasion, McCord reportedly testified, Liddy specifically told him that he regularly "hand-carried" the transcripts to Mitchell, who was then President Nixon's campaign manager.

On another occasion, McCord reportedly testified, he saw Liddy's secretary, Sally Harmony, typing a final version of the transcripts from McCord's own preliminary draft. One source familiar with the testimony said yesterday: "If those conversations were being retyped, it meant they had to be going somewhere; Liddy certainly didn't need to have them typed again for himself."

Miss Harmony, who testified before the Watergate grand jury in its original inquiry last

year, has been contacted by the Senate select committee investigating the bugging of Democratic headquarters and other political espionage and sabotage, and is expected to be recalled before the grand jury as well.

McCord also reportedly told the grand jury that the Watergate bugging team had planned to install wiretapping and eavesdropping devices at Sen. McGovern's headquarters during the same weekend that he and four other conspirators were arrested at the Watergate. The operation at the Fontainebleau, he reportedly testified, was still in the planning stages and Liddy told him that it would be executed as soon as word came from Mitchell.

McCord is also known to have told others that the bugging team had planned to wiretap the campaign headquarters of Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine) during the spring, but that the plans were abandoned when it was clear that Muskie was no longer the front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination. It could not be learned if McCord, who rented an office next door to Muskie headquarters in Washington mentioned that matter to the grand jury.

Like his earlier testimony before the Senate's select investigating committee, McCord's grand jury statements about the alleged involvement in wiretapping activities of presidential aides and advisers was based on hearsay—primarily in the form of what he says he was told by Liddy.

Liddy has been sentenced to an additional prison term for contempt of court in refusing to answer the grand jury's questions, including those based on what he is said to have told McCord.

The meaning of the appearance by former presidential appointments secretary Chapin, former White House aide Strachan and alleged agent provocateur Segretti before the Watergate grand jury yesterday was not immediately clear.

One federal source said their appearance is the first indication that the grand jury investigation may have moved beyond illegal electronic surveillance to include a broad range of political espionage and sabotage activities. Previously, the Justice Department has maintained that there was nothing illegal about the operations Segretti and Chapin were allegedly involved in.

Some federal sources suggested yesterday that Chapin and Segretti were called before the grand jury to establish that they have no knowledge of illegal electronic surveillance.

Before yesterday's grand jury session began, Presi-

dents took unusual steps to prevent news reporters from observing who was to appear before the panel. The preparations included moving the grand jury to a different room, accessible from two entrances, one of which is reachable through a back elevator.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Earl J. Sihert, who heads the renewed federal investigation into the Watergate bugging and related matters, said the new arrangements were ordered because a circus atmosphere had developed outside the other grand jury room, where reporters have gathered in the last two weeks to watch persons entering and leaving.

Despite the new arrangements, reporters were able to determine that Chapin was in the grand jury room for about 90 minutes, after which he scurried past reporters, smiling but refusing to answer any questions. Outside the courthouse, he entered a brown sports car and sped away.

Segretti, who followed him into the closely guarded grand jury room, was there for about 45 minutes before the grand jury quit for the day at about 5:45 p.m. Prosecutors refused to say whether Segretti would return for more questioning. It could not be determined how long Strachan, a former political aide to White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman, was before the grand jury.

According to investigators, Chapin and Strachan both played a role in hiring Segretti to engage in political disruption and spying activities. Chapin, according to FBI records made public, also made arrangements for Segretti to be paid by President Nixon's personal lawyer, Herbert W. Kalmbach, and Strachan allegedly put Watergate conspirator Liddy in touch with Segretti to merge two nominally separate spying-and-sabotage operations: one run by the White House and the other by the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Another witness to appear before the grand jury yesterday was Robert Reisner, a former aide to Jeb Stuart Magruder, the deputy director of the Nixon re-election campaign. Reisner, who has also been contacted by the Senate's investigating committee, was presumably before the grand jury yesterday to be asked about McCord's hearsay allegations that Magruder was among high presidential associates who had advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging.

During his appearance before both the grand jury and the Senate committee, McCord reportedly testified that Liddy told him that the plans and budget for the Watergate operation were approved during a February meeting in then-

Attorney General Mitchell's office that was also attended by presidential counsel John W. Dean III and Magruder. Mitchell, Dean and Magruder have repeatedly denied any involvement in illegal wire-tapping operations.

Although McCord claims no first-hand knowledge of those persons' alleged involvement in such activities, he reportedly has provided both the grand jury and Senate investigators with several important leads dealing with that aspect of his testimony. Reisner was expected to be asked by prosecutors yesterday about some of the leads provided by McCord.

Both Senate and Justice Department investigators have confirmed that Mitchell, Dean, Liddy and Magruder were all present during a February meeting in Mitchell's office but have thus far have been unable to substantiate that the bugging was discussed.

WASHINGTON POST
11 April 1973

Mitchell Aide Got \$70,000 Of Bug Fund

By Bob Woodward
and Carl Bernstein
Washington Post Staff Writers

About \$70,000 in cash from President Nixon's campaign was transferred in apparent violation of the law last July to a principal assistant of former Attorney General John N. Mitchell, according to reliable investigative sources.

The \$70,000—mostly in \$100 bills—came from the same account that financed the Watergate bugging and went to former White House aide Frederick C. LaRue, one of Mitchell's closest political aides, the sources said.

The purpose of the transfer is not yet known, the sources said, but federal investigators are expected to try to determine if the \$70,000 was in any way used to pay the Watergate conspirators for their silence.

LaRue received the \$70,000 two weeks after the arrest of five men June 17 in the Democrats' Watergate headquarters and several days after Mitchell resigned as the President's campaign manager, the sources said.

The transfer was approved by former Commerce Secretary Maurice H. Stans, the finance chairman of the Nixon campaign, according to sworn testimony given this month to federal investigators in New York City.

A spokesman for the Committee for the Re-election of the President, reached yesterday

DeVan L. Shumway, spokesman for the Nixon re-election committee, said yesterday that Mitchell does not recall such a February meeting, and that Mitchell first met Liddy on June 15, 1972, at least three months after the alleged meeting.

In seeking corroboration of McCord's testimony, Senate sources said yesterday that staff members of the select committee have talked to Vicki Chern, Reisner's secretary at the Nixon committee, and that she provided an appointment book or calendar confirming a scheduled meeting of Mitchell, Dean, Liddy and Magruder in February.

Miss Chern is also understood to have provided the committee staff with other information. However, reliable Senate sources discounted published reports that the committee has found a witness who can confirm that the bugging was discussed at the meeting.

day afternoon, had no immediate comment on the report of \$70,000 fund. Mitchell, Stans and LaRue could not be reached for comment.

The testimony concerning the \$70,000 transfer is the first indication that the President's re-election committee continued to maintain a secret account of some sort after the arrests in the Watergate.

The General Accounting Office was not told of the transfer, as required by the new Federal Election Campaign Act, which directs full public accounting of all campaign money after April 7, 1972.

Philip S. Hughes, head of the Federal Elections Office in the GAO, responded yesterday to an inquiry about the \$70,000 by saying:

"It seems that the law is loud and clear that all money in their hands after April 7 had to be fully accounted for. If this money went out in July—and I've never heard of it before—I don't think any reasonable person could argue that it was not a violation—even Stans hasn't argued that."

The \$70,000 came from a large cash fund that was kept in Stans' office safe and was used to finance a broad campaign of political espionage and sabotage.

That intelligence-gathering fund, which fluctuated in size between \$350,000 and \$700,000, was the source of at least \$235,000 for convicted Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy, the former finance counsel to the Nixon committee.

In January, the Nixon committee pleaded no contest to eight separate violations of the new campaign finance disclosure law stemming from

the payments to Liddy and was fined \$3,000.

According to two sources at the Nixon committee, the \$70,000 was given to LaRue for noncampaign purposes that are apparently known only to Mitchell, LaRue and other top campaign officials.

LaRue was one of two persons directed by former Attorney General Mitchell to keep the public and federal investigators from learning many details about the Nixon committee's involvement in the Watergate bugging, according to highly placed sources in the Nixon campaign.

Meanwhile, federal investigators in Washington are known to be checking into testimony of convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. that he received \$3,000 a month from the late wife of coconspirator and former White House consultant E. Howard Hunt Jr.

According to reliable sources, McCord received the money in cash—mostly \$100 bills—in exchange for his silence about the Watergate operation.

McCord, the former security coordinator of the Nixon committee, reportedly testified before a federal grand jury here that Dorothy Hunt told him last year that the \$3,000 a month and \$1,000 monthly payments to other conspirators came from the Nixon re-election committee under an arrangement worked out by Kenneth W. Parkinson, the committee's attorney.

Parkinson has denied the charge and said it is "totally and completely false."

According to sworn testimony given to federal investigators in New York City, LaRue received the money from Hugh W. Sloan Jr., the former Nixon committee treasurer who resigned about the time of the July transfer.

The testimony by campaign committee officials was made to a federal grand jury in New York City investigating a \$200,000 cash contribution to the Nixon committee by financier Robert L. Vesco.

Vesco is charged in a civil suit filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission with misappropriating \$224 million in mutual funds managed by IOS, Ltd., a financial complex based in Switzerland.

According to other federal sources, the \$200,000 Vesco contribution went into the cash fund kept in Stans' safe.

That fund has been a central focus of the Watergate investigation and has the following history:

• In August, the GAO cited the Nixon committee for 11 apparent violations of the law for failing to report receipts and expenditures from the fund, which the GAO at the time said contained at least \$350,000. In May, after the new

disclosure law took effect, the \$350,000 was deposited in the bank, apparently liquidating the fund.

• Federal investigators later determined that at least \$12,000 from the fund (part of the \$235,000) was given to the Watergate conspirator Liddy after May 25, but before the Watergate arrests, establishing that the fund had not been liquidated on May 25.

• Cash from \$114,000 in checks, including \$89,000 in Mexican checks taken across the border to conceal the names of the original contributors, went into the cash fund.

The checks were cashed by Watergate conspirator Bernard L. Barker in his Miami bank account last April.

• At least \$30,000, which came either directly or indirectly from the cash fund, was given to California attorney Donald H. Segretti, an alleged political saboteur working against the Democratic presidential candidates. The money was paid to Segretti by Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal attorney, at the direction of former presidential appointments secretary Dwight L. Chapin.

• Disbursements from the fund were, according to federal sources, controlled by Mitchell, Stans, Kalmbach, Jeb Stuart Magruder (the No. 2 official at the Nixon campaign) and White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman. The White House has denied that Haldeman controlled disbursements from the fund.

Hughes, head of the federal elections office, said yesterday that officials from the Nixon committee have declined to say how much money was in the fund. Reliable sources have said that the fund contained close to \$1 million.

LaRue, once the part owner of a gambling casino in Las Vegas, has been one of the most enigmatic figures of the Nixon administration's inner circle since the President took office. During the 1972 campaign, he was one of the most important presidential aides placed by the White House in the leadership of the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

A wealthy Jackson, Miss., oil man, LaRue was one of the architects of the "Southern Strategy" of the 1968 Nixon campaign, in which he worked as an assistant to campaign manager Mitchell.

During the first three years of the Nixon administration, he officially served as a counsel to the President, although his name was never listed in the White House staff directories, and some lower-level White House aides still say: "I never heard of him when he was over here."

Those few persons familiar with his work as a presidential counsel say many of LaRue's

assignments involved political liaison with the Southern states and with Sen. James O. Eastland (D-Miss.), the Senate Judiciary Committee chairman who has become a powerful administration ally on Capitol Hill.

According to Nixon administration sources, LaRue was assigned by Mitchell and the White House to help establish the Committee for the Re-election of the President and, with deputy campaign manager Jeb Stuart Magruder, later ran many of the day-to-day operations of the Nixon campaign.

Both La Rue and Magruder played roles in the Nixon campaign's program of espionage and sabotage activities against the Democrats, according to campaign and investigative sources. At the committee, the two shared an office suite and, among campaign insiders, became collectively known as "MagRue."

Magruder has denied allegations in hearsay testimony by Watergate conspirator McCord that he was one of several former presidential associates who had advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging. McCord, the former security coordinator of the Nixon re-election committee, is known to have told investigators that he has no knowledge that LaRue was involved in the bugging.

According to Alfred C. Baldwin III, the ex-FBI agent and

WASHINGTON POST

10 April 1973

McCord: 'Hush' Money Came From Hunt's Wife

By Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. has testified before a federal grand jury that he received \$3,000 a month from the late wife of his coconspirator, E. Howard Hunt Jr., to remain silent about his role in the bugging of Democratic headquarters, according to reliable sources.

McCord, the former security coordinator of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, reportedly testified that Dorothy L. Hunt told him the \$3,000 a month came from the re-election committee under an arrangement worked out by Kenneth W. Parkinson, the committee's attorney.

Parkinson called the charge "totally and completely false." Hunt's attorney, William O. Bittman, declined to comment, saying he had no information to either confirm or deny the substance of McCord's allegations.

McCord reportedly testified that Mrs. Hunt, who was

Mitchell security guard who monitored the wiretapped conversations of Democrats at the Watergate, his hiring by the Nixon committee was personally approved by LaRue. Baldwin, in an interview with The Los Angeles Times, said he was supplied with a gun by LaRue, who told him not to worry about not having a license.

At the time of the Watergate arrests on June 17, Mitchell, Magruder, LaRue and Robert C. Mardian, former Assistant Attorney General, were all together on the West Coast, according to investigative and Nixon committee sources. Mitchell reportedly ordered Magruder to fly directly back to Washington on Sunday, June 18, to investigate the situation.

Then Mitchell returned to Washington with LaRue and Mardian on Monday or Tuesday, and designated them as coordinators of the Nixon committee's response to the bugging, including responsibility for dealing with federal investigators.

Part of that response, according to investigators, was a massive "housecleaning" ordered by LaRue and Mardian, in which numerous records were destroyed. Mardian also sat in on almost all FBI interviews with Nixon committee employees and, with LaRue, reportedly advised some persons to "stay away from certain areas" in their discussions with investigators.

killed in an airplane crash in Chicago last December, told him she usually received Nixon committee money from an intermediary for Parkinson, and that she then distributed the cash to the Watergate defendants.

At the time of her death, Mrs. Hunt was carrying \$10,000 in \$100 bills, which McCord reportedly testified was part of a payoff to her husband for remaining silent about the Watergate conspiracy. McCord said Mrs. Hunt was taking the money to Chicago to invest it in a motel, according to reliable sources. Hunt also has said the money was for investment purposes.

According to sources familiar with McCord's grand jury testimony, he said he was told by Mrs. Hunt that she was also paying four other defendants in the case—the Miami men arrested inside the Watergate with McCord on June 17 — \$1,000 per month each to remain silent about

the conspiracy.

On one or more occasions, McCord reportedly testified, Mrs. Hunt told him she flew to Miami to pay those defendants while they were awaiting trial. In January, Frank A. Sturgis, one of the Miami men, was quoted in The New York Times as saying the four were still being paid but would not say who was supplying the cash.

McCord, according to the sources, testified that Mrs. Hunt had become increasingly disturbed about her role in allegedly paying off the defendants to keep silent, and discussed the matter with him on several occasions.

McCord reportedly told the grand jury that Mrs. Hunt appeared certain that the money was coming from the re-election committee, either directly or indirectly through Parkinson. On several occasions, McCord is said to have told the grand jury, Mrs. Hunt told him that the arrangements for the payoffs had been made through Parkinson.

During the Watergate trial, Hunt and the four Miami men pleaded guilty to all the charges against them. McCord and his principal superior in the conspiracy, former White House aide G. Gordon Liddy, were convicted without taking the witness stand. Liddy has continued to remain silent since his conviction and has received an additional prison sentence for contempt of court after refusing to answer a grand jury's questions.

At the time the four Miami men pleaded guilty, sources close to those defendants reported that each had been receiving \$1,000 a month since their arrest and that Hunt had promised them they would continue to receive the money if they followed his lead and pleaded guilty. Hunt, a former White House consultant, told the men they would eventually be granted executive clemency if they remained silent, according to the sources. The sources said they were aware of how the \$1,000 a month was being distributed but refused to disclose the details.

Parkinson, the principal attorney for the Committee for the Re-election of the President, is a partner in the Washington law firm of Jackson, Laskey & Parkinson.

Last October, Alfred C. Baldwin III, the ex-FBI agent and Nixon committee security guard who monitored the wiretapped conversations of Democrats in their headquarters at the Watergate, told The Los Angeles Times that Parkinson had urged him to take the Fifth Amendment before the grand jury investigating the case. Justice Department sources said at the time that they could not substantiate the allegation by Baldwin, who cooperated with the prosecution and became a key

government witness in the case.

Parkinson, 45, graduated in 1952 from the George Washington University Law School. He has been active in Legal Aid and Neighborhood Legal Services programs here.

Meanwhile, Lawrence Young, the California attorney who first disclosed the contact between alleged political saboteur Donald H. Segretti and the White House, charged yesterday that there is an attempt to "muzzle" him.

Young said he had received a letter from Segretti's attorney warning that any communications between Young and Segretti are covered by a lawyer-client privilege of confidentiality "and are not to be discussed by you under any circumstances."

Young denied a lawyer-client relationship with Segretti and said he views the attempt to keep him quiet as an indication that Segretti will refuse to cooperate with the Senate select committee investigating the Watergate bugging and related allegations of political espionage and sabotage.

Young said the letter from Segretti's lawyer was dated April 4, two weeks after an investigator from the select committee had asked Young for additional information about Segretti.

The letter, which Young said was signed by John P. Pollock, a Los Angeles attorney for Segretti, told Young that he was not to discuss anything regarding Segretti's "actions, persons with whom he was associated, places where he traveled and all other aspects of his work."

Last fall Young told The Washington Post in a series of interviews that Segretti had told him that Dwight L. Chapin, President Nixon's appointments secretary, and Watergate bugging conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. were his contacts in spying and sabotage operation.

Young, Segretti and Chapin were all friends in the early 1960s when they attended the University of Southern California together.

The letter directs Young not to repeat any of his earlier statements or make any additional disclosures.

"I deny any lawyer-client relationship," Young said yesterday in a telephone interview from Los Angeles. "I received no legal fees and asked Segretti three times if he wanted to retain me and he said 'no' each time."

Young said the letter, coming more than five months after his first public disclosures about Segretti's activities, is the first indication that Segretti might claim that their conversations were protected by the lawyer-client privilege.

A summary of FBI reports made public during acting FBI director L. Patrick Gray's con-

firmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee supports at least some of Young's most serious statements about Segretti.

The FBI summary said that Herbert W. Kalmbach, the President's personal attorney, paid at least \$30,000 to Segretti for undercover political activity and the payments were made at the direction of Chapin, who has since left the White House.

In a related development yesterday, Mary Lou Burg,

deputy chairman of the Democratic National Committee, said yesterday that the FBI swept the Democrats' Watergate headquarters last Friday, fruitlessly checking every telephone in the 29-office suite for a wiretapping device. One federal source said yesterday that one of the Watergate conspirators had told federal investigators to look for a bug in a telephone in the office of the party's official press spokesman, John Stewart and Joseph Mohr.

director for criminal enforcement at the Department of the Treasury.

The Washington Post has repeatedly attempted to interview Caulfield over the past six months, but he has declined to be interviewed or specify his duties at the White House or for the re-election committee.

McCord's deposition to lawyers for the committee is being taken as part of one of the civil suits arising from the June 17 break-in at the Watergate.

At one point in the deposition McCord refused to say if he had any tape recordings in his possession that might be relevant to the bugging conspiracy, after being advised by attorney Henry B. Rothblatt not to answer the question until being granted immunity from further prosecution.

McCord was granted such immunity on Thursday, and is expected to answer the question when the deposition continues next week.

Another attorney for McCord, Bernard Fensterwald, said the only tapes that he knows are in McCord's possession are recordings of lectures for classes he gave in security work at Montgomery Junior College.

At another point in the deposition, McCord said he

took notes about activities "in the security area" while at the Nixon re-election committee and has since turned some of them over to a grand jury investigating the Watergate bugging.

McCord also said that for a two-week period in April he went daily to the apartment of former Attorney General Mitchell to pick up the Mitchell's daughter and drive her to school because Mrs. Mitchell feared she might be harmed.

He said he would often meet Mitchell or Mrs. Mitchell or their maid, there, although Mitchell has said under oath he only met McCord once — at the re-election committee — except to pass him in the hall at the committee.

Mrs. Mitchell, McCord testified, was so concerned about the family's security, including the possibility of being wiretapped or bugged, that he once X-rayed all the furniture in the Mitchell's apartment, after she received a death threat over her unlisted telephone. McCord said he also had a telephone company security officer check out the Mitchell's telephones.

McCord himself said he has been the target of a telephoned bomb threat since agreeing to disclose all he knows about the Watergate conspiracy and possibly other related illegal activities.

Saturday, April 7, 1973 THE WASHINGTON POST McCord Says Dean Cleared His Getting Job

Convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. has testified under oath that his hiring as security coordinator for the Committee for the Re-election of the President was apparently cleared through White House counsel John W. Dean III.

The White House said last night that Dean has "no recollection of . . . being involved in the hiring of McCord."

Dean, who recommended that Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy be hired by the re-election committee, is one of the high presidential aides who McCord has said he was told had advance knowledge of the bugging of Democratic headquarters.

In a sworn deposition to attorneys for the President's re-election committee, McCord said that he was first contacted in the fall of 1971 about doing security work in the Nixon campaign, and that the contact was made by Alfred Wong, the special agent in charge of the White House Secret Service detail.

Wong, according to McCord's testimony, told him that if he was interested in a job in the campaign someone would call him later. That call came in September, 1971, from John Caulfield, who identified himself as a member of the White House staff, McCord continued.

At a meeting with Caulfield, McCord said, they discussed the general concept of campaign security and Caulfield brought up Dean's name. "He said he was sending some sort of memo to John Dean about me and my qualifications," McCord testified, and asked if McCord testified, and asked if background data that could be forwarded to Dean.

A spokesman for the Nixon re-election committee, Devan L. Shumway, said last night that Caulfield had denied to him that Dean was involved in the hiring of McCord. The White House said, "Mr. Dean says he knows of no such memo" as the one described in McCord's testimony.

In another deposition, taken last Aug. 31, Secret Service Agent Wong said he recommended McCord to Caulfield, but made no mention of ever contacting McCord personally about going to work at the President's re-election committee.

Caulfield, then an assistant to the President, "said that the committee was looking for a general officer who had knowledge of all phases of security, and did I know of one." Wong testified, and added: " . . . I told (Caulfield) that I could not think of a good general security officer at that moment, but then, again, I said I just heard that a man by the name of James McCord had retired from the CIA . . . and that he enjoyed a very good reputation in the community as a good security officer."

In his deposition, Wong declined to answer what Caulfield's duties at the White House were, citing "security reasons." Caulfield, according to Shumway, headed the security operation for the 1968 Nixon campaign and, before joining the White House staff, worked "as a security man" for former Attorney General John N. Mitchell.

Caulfield reportedly left the White House staff in the spring of 1972 to work for several weeks, as an assistant to Mitchell, then the President's campaign manager, at the Nixon re-election committee. He is now acting assistant di-

NEW YORK TIMES
8 April 1973

Colson Reported Passing A Lie Test on Watergate

By CHRISTOPHER LYDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 7— Charles W. Colson, former special counsel to President Nixon, has voluntarily taken a private lie-detector test in New York to buttress his sworn testimony that he had nothing to do with the Watergate raid last summer.

Close friends of Mr. Colson in New York disclosed that Richard O. Arther, president of Scientific Lie Detection, Inc., who is an authority in his field, conducted the test and concluded on Wednesday that Mr. Colson had "truthfully" denied all foreknowledge of the plot.

Mr. Arther and Mr. Colson's personal lawyer, who helped to prepare the examination refused to elaborate on the questions asked and the results. Mr. Colson was unavailable.

Other associates of Mr. Colson who have examined Mr. Arther's report said that Mr. Colson had passed the test on five questions about the Watergate affair.

The examination did not deal with the campaign of espionage and disruption that was reportedly directed from the White House against several Democratic Presidential candidates last year.

Mr. Colson's resort to the lie detector, believed to be the first of its kind in the Watergate case, appeared to signal a new eagerness among members of the President's inner circle to document their innocence.

The 41-year-old Mr. Colson has consistently denied all involvement in the break-in at the Democratic party headquarters at the Watergate complex last June 17.

It is acknowledged that Mr. Colson hired and supervised E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former officer of the Central Intelligence Agency, in his work as a White House consultant. Yet the Watergate conspiracy, to which Hunt pleaded guilty last

January, was a complete surprise, Mr. Colson has insisted.

Ten days ago it was reported that James W. McCord Jr., another convicted conspirator, had told Senate investigators that he had gathered the impression from Hunt and others that Mr. Colson had been in on the planning of their raid.

Mr. Colson branded the hearsay charge a "goddamn lie." Referring to a grand jury appearance last summer, a sworn deposition in a civil suit and an interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Colson repeated, "I've testified under oath three times that I had no knowledge of it."

But with his name in the headlines again, and with the search for masterminds continuing, he decided last week on a lie detector test as a way to clear his name.

He was also concerned, friends say, about the effect of rumors on his law practice.

Partners in his New Law firm, Colson & Shapiro, which has hired 10 new lawyers in anticipation of the business that Mr. Colson could attract, also urged him to undergo the test.

New York associates of Mr. Colson who have read the test results say that he was asked to state whether he had any knowledge of the bugging of the Democratic National Committee offices before June 17, 1972, when five invaders were captured, with their electronic recording equipment, in the Watergate office building. He was also asked to say whether he had been telling the truth earlier when he denied all involvement.

On these and three other closely related questions, Mr. Arthur, the examiner, is reliably understood to have concluded that Mr. Colson was "truthful in all respects."

Gene Sandacz, a vice president of Mr. Arthur's company, said today that David I. Shapiro, Mr. Colson's law partner and

his legal adviser in this case, had helped to frame the questions in a manner that also briefed Mr. Colson in advance on the wording of the questions.

Independent experts in the use of the polygraph, or lie detector, said today that the preparation of subjects on the content of their examination was standard procedure that helped to heighten the sensitivity of the test.

Mr. Colson, a tough-talking ex-marine, has in the past seemed to take pride in his reputation as President Nixon's "hatchet man." He once said that he would do "anything Richard Nixon asked me to do—period."

Takes Credit For 'Leak'

He took credit for leaking the report, hinting at conflict of interest, that helped to defeat Senator Joseph D. Tydings, a Maryland Democrat, in 1970. And he was proud last year to have nursed the White House alliance with the International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, the nation's largest union.

The teamsters union endorsed the Republican President last year and recently hired Mr. Colson's law firm as its Washington counsel.

In a famous memo to his staff in the White House, Mr. Colson wrote last August, "I would walk over my grandmother if necessary" to re-elect the President. However, he has vehemently and repeatedly denied that the Watergate break-in was his project.

Mr. Arthur, who administered the examination of Mr. Colson, is a busy New York practitioner and one of the country's ranking experts on lie detector tests and their use as legal evidence. Trained 20 years ago by John E. Reid in Chicago, Mr. Arthur now runs his own school in New York, the National Training Center of Lie Detection, Inc., and edits The Journal of Polygraph Studies. His offices in Manhattan are at 57 West 57th Street.

Sunday, April 8, 1973

THE WASHINGTON POST

Key to Watergate Puzzle: Nixon Aide H.R. Haldeman

By Carl Bernstein
and Bob Woodward

Washington Post Staff Writers

White House chief of staff H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, the man who controls the flow of both paper and people to the President, is losing his cherished anonymity as his name becomes entangled in the Watergate affair.

The Senate has established a special select committee to investigate the Watergate bugging and other related acts of political espionage and sabotage and a federal grand jury has renewed its inquiry.

Sources familiar with both investigations say that final understanding of the widespread undercover activities of the 1972 Nixon campaign is largely dependent on determining Haldeman's role in those events.

These are the known elements about the President's No. 1 aide and the Watergate, as pieced together from sources in the FBI, Justice Department, White House, Senate, the Committee for the Re-election of the President and the Republican Party:

- To date, investigators have developed no hard evidence involving Haldeman in the electronic eavesdropping at the Watergate or other illegal activities.

- Haldeman told an off-the-record meeting with some Republican congress-

men last month that he personally ordered the "surveillance" of Democratic presidential candidates, including the taping of their speeches and public statements and gave the impression that the operation somehow "got out of hand." (One congressman at the meeting said he took this to mean that Haldeman acknowledged setting up the operation from which the Watergate bugging stemmed.)

- Haldeman effectively ran the President's re-election committee, a creation of the White House, and put his own trusted aides in most of the key positions of responsibility there.

- Most of the men alleged to have played central roles in a broad campaign of political espionage and sabotage — among them former presidential appointments secretary Dwight L. Chapin, deputy Nixon campaign director Jeb Stuart Magruder, and former presidential assistant Gordon Strachan — had previously worked directly under Haldeman and owed their positions and loyalty to him and the President.

- Haldeman was one of five persons authorized to approve disbursements of campaign funds from the account that financed the Watergate bugging and other political espionage: the key recipients of large bulk payments from that

fund were his own lieutenants. The White House has denied that Haldeman controlled disbursements from the fund.

- During a campaign strategy meeting in late 1971, Haldeman told then Attorney General John N. Mitchell that certain security operations then under White House and Justice Department jurisdiction should be transferred to the Committee for the Re-election of the President. One result of that decision was the transfer of Watergate conspirators G. Gordon Liddy and E. Howard Hunt Jr. from the White House staff where they investigated news leaks, to the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

- Three of the four men named by convicted Watergate conspirator James W. McCord Jr. as allegedly having advance knowledge of the bugging are present or former Haldeman deputies. Based on hearsay information he said he received from coconspirators Liddy and Hunt, McCord, former security coordinator of the Nixon campaign committee, testified to the Senate select committee that Magruder, presidential counsel John W. Dean III, and former White House special counsel Charles W. Colson had advance knowledge of the illegal electronic surveillance. All three have denied any involvement or

knowledge of the bugging.

- Since the arrest of five men inside Democratic headquarters on June 17, Haldeman—with President Nixon, former Attorney General Mitchell and White House Counsel Dean—have been almost the sole architects of the White House response and carefully worded denials of the allegations loosely gathered under the term "Watergate."

According to sources in the Nixon administration and federal law enforcement agencies, the Watergate bugging stemmed from a broad campaign of political espionage and sabotage conceived in the White House in 1971, before President Nixon emerged as the clear favorite to be re-elected.

Several sources, including past and present members of the White House staff, have said that the clandestine activities represented a basic strategy to attempt to determine the person the Democrats would nominate as their presidential candidate.

The disruptions and surveillance were designed first to derail the presidential candidacy of Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine), regarded by the White House as the most serious potential threat to unseat the President, according to the sources.

The White House, particularly in the person of Haldeman, looked on Sen. George

McGovern (D-S.D.), the eventual Democratic nominee, as the easiest opponent to beat and attempted to gear the undercover campaign toward that end, the sources said.

Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) was reportedly the second choice of the White House, should the strategy fail in its principal objective of getting McGovern nominated.

Last fall, one highly placed source in the Justice Department described the overall, well-financed program of espionage and sabotage as "a Haldeman operation." Since then, others have used virtually the same description, including a former White House official and member of the Nixon campaign high command who said:

"Most of it (the espionage) came out of the White House, out of you-know-where at the White House — Haldeman's office." He added: "I still don't think Bob knew about the bugging . . . That's when the real zealots took over."

Because Haldeman traditionally insulates himself from most direct involvement in controversial enterprises ("He never really 'runs' anything to the extent of becoming involved in line activity," says one colleague; "he always spins it out to somebody else"), investigators have not been optimistic about determining his exact role in the Watergate affair.

At the very least, hard information known thus far to investigators puts Haldeman on the fringes of the Nixon campaign's undercover activities; including a surveillance network, financed by at least \$235,000 in campaign funds. The Nixon re-election committee maintains the surveillance effort was intended to collect information about radical demonstrators, not regular Democrats.

The prosecution at the Watergate trial accepted the committee's explanation—articulated on the witness stand by Magruder—that a "legal" and "ethical" surveillance operation aimed at radicals was expanded by overzealous Watergate conspirators to include Democratic presidential candidates and the use of illegal electronic surveillance. High-level FBI and Justice Department sources have long been skeptical of the committee's version of what happened.

Yet, if as some White House sources and investigators contend, Haldeman was at the very center of the broad espionage and sabotage campaign, it does not necessarily follow that he

had knowledge of the Watergate bugging and other attempts at illegal electronic surveillance.

Many investigators have considered it likely that either the principal Watergate conspirators or presidential aides in the White House or re-election committee thought they could please Haldeman or President Nixon by expanding the broad mandate to conduct intelligence-gathering operations and never revealing that information was being obtained through electronic eavesdropping.

And, at the highest levels of the federal investigation into the bugging of Democratic headquarters, some believe that the Watergate conspirators were vaguely authorized to use "whatever means necessary" to gather intelligence, with the tacit understanding that the methods of gaining information would never be explicitly disclosed to their superiors.

Sources inside the White House, as well as federal investigators, maintain that only Haldeman, and perhaps a half-dozen other men close to him and the President, can definitively answer such questions at this point.

And not only have the President, Haldeman and others high in the White House chain of command refused to answer press inquiries, but Mr. Nixon has said that his present and former aides will not appear before any "formal session" of the Senate's select committee investigating the Watergate allegations.

Even inside the Executive Mansion, where the most sensitive topics are often quietly discussed at the White House mess, knowledge about the Watergate since the June 17 break-in at Democratic headquarters has been strictly on a need-to-know basis, with many high-level presidential assistants left completely in the dark, according to two White House officials.

"The Watergate has put a pall over our business," explained one of the President's principal aides. Another added: "We get most of our information from the newspapers. We're just as surprised as everybody else when we pick up the paper and find out what's been happening."

Haldeman, who perhaps more than any single person, could throw some light on the matter, told a group of Republican congressmen that in 1971 he personally ordered the organization of a political "surveillance" group on behalf of the Nixon campaign. Haldeman said the operation was to use entirely legal means to obtain information, but "got out of hand," according to

congressional sources.

Haldeman "gave the impression" that his order to conduct "surveillance"—reportedly his term for the activity—included instructions to monitor the movements of candidates, according to one person who attended the unusual 5 p.m. meeting on March 28 between Haldeman and the Wednesday Group of 25 Republican congressmen.

At the meeting, Haldeman said he wanted tapes of everything the Democratic presidential candidates said about the issues and each other, a participant said, and quoted Haldeman as stating: "I wanted those tapes."

Several congressmen who attended the meeting said that Haldeman also told them that the White House has seriously mismanaged its response to the Watergate affair and is now uncertain how to proceed. One source said that Haldeman, without elaborating, indicated that the President hopes to take the "offensive" on the issue in the near future.

Haldeman reportedly appeared before another group of congressional Republicans recently. Capitol Hill sources said that to their knowledge Haldeman has never previously held such meetings, and they interpreted it as a sign that the White House is deeply shaken both about Watergate's effects on the public and on the President's relations with Congress.

The Wednesday Group arranged an appearance by Haldeman only after putting out an urgent request through House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (R-Mich.), according to the sources. They said the Watergate was the last topic discussed and took up only about 10 minutes of the 1½-hour meeting.

"Haldeman seemed perplexed about the entire subject," according to one participant who observed that the White House chief of staff didn't seem to fit the "tough, all-business reputation he has."

One of the congressmen present quoted Haldeman as telling the Wednesday Group the following: "One morning I picked up The (Washington) Post and they said I controlled money from some secret fund. Across the breakfast table, my wife said, 'Bob is this true?' I said we had some funds and it probably was, but I'd have to go down and check. Well, I checked and discovered that The Post had messed it up and I was happy to come back and tell my wife and children that it wasn't true."

The reference apparently was to an Oct. 25 report in

The Washington Post that identified Haldeman as one of five presidential aides who controlled disbursements from a cash fund of hundreds of thousands of dollars used to finance political espionage and sabotage activities, and kept in the safe of former Commerce Secretary Maurice H. Stans, the Nixon campaign finance chairman.

In its report, The Post had made an incorrect attribution to grand jury testimony by one of his former White House assistants, Nixon committee treasurer Hugh W. Sloan Jr. This apparently was the allusion made by Haldeman to the report being "messed . . . up" by The Post.

Highly placed sources in both the Justice Department and the Committee for the Re-election of the President have subsequently reconfirmed the substance of the account, and in the words of one person with first-hand knowledge of the operation of the fund, identified Haldeman as "the guiding hand" behind the expenditures from the fund.

From that fund, Magruder, who was Haldeman's hand-picked choice to serve as interim manager of the Nixon re-election campaign until it was taken over by John Mitchell, authorized the payment of more than \$200,000 to convicted Watergate conspirator Liddy.

In addition, Liddy received an additional \$35,000 from the fund from another former member of Haldeman's White House staff, Herbert L. Porter, later the scheduling director for the Nixon campaign.

In addition to Haldeman and Magruder, according to the sources, those authorized to approve disbursements from the fund—which cumulatively totaled almost \$1 million during its existence—were Mitchell, Stans and Herbert W. Kalmbach, President Nixon's personal attorney and finance chairman of the campaign before Stans left the Commerce Department in early 1972.

It was Kalmbach, a Newport Beach, Calif., attorney, brought into the Nixon inner circle by Haldeman more than a decade ago, who acknowledged to the FBI that he paid more than \$30,000 from the fund to Donald H. Segretti, an agent provocateur allegedly hired by the White House to conduct spying and sabotage operations against the primary campaigns of Democratic presidential candidates.

In his statement to the FBI, Kalmbach said he was told to make the arrangements for paying Segretti by Chapin, then President Nixon's appointments secretary and Haldeman's closest

White House deputy. Chapin, a protégé of Haldeman at the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency who reported to the President and Haldeman at the White House, resigned his post this winter, some four months after published reports first alleged that he hired Segretti.

"Haldeman trusts Dwight further than anyone else," a White House colleague commented shortly after the Segretti-Chapin connection was first reported. "Dwight could never have gotten into this without Bob's approval."

Haldeman's principal White House political aide during the 1972 campaign, Gordon Strachan, has also left the presidential staff in the wake of news reports linking him to the hiring of Segretti, a University of Southern California classmate of Chapin.

According to federal investigative sources, Strachan put Watergate conspirator Liddy in touch with Segretti to merge two political spying and sabotage operations that until then were nominally separate—one run by Hunt and Liddy at the Nixon re-election committee, and the other involving Segretti and the White House.

Strachan served as Haldeman's political liaison with Jeb Stuart Magruder and the re-election committee. "Accusing Strachan," said one White House aide last fall, "would be like accusing a secretary who took a letter

as being part of a conspiracy. He is Haldeman's runner"—a view shared by other sources at the White House and the re-election committee.

The same day that Haldeman appeared on Capitol Hill, Colson, the former presidential special counsel, was named in McCord's hearsay testimony as one of those allegedly having advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging. Colson was a principal architect of the 1972 Nixon campaign strategy who reported directly to the President and Haldeman before leaving the White House staff last month.

On March 30, 1972, Colson's political aide at the White House, W. Richard Howard, wrote a memo to Haldeman's "office manager," White House staff secretary Bruce Kehrli. The memo, according to FBI sources, described Hunt—who was hired as a White House consultant on Colson's recommendation—as "very effective for us" and formally recommended that he be shifted to the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

Kehrli, according to court papers, was instructed on June 19 by White House counsel Dean—a primary figure in the Nixon-Haldeman chain of command—to secure materials in Hunt's office safe after Hunt had been implicated in the Watergate break-in two days earlier.

Kehrli and another White

House assistant took the contents of the safe to Dean's office. Dean kept the material (which included electronic equipment and instruction booklets) for at least six days before turning it over to the FBI.

According to court papers filed by Hunt, two notebooks—said by his attorneys to contain names and addresses that could have been used as investigative tools in the Watergate probe—were not among the items received by the FBI.

During the period while Dean was holding the material from Hunt's safe, he told an FBI agent that he did not know whether Hunt had a White House office, prompting Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray to tell the Senate Judiciary Committee that Dean "probably" lied to the bureau.

In the wake of June 17 break-in at the Watergate, President Nixon has said he appointed Dean to conduct a White House investigation to determine if members of the presidential staff were involved in the bugging operation.

That investigation, which absolved all then-current White House personnel, was "a direct pipeline to Haldeman," according to one of the few Justice Department officials familiar with its details.

Watergate conspirator McCord, during his appearance before the Senate select committee, was asked if he knew whether Haldeman had anything to do with the

Watergate bugging, and replied: "I have no knowledge of it, no knowledge of it if he did."

Nonetheless, several newspapers mistakenly reported that McCord had implicated Haldeman.

Meanwhile, Sen. Lowell P. Weicker (R-Conn.), a freshman senator and member of the Watergate select committee, cited highly placed Republican Party sources and charged last week that Haldeman had condoned the Nixon campaign's overall espionage and sabotage operations.

The result, said Weicker, was "an almost competitive attitude as to who could do the dirtiest deed" at the Committee for the Re-election of the President. Demanding Haldeman's resignation, Weicker said the White House chief of staff "clearly has to accept responsibility" for what occurred during the campaign.

But last Wednesday, Sen. Sam J. Ervin (D-N.C.), chairman of the Senate committee on Watergate, issued a statement about Haldeman that Senate sources said was designed to keep his committee clear of any charges of innuendo in its investigation. Said Ervin:

"In the interest of fairness and justice, the committee wishes to state publicly that as of this time it has received no evidence of any nature linking Mr. Haldeman with any illegal activities in connection with the presidential campaign of 1972."

THE WASHINGTON POST

Monday, April 2, 1973

McCord Names Mitchell 'Bug' Planner

By Jack Anderson

Watergate defendant James McCord asserts that the bugging of the Democratic National Committee was planned secretly in former Attorney General John Mitchell's Justice Department office by Mitchell, White House counsel John Dean and Nixon campaign aides Gordon Liddy and Jeb Magruder.

McCord has given a written memo to this effect to the Senate committee probing the Watergate scandal. Quoting Liddy himself, the stolid McCord, who served as campaign security chief, sets the date of the meeting in February, 1972—while Mitchell was still Attorney General.

In his memo for the Senate dated March 26, McCord says Liddy gave him considerable details about the clandestine Justice Department meeting. As McCord reports in his two-page initialed document:

"John Dean, Jeb Magruder, Gordon Liddy and John Mitchell in Feb. 1972 met in Mitchell's office at the Department of Justice and held the first

formal discussion of bugging and related operations.

"Liddy had planned for the meeting very carefully and had drafted out in longhand budget figures for various items of expense, and had discussed them and certain details of the overall operation with Jeb Magruder (who) reportedly set up the meeting with Mitchell."

McCord's carefully worded memo says he believed Liddy was planning to send or hand-carry the plans "to someone in the White House. I do not know to whom he took it."

As Liddy recounted it to McCord, the crucial Justice Department meeting was "set up for one particular day, but was cancelled, and reset for a day or so later."

McCord's statement says Liddy spent about \$7,000 to have four-by-four-foot charts drawn up for the meeting.

"The charts were brought in late one afternoon and left in (Liddy's) office on the 4th floor wrapped in brown paper. My impression was that they were commercially done . . ."

gathered in Mitchell's office in the afternoon, as McCord recalled it and "from what Liddy told me it lasted an hour or more."

Liddy, according to McCord, said that the discussions at the Justice Department "covered the pros and cons of various bugging type operations. No decisions were made at the meeting . . . but the impression Liddy had seem(ed) to be that the operation would be approved."

Within a few days, "Dean told Liddy that a way would have to be worked out to undertake the operation without directly involving the Attorney General so that he would have deniability about it at a future date."

"Dean told Liddy at this time that the funding for the operation would subsequently come to him through other than regular Committee for the Re-Election (of the President) funding mechanisms so that there would be

no record of it . . ."

Liddy said Dean told him "to destroy the (\$7,000) charts" but Liddy said that he had paid so much for them that he did not plan to do so . . . I never saw the charts . . .

"About 30 days after the February meeting in the A/G's (Attorney General's) office, Liddy told me that the operation had been approved' . . . My impression was that this word of the approval came from Dean, although this was not specifically stated by Liddy."

A few months later in June, McCord and four Cubans were trapped inside Democratic headquarters by city police. All five, plus Liddy and ex-White House aide Howard Hunt have been convicted in the case. McCord is now telling his story to the Senate.

Footnote: Mitchell, Magruder and Dean have all denied any advance knowledge of the bugging.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, April 3, 1973

Fitting Pieces Into Watergate Puzzle

By Jack Anderson

Sources close to the Watergate investigation have put together for us a few more jigsaw pieces in the puzzle. Here are the latest fascinating facts which investigators have established:

- Presidential counsel John W. Dean III, despite vigorous White House denials, lied to FBI agents when he claimed not to know whether Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt had a White House office. This is spelled out clearly in FBI reports which have now been circulated outside the FBI. So many people have read the reports that acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray had no alternative, under oath, but to agree that Dean "probably lied." It is a federal violation to make a false statement to the FBI.

- Both Hunt and Gordon Liddy, another White House consultant convicted of Watergate crimes, indiscreetly mentioned several big names to their co-conspirators. Although Hunt and Liddy had direct contact with the White House inner circle, their five-man wiretapping team had no

access to the likes of John N. Mitchell, John Dean, Jeb Magruder and Charles Colson. These bigwigs' link to the illegal activities, therefore, is now strictly hearsay. Investigators have a better circumstantial case against Magruder than the others, though he has denied under oath any advance knowledge of the burglary-bugging operation.

- Aside from this name-dropping, the conspiratorial Hunt and Liddy, whose direct testimony could implicate the higher-ups, always followed the old CIA rule: "When three people know a secret, it is an open record." Investigators describe Hunt as a CIA-trained professional sworn to keep his mouth shut. Liddy is regarded as eccentric, with an obsessed sense of mission. Of the two, Liddy was most inclined to brag and drop names.

- The funds for the Watergate break-in and bugging were distributed by Hunt, who always dealt in cash. After his cohorts were caught at gunpoint inside Democratic Party headquarters, he continued to dole out cash to pay the legal and living expenses of the defendants. But there-

after, Hunt's superiors never contacted him directly but delivered money through his wife, Dorothy, who was killed in a Chicago airliner crash with \$10,000 in her purse. She would receive cryptic instructions by telephone, then would pick up money from go-betweens. A reluctant conspirator, she told her husband not to trust the telephone promises.

- James McCord, the member of the Watergate conspiracy who is now talking, worked with the White House staff as a CIA agent. One source told us McCord's CIA activities brought him into direct contact in the 1950s with Richard Nixon, then the Vice President. McCord has acknowledged that he was hired as President Nixon's security chief for the 1972 campaign through his old White House contacts. Investigators describe McCord as solid, honest, intensely patriotic, with an almost fanatic hatred of communism.

- Despite an outward appearance of amity, Hunt and Liddy were jealous of each other, each vying with the other to bring off more spec-

tacular coups. In currying favor with the White House, Liddy aimed to please his patron, presidential counsel Dean, while Hunt was anxious to gain the plaudits of Charles Colson.

- McCord, a pragmatic, ex-FBI man, has confided to his friends that he is disappointed with the Senate committee investigating the Watergate. He had hoped Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D-N.C.), the chairman, would put off the session with Ervin absent. Instead, it was left in the hands of Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.). McCord had gone to the unusual extent of preparing a memo that carefully distinguished between what he knew of his own knowledge and what was hearsay. But senators' meandering questions clouded the important distinction and McCord wound up being unfairly criticized for giving hearsay testimony.

- McCord has acknowledged that he was promised executive clemency and financial support for his family if he would plead guilty and keep quiet about his involvement in the Watergate crimes.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, April 13, 1973

Tight-Lipped Liddy Key to Watergate

By Jack Anderson

The truth about the Watergate scandal, it now appears, may be locked behind the clenched mouth of G. Gordon Liddy.

As evidence that he won't talk, Justice Department sources tell us Liddy once held his hand over a burning candle until the flame seared through the flesh of his hand and burned the nerve endings. He merely wanted to prove to a couple of girls in Detroit, say our sources, how tough he was.

Both E. Howard Hunt and James McCord, the other Watergate ringleaders, have now implicated ex-Attorney General John Mitchell, White House counsel John Dean and ex-presidential aide Jeb Magruder in the Watergate break-in and bugging. The three have denied any advance knowledge of the illegal activity.

Only the tight-lipped Liddy can give direct testimony. He was the liaison between the higher-ups and the spying-sab-

otage operation. Hunt and McCord have recited elaborate details, which they swear Liddy gave them about his meetings with Mitchell, Dean and Magruder. But it will take Liddy's testimony to make the case stick.

The "Cowboy," as his friends call him, isn't talking. He took an additional sentence for contempt rather than answer questions before a grand jury. And Justice Department sources are convinced that a man who would hold his hand over a candle flame will sit it out as long as necessary in a jail cell.

White House aides, meanwhile, are spreading the story that Liddy is mentally unbalanced and promoted the whole Watergate adventure himself. This kind of talk could backfire and bring Liddy out of his jail cell with an angry rebuttal.

We have carefully investigated the possibility, however, that Liddy may have recruited the Mission Impossible team and ordered the Watergate break-in strictly on his own to satisfy his romantic bent.

We established that he had

a fascination for guns; that he distributed to various girls huge pictures of himself beside a police car, gun and flashlight at the ready; that he threatened to kill people who crossed him; that he terrified the youngsters in his neighborhood once by leaping out at them "like Batman" from a garage roof.

My associate Jack Cloherty talked to parents and children in Liddy's neighborhood. They said he sent his own children to bed before dark and became agitated when the neighborhood kids made noise around his house.

He berated them, chased them and, on one occasion, leaped upon them from a hiding place on the garage roof. Another time, he lay in wait for some loudly talking teenagers, jumped them and slapped one of them around.

After this incident, a delegation of parents called on him to complain about his abuse of the neighborhood children. They noted that his guns were prominently displayed on the dining room table throughout their visit.

Others who know Liddy describe him as mentally sharp,

if slightly eccentric. He had a reputation, they say, for telling the truth. "If he ever did talk and denied others were involved, you could believe that, and if he implicated others, you could believe that," the Los Angeles Times quoted Liddy's former law partner as saying.

Liddy's father, Sylvester Liddy, a respected New York attorney, also described the rumors about his son's mental instability as "nauseating" and denounced the portrayal of the younger Liddy "as flaky, self-promoting adventurer."

We have also established that money was delivered by higher-ups to pay the legal and living expenses of the break-in crew after they were caught at gunpoint in Democratic Party headquarters. This suggests that the higher-ups, whoever they are, recognized their responsibility for the Watergate crimes.

Meanwhile, Liddy is keeping his mouth shut in jail where, characteristically, he got into an altercation with another inmate over a hairbrush and wound up with a cut ear and a bruised nose.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, April 17, 1973

McCord Tells of Watergate Payments

By Jack Anderson

In secret testimony before the grand jury, Watergate defendant James McCord has confided that his co-conspirator, Howard Hunt, last July feared the President's campaign chiefs were abandoning them and wrote a three-page letter demanding "to contact someone in the White House."

Thereafter, money allegedly was delivered to Hunt's attorney, William O. Bittman, for distribution to the defendants. Mrs. Hunt, acting as the courier, arranged to meet McCord at various places and slip him cash payments. McCord testified that he received around \$45,000 after the Watergate break-in for "salary" and legal expenses.

The grand jury is trying to track down who authorized the payments and whether the money was intended to buy the defendants' silence. Bribery to obstruct justice, of course, is a serious federal violation.

As McCord related it to the grand jury, he received a phone call around July 20 from Hunt. "He asked me," said McCord, "to go to a pay phone away from the house."

'Afraid We Might Talk'

"He felt the Committee to Re-elect the President (was) trying to do him in and to do us in for good and to put us away and abandon us. This

was his, almost his exact words.

"And he said that he was going to do, well, he said words to the effect that he was going to now assume a leadership role in dealing with the committee." McCord said he, too, felt "they were more interested in keeping us in jail than they were in getting us out, because they were afraid we might talk."

McCord later learned from Mrs. Hunt that her husband had written a three-page letter which was read to the campaign committee's attorney, Kenneth W. Parkinson. Recounted McCord: "She said that when Bittman read the letter to Parkinson that Hunt wanted to contact someone in the White House, Parkinson said, 'Give us a week.' And Hunt came back and said, 'No you get two days.'"

"So they said, 'Okay. Something will be worked out in a couple of days.' And that something, it appeared to me, had to do with a contact and it also had something to do with the funding for the defendants."

Not long afterward, Mrs. Hunt, using the code name "Chris," called to arrange the first transfer of funds. "I went over to her car and she gave me an envelope and she said, 'This is the payment for your salary for five months, beginning in July through whatever

it is'—I think it was November...

"I asked her if she wanted a receipt and she said, no, it was not necessary, that she would be making an accounting to Mr. Bittman for it." McCord also talked to her about legal fees. "They want to know," she reported back to him later, "if you're going to keep quiet."

'Executive Clemency'

Still later, Hunt brought up the same question with him directly. Testified McCord: "(Hunt) said, 'we have legal fee money for you.' And I said, 'What goes along with it?' ... He put it this way, 'Everybody's naturally interested in knowing whether you're going to keep quiet.'"

McCord felt this was merely a maneuver to keep him quiet until the election, so he put off Hunt until Nov. 7. Then he decided "to go ahead and take the legal fee money." But he refused to be bound if the legal fees were offered "as a weapon to keep us from saying anything."

The question came up again at a meeting with Mrs. Hunt on Nov. 30. As McCord interpreted the conversation, "essentially there wasn't going to be any more money unless you fellows agree to plead guilty and take executive clemency at a later time and keep your mouth shut."

He quoted her as saying,

"They want to know if more than one year is okay with you ... staying in jail more than one year, and then executive clemency." McCord turned down the deal saying he was going to plead not guilty and fight the case. "And she repeated this to me three more times," he recalled, "and it was in the context of 'Well, I'm not sure they're going to give you any more money' ..."

"The meaning was very clear, that 'Unless you agree to go along with this, you can forget about any further legal fee money, or any further salary continuance.'"

Footnote: After the break-in squad was arrested inside Democratic Party Headquarters, McCord testified, the higher-ups first wanted to blame it on the CIA. But neither Hunt nor McCord would go along with that cover story. Then there was talk about blaming the whole affair on Gordon Liddy, the Watergate ringleader. McCord quoted Mrs. Hunt as saying she had been told "that there were now plans to charge Liddy. Some type of plan was under way to charge Liddy stole the money and bribed Hunt and McCord to perform the operation. I said, 'Well, you can pass the word that I won't stand for that ... it's not true. It's not the way it happened.'" Parkinson has denied any role in getting money to the defendants.

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THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, April 18, 1973.

Watergate Called Part of Vast Plan

By Jack Anderson

Watergate conspirator Howard Hunt has told a federal grand jury that he and Gordon Liddy traveled to Miami under aliases in December, 1971, to set up a vast spy mission against the Democrats.

As part of the mission, Hunt, a former Central Intelligence Agency sleuth, went to the CIA's placement bureau, which willingly provided him with the name of a locksmith skilled in "lockpicking" and opening "a locked room." The locksmith, Thomas Amato, said he'd rather sailboat with his family than spy for the GOP, Hunt testified.

The articulate Hunt, who once paid a secret visit to ITT memo-writer Dita Beard in an ill-fitting red wig, said he disguised his name during the Miami mission out of habit. As a CIA man he had often traveled under false papers in case he was hijacked to Cuba, he said.

It was natural, then, that when he went to Miami with

Liddy, the same air of mystery that surrounded Hunt's CIA work and his numerous published thrillers prevailed.

Hunt told the grand jury that his and Liddy's main target was information on the Democratic National Convention in Miami, and especially on the role of Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) who then seemed to have "a lead" among the candidates. Hunt testified that "when Kennedy ... would in fact be a candidate" was the big question for Liddy, the flamboyant counsel for the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

But Hunt, traveling as "Ed Warren" and Liddy, as "George Leonard," had far more in mind than just espionage on Kennedy's place in the presidential race. They checked into Miami Beach's plush Playboy Plaza and met with Hunt's old "comrade in arms," ex-CIA agent Jack Bauman. What Liddy, who was running the Miami venture, wanted from Bauman was no less than total "intelligence" on everything the Democrats

were doing "in terms of political action," Hunt swore.

Obviously awed at the breadth of this mandate for spying, the prosecutor in the grand jury asked Hunt, "What kind of Democratic activities?" Hunt reiterated: "Political activities."

Under questioning, Hunt spelled out for the jurors Liddy's grandiose master scheme. For one thing, Liddy wanted to discover all that the Democrats were doing "against each other." He wanted to know all their motivations, who was strong enough to "knock another man out of position" and who at any moment was "gaining ascendancy," Hunt asserted.

The Liddy blueprint also called for spying on those candidates close to "radical people," reports on where all candidates were at all times and how many hotel rooms each candidate's delegations were occupying.

Faced with this demand for nearly total knowledge of the opposition, the capable Bauman told Hunt and Liddy that

"his services would come very high," Hunt testified. In fact, said Hunt, Bauman wanted payment in the form of a "trust fund [for] the future of his children."

The Playboy Plaza meeting ended with Bauman agreeing to "give the matter some consideration and [to] let us know." A few days later, Bauman sat down again with Hunt at the Hay Adams hotel just across Lafayette Park from the White House. As Hunt gloomily described it to the grand jury, Bauman said he "was not going to cooperate" with the master spying scheme.

At about the same time, the conspirators got the bad news on Amato's preference for sailing. When the prosecutor asked Hunt why they needed a lockpicker, Hunt said Liddy told him that in "ensuing months" there would be a "wide variety" of tasks, among them lockpicking. Later, observed Hunt pointedly to the grand jury, he found out exactly what Liddy meant. Presuma-

bly Hunt meant to breaking at Democratic headquarters in Washington's Watergate complex.

In the course of his appearances before the grand jury, Hunt testified that Liddy had a White House office and pass at the very time he was plotting missions against the Democrats. Hunt, too, had a White

House office which the Secret Service had secured with a special lock, he said. His papers were in a three-way combination safe, which White House aides cracked after Hunt's arrest.

It was in the White House and, once, in Hunt's kitchen at home, that Liddy unfolded some of his plans for activities

against the Democrats.

Hunt kept \$8,500 in cash in his White House safe for Liddy in case speedy funding was needed on weekends for Liddy's Mission Impossible duties. The money finally was turned over by Hunt to lawyer Douglas Caddy, after the Watergate housebreakers were captured on June 17, 1972.

Caddy was the first lawyer to step in on behalf of the Watergate suspects.

Footnote: While the Bauman approach failed, there is evidence that the Watergate gang was planning other spying against the Democrats at the time they were captured.

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THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, April 19, 1973

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Secret Testimony on Delivery of Cash

By Jack Anderson

Secret grand jury testimony reveals that H. R. Haldeman, the White House major domo, ordered \$350,000 in \$20, \$50 and \$100 bills locked in a White House safe during the 1972 campaign.

After the election, the cash was delivered surreptitiously to a campaign aide, with Haldeman's approval, in an apparent violation of the new campaign disclosure law.

This is the sworn testimony of Haldeman's loyal former assistant, Gordon Strachan, who picked up the money the day before the disclosure law went into effect. He received it from Hugh Sloan, the campaign treasurer, but returned it to Fred LaRue, a campaign aide, at his Watergate apartment.

It took Strachan 45 minutes, he testified, to count all the cash. Yet no receipt was asked, and none was given. He quoted LaRue as saying, "I'll take care of this."

The money was supposed to be used, explained Strachan, for polling. He acknowledged that the President's campaign committee was already conducting "a very, very extensive polling operation." Yet \$350,000 was taken away from the committee and stashed in the White House, he said, "in

case we needed to get even more polling."

"Who told you to go to Mr. LaRue and give him the money?" asked Seymour Glanzer, an assistant U.S. attorney.

"I decided that myself," said Strachan.

Haldeman's Role

"Did you discuss this incident with anybody afterwards?" pressed Glanzer.

"Yes, I told Mr. Haldeman afterwards that I had given the money to Mr. LaRue."

"What did he say to you?"

"Fine," Strachan, quoted Haldeman as saying.

"Does the . . . Committee to Re-Elect the President conduct its business in Mr. LaRue's apartment?" demanded the prosecutor.

"No," said Strachan. "It was a matter of courtesy. He's a senior official. He asked me to drop it by after work . . ."

"Do you have any idea why Mr. LaRue asked you to return this money to his apartment, where actually you could just walk across 17th Street?" asked the grand jury foreman.

"No, I do not," said the witness.

"I mean, I find it somewhat dangerous for a person to be carrying this amount of

money in Washington in the evening . . ." said the foreman, "when it would have been much easier and handler just to walk across 17th Street."

"I agree, and I was nervous doing it, but I did it," shrugged Strachan.

"Did it occur to you at the time," broke in another juror, "that it was not the proper way to do it?"

"Well, 'proper' is not—" stammered Strachan.

"Is 'proper' an obsolete word these days?" snapped the juror.

"No," said Strachan.

"Whether it was proper or improper, I was asked to return the money. I returned the money, and he asked me to deliver it to him at his home, and I did that."

Incredulous Juror

The foreman seemed incredulous. "I'm still puzzled," he said. "You get the money from the treasurer or whatever Mr. Sloan's position was in the committee . . . and the money sits for seven months. Then Mr. Haldeman decides it has to go back to the committee. You call Mr. LaRue—you don't call Mr. Sloan and say 'Hugh, seven months ago you gave me this \$350,000, and we haven't used any of it; I'd like

Normally, only prosecutors, court reporters, transcribers and typists would have access to the transcripts of grand jury minutes.

Anderson's columns this week have contained excerpts from testimony by convicted Watergate conspirators James W. McCord Jr. and E. Howard Hunt; Sylvia Panarites and Sally Harmony, both former secretaries to Liddy, and Robert Reisner, assistant to former White House aide Jeb Stuart Magruder.

Anderson's column on Tuesday was typical of some of the lengthy grand jury excerpts he has been using of late. For example, at one point Anderson quotes McCord as telling the grand jury of a phone call he received last July 20 from

to give it back to you since I got it from you," but you call Mr. LaRue."

First Strachan said it was because Sloan had left the committee. When asked why he didn't return it to his successor, he said: "I honestly don't know."

Then Glanzer resumed the questioning. "Have you talked to Mr. Haldeman in the last couple of weeks?" he asked.

"Yes I have," replied Strachan.

"About your appearance before the grand jury?"

"Yes I have."

"What did you say to him and what did he say to you," pressed the prosecutor.

"He told me," replied Strachan, "to tell the absolute truth and to not worry about any political consequences. And those are my orders . . ."

"Is there any reason," demanded Glanzer, "why Mr. Haldeman would have to urge you to tell the truth?"

"No, there's no reason," said Strachan, "except it's a matter of real concern, the political damage that has resulted from this."

The handsome Strachan had one final word about Haldeman. "He's a man," said Strachan, "I admire very much."

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Hunt. Anderson quotes McCord as saying:

"He asked me to go to a pay phone away from the house, where I could call him, which I did . . ."

"He felt the Committee to Re-elect the President (was) trying to do him in and to do us in for good and to put us away and abandon us. This was his, almost his exact words."

"And he said that he was going to do, well, he said words to the effect that he was going to now assume leadership role in dealing with the committee."

Anderson's associate, Les Whitten, said yesterday that he and Anderson "have copies of the grand jury proceedings. I want to make that clear. We do not have the actual documents themselves."

WASHINGTON POST

20 April 1973

Column's Quotes Termed Authentic

Prosecution sources said yesterday that columnist Jack Anderson obviously is in possession of authentic copies of the minutes of testimony before the federal court grand jury that is investigating the Watergate bugging here.

One source indicated that the continued printing of excerpts from the grand jury

testimony by Anderson "is causing us all sorts of problems" and is hampering the investigation.

No one in the U.S. attorney's office here would comment for the record on the publication of testimony by Anderson. One source said that "very, very few" persons have access to grand jury transcripts, but he declined to say whether the source of the leak had been located.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, April 20, 1973

Web Tightens Around Nixon Advisers

By Jack Anderson

The Watergate web is tightening around three of President Nixon's closest advisers—former Attorney General John Mitchell, former aide Jeb Magruder and White House counsel John Dean.

All three have protested their innocence, and the case against them is still largely circumstantial. But witnesses before the grand jury have given secret testimony, which darkens the cloud over the trio.

The case against them rests heavily upon Watergate wire-tapper James McCord's charge that the burglary-bugging operation was actually planned in Mitchell's Justice Department office by Mitchell, Magruder and Dean, with Watergate ringleader G. Gordon Liddy giving the briefing.

On April 2, we quoted from McCord's confidential initial memo that "John Dean, Jeb Magruder, Gordon Liddy and John Mitchell in Feb. 1972 met in Mitchell's office at the Department of Justice and held the first formal discussion of bugging and related operations."

The memo states that Liddy prepared huge four-foot-by-four-foot charts for the meeting. "The charts were brought in late one afternoon and left in (Liddy's) office on the 4th floor wrapped in brown paper," McCord related.

Liddy's former secretary, Silvia Panarites, has confirmed to the grand jury that a meeting was scheduled. "It was a meeting at the Justice Department," she testified, "among Mr. Liddy, Mr. Magruder and Mr. Mitchell."

Mysterious Package

"Now, Miss Panarites," asked Assistant U.S. Attorney Donald Campbell, "did there come a time when you observed a brown package in Mr. Liddy's office?"

"Yes, sir," she replied. She described the package as about four feet in dimension, an inch thick, wrapped in brown paper. "Mr. Liddy himself carried the package into the office . . ." she testified. "He did say that I was not to look in the package; that it was better for me not to know of its contents . . ."

The mysterious package was left in Liddy's office overnight, she said, so Liddy asked her to hide it in case "somebody should happen to walk in, it would not be seen . . . So I moved the bookcase and put the package behind the bookcase."

Another prosecutor, Seymour Glazer, asked whether Liddy's removal of the package the next day was "related in your mind to this appointment he had at Justice?"

"I can't relate it to anything," she responded, "other

than the fact that he removed it himself."

Mitchell reiterated to us in a telephone conversation that he had no advance knowledge of the Watergate bugging. Magruder acknowledged attending the February, 1972, meeting but insisted the bugging had not been discussed. We couldn't reach Dean, but our White House sources say he has now admitted to his superiors that Liddy presented various "wild" bugging plans at the meeting.

"Gemstone" Papers

The most damaging grand jury testimony disputes Magruder's sworn statement that he knew nothing of the Watergate bugging. Another Liddy secretary, Sally Harmon, testified that she had typed up reports on the conversations of Democratic Party officials. She used secret stationery with the code word, "Gemstone," printed on top, she said.

She reported that the campaign committee's own printer had delivered the "Gemstone" stationery to Liddy's office and had cautioned her: "Mr. Liddy said no one is to see this."

After the arrest of the burglary-bugging squad at the Watergate, Magruder in a phone call from California instructed his assistant, Robert Reisner, to remove sensitive files from his office. One was

a blue folder, which Reisner testified he associated with Liddy.

"Now my memory is vague," he stated, "as to whether it said 'Source' or whether it said 'Memorandum from.' But it said that first, and then the second word was 'Gemstone.' It seemed to me that was from Mr. Liddy."

"Gemstone?" asked prosecutor Earl Silbert.

"That's right."

Reisner said he turned the "Gemstone" folder over to campaign official Robert Odle who later testified he returned it to Magruder without examining it.

Reisner also recalled that Magruder, in introducing Liddy to the staff in January, 1972, said: "This is Gordon Liddy, who is going to come to the staff as a lawyer, and Gordon Liddy also has other talents."

Commented Reisner: "(Magruder) was trying to make a joke about the fact that Mr. Liddy was . . . engaged in doing kinds of research activities." Afterwards, Reisner overheard enough around the office to "infer" that Liddy "was responsible for some sort of secret activity or research."

It would appear Magruder must have had more knowledge than he has admitted of Liddy's Watergate operation.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, April 14, 1973

CIA-Inspired Tibet Raids Wind Down

By Jack Anderson

In mountainous Nepal, least bloody war is winding America's least known and down. The warring tribesmen and the Central Intelligence Agency, which recruited them, are losing interest in the adventure.

After the fleece-clad Red Chinese legions crushed a revolt in Tibet in 1959, the fiercest of the Tibetan clans fled on wiry ponies into the high fastness of Nepal.

CIA agents slowly gained the confidence of the mountain fighters, known as Kham-

pas or "warriors," and began organizing them against the Chinese. In the cloud-capped regions of Mustang and Dolpa, the Khampas were outfitted with American saddles, small arms and other equipment.

Then, out of the craggy highlands, they swooped down into Chinese military encampments in Tibet, disrupting communications and stealing supplies. This distressed the Nepalese authorities, who never authorized the raids and feared Chinese retaliation.

We spoke to sources who were invited to participate in a raid on Chinese army facil-

ities in Tibet. The Khampa leader claimed he learned his English and was trained in guerrilla tactics in the United States.

In past years, Indian intelligence agents were used to parachute American supplies to the Khampas' mountain bivouacs. The bright orange supply parachutes were converted into shirts by the Khampas and quickly became a "Red Badge of Courage" in Tibetan refugee restaurants in Khatmandu.

But now the Tibetan refugees, when they gather in the restaurants for marijuana

stew and cakes, are forlorn. The American aid is drying up, and the Khampas have to depend on the penurious Indian intelligence services for supplies. This has so weakened them that the Nepal government, branding them "bandits," has been able to move them from the border areas. Now when the tribesmen feel warlike, they prey on peasants instead of Chinese soldiers.

Thus has a faraway war flared up and died down, virtually unknown to the American people, whose dollars supported it and whose secret agents encouraged it.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Wednesday, April 11, 1973

Military Intelligence Role Seen Enhanced

By ORR KELLY
Star-News Staff Writer

James R. Schlesinger, the new director of Central Intelligence, is giving the military a stronger role in assessing threats posed by other countries, according to the Pentagon's top civilian intelligence official.

Albert C. Hall, assistant defense secretary for intelligence, acknowledged in an interview yesterday that "some of the civilians up the river" (at the Central Intelligence Agency) are quite concerned by the new development.

But Hall, who was brought into the Pentagon by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird two years ago to strengthen civilian control over intelligence, said he thinks what Schlesinger is doing "is really quite sound."

SCHLESINGER, who drew up a plan for revamping the intelligence community when he was at the office of Management and Budget in 1971, has placed two career soldiers on his personal staff.

Maj. Gen. Lew Allen, a West Pointer who holds a doctor's degree in physics and who has been active in Air Force nuclear and space programs, became one of Schlesinger's deputies "for the intelligence community" on March 1. He was nominated yesterday for promotion to lieutenant general. Maj. Gen.

Daniel G. Graham, a career intelligence office who is now deputy director for estimates in the Defense Intelligence Agency, is scheduled to become a deputy to Schlesinger May 1.

While Schlesinger is reportedly embarking on a house cleaning to cut about a 1,000 persons from the CIA payroll of about 15,000, he has given his stamp of approval — at least for the time being — to the military intelligence operation, Hall said.

"I have told the DCI (Schlesinger) what we are doing, what our objectives are, and how we are going about researching them in a broad sense and he's endorsed them," Hall said.

THE DIA, the key Pentagon intelligence office, underwent a house cleaning of its own beginning in 1970, when Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett became its director. The entire defense intelligence community has received a further shaking up under Hall.

Over the years, there has been a tendency to downgrade the military estimate of the threat from other countries — primarily the Soviet Union — and for the civilian analysis of the CIA to be predominant, Hall said.

"On the civilian side — up the river — they were more inclined to regard the Soviet Union as a more peaceful ent-

ity than it actually is. Their tendency is to regard what they (the Soviets) do as a reaction to us," Hall said.

The military picture tends to make the Soviets look like the fierce guys, and that we've got to catch up, he said.

"In analysis of the Soviet Union, one was too far on one side, the other too far on the other side. I don't want to overstate this, because it was not that bad a situation. But it would be better if they both moved toward the middle," Hall said.

WHILE the different interpretations seemed to provide a broad range of views, the opposite was often the case, Hall said. Graham, in an article of the current issue of Army Magazine, said "planners of all services, 'coordinating' an intelligence estimate are quite capable of reducing it to lowest common denominator, mush."

The goal now, Hall said, is to recognize that "There really isn't one estimate — that there are ranges of possibilities driven by certain circumstances."

"It is important to get the ranges and the circumstances laid out," he said.

Unfortunately, he added, many of those who receive the intelligence information would rather have a specific figure than a range of choices.

HALL ALSO STRESSED, throughout the interview, that he is seriously concerned about the nation's intelligence budget. Over the last three years, he said, the Pentagon's intelligence budget has been cut about a third.

"We don't have all the things covered at all that we'd like to have covered," he said. "When resources are limited, it is no easy way out of that situation."

Hall refused to say how much Nixon spends on intelligence or how many people are involved. He did say, however, that an estimate by Sen. William Proxmire, D-Wis., that the nation's annual intelligence bill is \$6.2 billion is just plain wrong.

PROXMIRE SAID yesterday his figures were "in the ballpark" and called on Schlesinger to make the intelligence budget public.

He said his estimates of manpower and budget are: CIA, 15,000 and \$750 million; National Security Agency, 20,000 and \$1 billion; Defense Intelligence Agency, 5,016 and \$100 million; Army Intelligence, 38,500 and \$725 million; Navy Intelligence, 10,000 and \$775 million; Air Force Intelligence, 60,000 and \$2.8 billion (including satellite launches and reconnaissance); State Department Intelligence, 333 and \$8 million.

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, April 7, 1973

Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA Bars FBI Watergate Interviews

Jack Anderson

The Central Intelligence Agency has ordered its agents not to talk to the Federal Bureau of Investigation about the explosive Watergate case.

Yet curiously, the CIA has cooperated fully with Sen. Frank Church, (D-Idaho), who is investigating the cozy relationship between the White House and ITT. A clandestine CIA operative, William Brock, was even granted permission to testify at the Senate hearings.

Early in the Watergate investigation, however, the CIA

balked at giving information to the FBI. G-men approached CIA officials and succeeded in interviewing one before the gag was imposed. The CIA formally requested the FBI not to question CIA people, and orders were issued to John Rule, the Watergate case supervisor, to lay off.

Some of the Watergate conspirators worked with the CIA on the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion. James McCord, who headed the Watergate break-in squad, spent more than 20 years in the CIA. Our sources say he met Richard Nixon, then Vice President, during a CIA investigation into the shooting down of an Air Force C-119 over Russia in 1959.

New York Times

9 April 1973

In the Small Print, An 'Official Secrecy Act'

By Edmund S. Muskie

FROSTBURG, Md.—We are tangled in angry and important disputes about Presidential and Congressional power, about spending and taxation, about social needs and governmental indifference, about the whole structure of our Federal system and about the integrity of our political process.

And to those disputes we must now add a new one brought on by this Administration's latest attempt to stifle the flow of official information to the public. The attempt is hidden deep in a lengthy and complex legislative proposal (S.1400) introduced in the Congress as a revision of the Federal Criminal Code. Five sections of that proposal, taken together, would establish in peacetime a system of Government censorship that a democracy could hardly tolerate in a time of war.

The "official secrets act" being proposed would punish Government officials who disclosed almost any kind of defense and foreign policy information, whether or not its disclosure would endanger national security.

It would punish newsmen who received such information unless they promptly reported the disclosure and returned the material to a Government official.

It would punish not only reporters but all responsible officials of their publications or broadcasting companies who participated in making the unauthorized information public.

It would punish Government employees who knew of a colleague's unauthorized disclosure and failed to report their co-worker's action.

The law's penalties—from three to seven years in jail, from \$25,000 to \$50,000 in fines—would be imposed on actions which are not now considered crimes, which are, instead, the applauded work of investigative journalists.

For instance, part of the law would make any unauthorized disclosure of what is called classified information a crime.

And the law would explicitly prevent officials who disclosed such information from defending their action by proving that the information was improperly classified.

Well, what is classified information? According to the Administration proposal, it is "any information, regardless of its origin, which is marked or designated pursuant to the provisions of a statute or executive order or a regulation or rule thereunder, an information requiring a specific degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security."

On its surface, that language sounds reasonable, it does what existing law already does: by insuring secrecy of data about our defense codes, about our electronic surveillance techniques,

about military installations and weapons, about our atomic secrets and about plans and operations which might aid our enemies. All that information is already kept secret by laws which punish its disclosure with intent to damage America and its security.

But this new law would go farther. It would prohibit and penalize disclosure of any classified information, regardless of whether or not it damaged security.

Classified information, you should know, is any document or record or other material which any one of over 20,000 Government officials might have decided—for reasons they need never explain—should be kept secret. It is any piece of paper marked top secret, secret or confidential, because someone, sometime, supposedly decided that its disclosure could prejudice the defense interests of the nation.

In practice, however, classified information is material which some individual in the Government decides he does not want made public. He could make that decision to hide incompetence. Many have.

He could be trying to conceal waste. Many have.

He could even be attempting to camouflage corrupt behavior and improper influence. Many have.

He could simply be covering up facts which might embarrass him or his bosses. Many have.

Classified information is the 20 million documents the Pentagon's own most experienced security officer has estimated to be in Defense Department files. Classified information is the 26-year backlog of foreign policy records in the State Department archives.

And most of that information is improperly classified—not out of evil motives, but out of a mistaken interpretation by conscientious employees of what security actually requires. They do not limit the use of secrecy stamps just to information which would really affect our national defense, if disclosed. They often use them simply to keep material out of the newspapers—to make it a little harder, perhaps, for a foreign nation to get the information, whether the information is defense-related or not.

Let me give you a few examples.

Around 1960, a sign in front of a monkey cage in the National Zoo explained that the monkey on display was a research animal who had traveled into space in American rockets. But at the same time the Pentagon was classifying all information that showed we were using monkeys in space.

The reason given for trying to keep the information secret was someone's concern that it might damage our relationships with India where some religious sects worship monkeys.

Another example deals with India. Over a year ago when India and Pakistan were at war over the independence of Bangladesh, the Nixon Administration insisted in public that it was not interfering in the conflict,

that it was trying to be neutral. But Jack Anderson revealed classified information that proved that President Nixon had instructed Mr. Kissinger and others to "tilt" toward Pakistan. That information was being kept secret to conceal a lie.

India and Pakistan knew the truth. Only Americans were being deceived.

Similarly, a laboratory at M.I.T. prepared an assembly manual last February for a gyroscopic device used in missiles. Again the Air Force classified the manual and put the following words on its front page: "Each section of this volume is in itself unclassified. To protect the compilation of information contained in the complete volume, the complete volume is confidential."

And then in 1969 it was disclosed that someone in the Navy Department was clipping newspaper articles that contained facts that were embarrassing to the Navy, pasting those articles onto sheets of paper and stamping the paper secret. It turned out that such a practice was common throughout the Defense Department.

If newspaper articles can be stamped secret as a matter of course, what else is systematically being hidden from the public? Should this Administration proposal become law, you and I will never know the answer to that question.

The examples I have given should indicate to you the folly of any blanket prohibition against the disclosure of classified information, as long as our system of classification is so erratic, arbitrary and unmanageable.

Not only would the proposed law perpetuate the widespread abuses of secrecy I have listed, it would enforce public ignorance by making criminals out of honest men and women who put the public interest above bureaucratic secrecy. Indeed, the Administration's proposed secrecy law goes far beyond protection of what might be legitimate secrets as determined by a workable classification system, should one be developed.

Additionally, it would punish the unauthorized disclosure of "information relating to the national defense . . . regardless of its origin" which relates, among other things, to "the conduct of foreign relations affecting the national defense." That broad definition could bar intelligent public scrutiny of America's most significant foreign policy decisions.

What could the enactment of such a sweeping gag rule mean to the flow of information to the public?

For one thing, the proposed law would mean that Robert Kennedy, were he alive and writing now, would risk prosecution for publishing in his book, "Thirteen Days," the secret cable Nikita Khrushchev sent the White House during the Cuba missile crisis of October, 1962.

It would mean that Seymour Hersh of The New York Times could not write, as he did last year, about the

still-classified Peers Report — the Army's own investigation of the My Lai massacre and the responsibility of Army officers for concealing the facts of that event.

It would mean that knowledgeable and conscientious Government employees could be brought to trial for telling newsmen about waste in defense contracts, or about fraud in the management of the military P.X. system.

It could mean denying the public the information necessary to understand how cost estimates on 47 weapons systems rose by over \$2 billion between March 31 and June 30 last year.

Thus, the Administration's official secrets act would create staggering penalties for disclosure of information even when the information is totally unclassified or classified only to prevent public knowledge of waste, error, dishonesty or corruption.

We already have the criminal sanctions we need against disclosure of true defense secrets. To expand the coverage of those penalties can only stifle the flow of important but not injurious information to the press and therefore to the public.

With the criminal penalties already in the law and with the proven record of responsible behavior by the great majority of Government employees and newsmen, the only purpose behind further expansion of the secrecy laws would be the effort to silence dissent within the Government and hide incompetence and misbehavior.

New penalties will not further deter espionage and spying. They will only harm those who want the public to know what the Government is doing.

Nothing could be better designed to restrict the news you get to the pasteurized jargon of official press releases than a law which would punish a newsmen for receiving sensitive information unless he returned the material promptly to an authorized official.

Nothing could damage the press more than a provision which would make a newsmen an accomplice in crime unless he revealed the source of information disclosed to him.

The Administration proposal carries an even greater danger in the power it would give to the officials who now determine what shall be secret and what shall be disclosed. Not only would they be able to continue to make those decisions without regard to any real injury disclosure might cause, they would be empowered to prosecute anyone who defied their judgment. Their imposition of secrecy could not be reviewed in the courts. And a violation of their decision would be a crime involving not only Government employees but journalists as well.

The Justice Department proposal goes far beyond any laws we have had, even the emergency requirements of World Wars I and II. No law now gives the Government such power to

prosecute newsmen not only for revealing what they determine the public should know but just for possessing information the Government says they should not have.

Under this proposal, a reporter who catches the Government in a lie, who uncovers fraud, who unearths examples of monumental waste could go to jail—even if he could show, beyond any question, that the Government had not right to keep the information secret and that its release could not possibly harm national defense.

This law then would force journalists to rely on self-serving press releases manufactured by timid bureaucrats—or risk going to jail for uncovering the truth.

It would force Government employees to spy on each other in a manner familiar in Communist or fascist states but abhorrent to our concept of an open democracy.

We have had enough of that abuse of secrecy in the attempts to hide the facts about our conduct in Vietnam from the American people. Official secrecy has even been used to keep back vital facts about Government meat inspection programs or pesticide regulations or drug tests or import restrictions or rulings that interpret income tax regulations.

These are excerpts from a speech delivered April 1 by Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Democrat of Maine, at Frostburg State College.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, April 6, 1973

Rogers Refused to Act Against Chile

By Jack Anderson

Minutes of a meeting between Secretary of State Bill Rogers and industrial tycoons doing business in Chile quote the Secretary as repeatedly reassuring them "that the Nixon administration was a business administration and its mission was to protect business."

Nevertheless, he refused to retaliate against Chile for expropriating American-owned businesses. It is clear from the minutes that he didn't want to push President Salvador Allende into Soviet arms.

Rogers indicated, according to the minutes, "that he had talked with the Russian Foreign Minister as to whether or not Moscow was going to finance Chile as it had Cuba. The Russian denied any such intention. Rogers went on to show grave concern of Russian domination of Latin America and its impact."

The Oct. 22, 1971, meeting was attended by representatives of International Telephone and Telegraph, Anaconda Copper, Ford Motor, Bank of America, First National City and Ralston Purina. The minutes were kept

by ITT.

Most of the angry businessmen wanted the U.S. government to bail them out by taking action against Chile. Only the Ralston Purina representative, whom the ITT minutes describe as a "dove," recommended "we not cut off shipments to Chile but should use private sources to impress Allende and his government to stay in the Western bloc."

The most Rogers would do was consider an "informal embargo" and recommend "periodic meetings" on the problem. "The Secretary

raised the question," the minutes state, "of whether there should be an informal embargo on spare parts and materials being shipped to Chile. The consensus of the group was quite mixed. Rogers recommended that there be periodic meetings of the group to attempt to solidify a position."

The ITT executives went away disgruntled over Rogers' attitude. Concludes the minutes: "In summary, the entire meeting indicates that the Secretary is pretty much going along with the . . . soft-line, low-profile policy for Latin America."

NEW YORK TIMES
19 April 1973

C.I.A. Trained Tibetans in Colorado, New Book Says

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 18—The Central Intelligence Agency set up a secret base in the Colorado Rockies to train Tibetan guerrillas in mountain warfare in the late nineteen-fifties, when there was an uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet, a new book discloses. In the book, "The Politics of Lying," David Wise, the author, said that the agency began training Tibetan refugees recruited in India in 1958 in a deserted World War II Army base near Leadville, Colo. The operation continued into the early months of the Kennedy Administration, he said.

A spokesman for the agency said that there would be no immediate comment on the report.

Mr. Wise, the former Washington bureau chief of The New York Herald Tribune and co-author of "The Invisible Government," a 1964 book about the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote that the Tibetan training program apparently ended abruptly in December, 1961, six months after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and a few days after its cover was almost blown in an airport near Colorado Springs.

"Ironically, it was the snow and the mountains—the very factors that led the C.I.A. to select Colorado for the training base—that almost caused the operation to surface," Mr. Wise wrote. A group of Tibetan trainees were loaded aboard a bus at the Army camp for a 130-mile trip to a nearby airfield in Colorado Springs, where a large Air Force jet was waiting to quietly fly them out of the country before dawn.


"But coming down the mountain," Mr. Wise wrote, "the bus skidded off the road in the snow. As a result of the delay caused by the accident, it was daylight when the Tibetans arrived at the field."

Once there, the book went on, overzealous military security officials herded the airport's employees around at gunpoint, but not until at least one of them saw the Tibetans board the jet.

Complaints to the local sheriff were made about the manhandling of the civilians, and a few newspaper articles describing the bizarre encounter were published in Colorado Springs and Denver. But, Mr. Wise wrote, the full implications of the incident did not become public.

When a reporter for The New York Times subsequently began a routine inquiry, based on a brief news-agency dispatch about the incident, the book said, the office of Robert S. McNamara, who was then Secretary of Defense, telephoned the Washington Bureau of The Times and asked that the story not be used because of "national security" reasons.

The Times acquiesced, Mr. Wise wrote, in line with the general newspaper practice in



The New York Times/April 19, 1973

Camp reportedly was in Rockies 130 miles from city of Colorado Springs.

those years of not challenging the Government's definition of "national security."

The two top news officials in Washington for The Times in 1961, the bureau chief, James Reston, and the news editor, Wallace Carroll, said yesterday that they did not recall the incident. Mr. Reston is now a vice president and columnist for The Times, and Mr. Carroll is editor and publisher of the Journal and Sentinel in Winston-Salem, N. C.

Jack Raymond, who was defense correspondent for The Times in 1961, said yesterday that "I do remember at the time knowing about the incident and I don't recall what prevented me from writing about it."

Mr. Raymond, who is now associated with the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies in New York, added in a telephone interview, "I'm inclined to think that I didn't have enough information about it to write a story. I have no immediate recollection of being thrown off the story by anybody."

In his book, Mr. Wise wrote that the issue caused some "nerve-racking moments" at the Central Intelligence Agency's new \$46-million headquarters in Langley, Va., because the incident occurred a week after President Kennedy announced the appointment of John A. McCone as the new Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. McCone replaced Allen W. Dulles, whose resignation was accepted after the Bay of Pigs incident, Mr. Wise wrote.

The dispute between Tibet and China began in the 13th century, Mr. Wise wrote, with China periodically claiming Tibet as part of her territory. Mainland China was taken over by Communist forces led by Mao Tse-tung in 1949, and in 1950 Chinese troops marched into Tibet.

In May, 1951, the Chinese signed an agreement with the Dalai Lama government for the occupation of Tibet, pledging not to alter the existing political system in Tibet or the powers of the Dalai Lama. However, the agreement also

provided for Chinese control through the appointment of a military and administrative committee.

During the mid-nineteen-fifties, however, Mr. Wise wrote, Tibetan guerrillas began insurgent warfare against the Chinese and officials of the Central Intelligence Agency "concluded that the situation offered an ideal opportunity" for covert United States aid.

In March, 1959, the Dalai Lama was forced to flee over high mountain passes to India, after a Chinese mortar attack on his palace. Mr. Wise asserted. Intelligence officials later concluded, Mr. Wise wrote, that some of the guerrillas who had been trained in the Colorado Rockies had been responsible for guiding the Dalai Lama to safety.

Open warfare broke out in Tibet after the escape, Mr. Wise reported, and thousands of Tibetans were killed, and the Dalai Lama's government was dissolved by the Chinese. India's decision to grant sanctuary to the Dalai Lama also increased the pressure between that nation and China, the book said.

The secret training operation was hardly a success, Mr. Wise wrote, because the guerrillas "infiltrated into Tibet by the C.I.A. were attempting to harass the Chinese, not to free the country; in the long run it is doubtful that they made very much difference. Since 1961 Communist China has tight-

NEW YORK TIMES

7 April 1973

Ellsberg Judge Accepts Hayden As Expert on Diplomacy of U.S.

By MARTIN ARNOLD

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, April 6 — Tom Hayden, the antiwar activist, was accepted today by the judge in the Pentagon papers trial as an expert witness on the diplomacy of the United States.

Mr. Hayden, in his second day of testimony, was asked by Leonard I. Weinglass, a defense attorney. If he had an opinion on whether disclosure of the diplomatic volumes of the Pentagon papers could have affected the peace negotiations in Paris between the United States and North Vietnam.

"There is absolutely no basis" for Mr. Hayden to be considered an expert witness on diplomacy, the chief prosecutor, David R. Nissen, said. United States District Court Judge William Matthew Byrne Jr. overruled the objection, and Mr. Hayden replied:

"It could not have affected the beginning or the completion of negotiations."

On cross-examination Mr. Nissen set out to destroy the witness's credibility and to show that he was a biased witness in behalf of the defendants, Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony

enied its grip on Tibet." Tibet, like other areas largely populated by ethnic minorities, now has the status of an autonomous region within China.

"Would the nation's security have been endangered if the story of the Tibetan operation had been disclosed in 1961?" the book asked. "In the wake of the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy ordered two separate investigations of the C.I.A., and he struggled to take tighter control over the agency's operations by changing its top leadership."

"Publication of the story might have focused public attention on a number of important issues," Mr. Wise suggested, "including the basic question of whether tax money would be used to finance clandestine intelligence operations." A second issue, he added, was whether the agency had a legal basis for operating a secret training base in the United States.

Finally, Mr. Wise wrote, that "disclosure might also have led to a public examination of such important questions as whether President Eisenhower approved the Tibetan operation, whether President Kennedy was aware of it or approved it, and whether the four 'watchdog' committees of the Congress had had any knowledge of what was going on in Colorado."

He elicited that on one occasion when Mr. Hayden had traveled to North Vietnam he was accompanied by Herbert Aptheker, whom Mr. Nissen described as a "theorist of the United States Communist party at that time."

"He was a member of the Communist party at that time," Mr. Hayden said.

On one of Mr. Hayden's three trips to North Vietnam, he told the jury under cross-examination, he stopped in Communist China for "three or four days," in the Soviet Union for "two or three days" and in Czechoslovakia for "two or three days."

Mr. Nissen then asked him how well he knew the defendants, and Mr. Hayden told how Mr. Busso had lectured twice to his college classes.

He told of other occasions on which he had met Mr. Russo and Dr. Ellsberg and other members of the "defense team" and how he spent two months, since this trial started, sharing living quarters with Mr. Weinglass. Mr. Weinglass was Mr. Hayden's attorney during the Chicago Seven trial.

NEW YORK TIMES
18 April 1973

Ellsberg Tells Jury Of Secrecy Pledge

By MARTIN ARNOLD
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, April 17—Dr. Daniel Ellsberg said today under cross-examination at the Pentagon papers trial that he had signed a pledge to the effect that he would not copy the documents.

He also told the jury that no one had given him permission either to remove the papers from the Rand Corporation or to copy them.

Further, he testified, he signed any number of statements dealing with the security of "top secret" documents.

At one point, David R. Nissen, the chief prosecutor, asked him if he had read portions of the Espionage Act referring to classified documents. Dr. Ellsberg answered that "to the best of my knowledge there is nothing in the Espionage Act about classified documents, so I couldn't have read them."

He was asked if anyone had given him permission to remove the documents in 1969 from the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, where he was employed, to a Los Angeles advertising office, where he Xeroxed them at night.

"No," he answered.
"No one had given you permission to copy them?" Mr. Nissen asked.

"That is correct," Dr. Ellsberg answered.

The pledge not to copy the documents had been disclosed before, but this was the first time that it had been disclosed to the jury.

Dr. Ellsberg said that the Xeroxing was done in about eight sessions, strating on Sept. 30, 1969, and going into November.

On some of those occasions, he said, he worked alone; on others he was helped by Anthony J. Russo Jr., his co-defendant. Lynda Sinay was then the owner of the small advertising agency, and she helped, he said. So, too, did his son, Robert, then nearly 14 years old, who helped out twice. Once his daughter, Mary, then nearly 11, was at the agency.

He was asked whether Miss Sinay or Mr. Russo or his son Robert had been given official access to the documents, and he answered, No. Nor, he said, had Vu Van Thai, a former South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States. Mr. Thai and Miss Sinay are co-conspirators but not co-defendants.

Dr. Ellsberg told the jury that after each Xerox session he either returned the documents that evening to Rand or on the next working day.

When he copied the papers on a Friday night, he sometimes kept them in his Malibu home until the following Monday, he said.

The prosecutor also asked Dr.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 April 1973

Ellsberg Witness Says He's Ousted

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 7—Samuel A. Adams, the Central Intelligence Agency analyst who testified about military deceit at the Pentagon papers trial, said in an interview today that he has apparently been discharged. The agency denied it.

Mr. Adams has been persistently seeking a formal inquiry into the military's alleged falsification of estimates of Vietcong strength in late 1967. He declared that on March 19, a few days after his court appearance in Los Angeles—he was told by a superior that he had been declared "excess" in his job and would be formally notified of his dismissal "in a couple of days."

He has yet to receive any such notification, Mr. Adams said, despite repeated requests to his superiors over the last two weeks. As of the close of work Friday he had heard nothing, he added.

Shifted to Other Post

A spokesman for the agency said that Mr. Adams was "still on the deck here" and added, "Of course, he has not been sacked."

The intelligence agency is no win the midst of a 10 percent staff cutback that was recently authorized by its new director, James R. Schlesinger. Those employees with poor performance ratings are to be weeded out first, according to some officials.

Mr. Adams, 39 years old, who is a direct descendant of the Adams family of colonial times, had served since the mid-nineteen-sixties as one of the agencies leading experts on the

strength of Vietcong and Cambodian communists. He was recently transferred to another office, in part because of his protests, and thus is no longer directly involved in Southeast Asia intelligence matters.

In his appearance at the trial of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony J. Russo Jr., Mr. Adams declared that there had been political pressures in the military to display the enemy as weaker than he actually was. He further charged that he had been lied to by Government officials in an attempt to keep him from testifying.

The thrust of his testimony was that at least some of the highly classified documents in the Pentagon papers, initially published in June, 1971, by The New York Times, were based on inaccurate and perhaps deliberately misleading information, thus negating their importance to enemy intelligence officers.

In his testimony, the C.I.A. official also disclosed that he was involved in 1971 in a similar dispute over the strength of the Cambodian Communist forces. As a result of his research, Mr. Adams said at the trial, the estimated number of Communist troops in Cambodia was officially raised to about 50,000 from about 10,000.

A Dozen Reprimands

In the interview, Mr. Adams professed admiration for the intelligence agency and the work it performs, although he acknowledged that he was personally reprimanded or threatened with dismissal at least 12 times in his 10-year career.

But now, he said, he wants to end his career. "I'm in

limbo," he complained. "I keep asking for my written notification of dismissal but they won't answer my mail."

"What I think happened," Mr. Adams said, "is that some people down at the lower level looked upon the recent staff cutback as an opportunity to finally get rid of me. They probably saw my Ellsberg testimony as heightening the opportunity."

Someone at higher levels apparently disagreed, Mr. Adams said, and the situation has yet to be resolved.

To resolve it, Mr. Adams began a campaign to get some official notification of his standing. Last week he wrote the deputy director of Intelligence, one of the top officials in the agency, a memorandum urging that he be formally told of his status within 24 hours.

"If I have not heard from you by then," the memorandum said, "I will respectfully assume that the decision to declare me in excess is final, and that I need wait no longer."

When the deadline passed, he telephoned a reporter and arranged for an interview. They had spoken two weeks earlier, shortly after he testified in Los Angeles. Mr. Adams said then he was sure that any staff cutbacks in the agency would not affect him. "They just wouldn't be so dumb as to do that to me now," he declared then.

Mr. Adams' friends in the agency have repeatedly professed admiration for his integrity and his willingness to contradict official policy to express his point of view. They also note, however, that Mr. Adams has not received a promotion in at least seven years.

Ellsberg to read to the jury portions of the Rand security manual.

The Government contends that because Dr. Ellsberg was given access to the Pentagon papers for his job at Rand—which had a contract with the Government—the violation of the Rand security manual was, in fact, a violation of Government security regulations.

The defense contends that Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo at most violated the Rand Corporation's regulations, which would have called for dismissal but little else.

At the end of today's session, the prosecutor said that he believed that he could complete his cross-examination in about an hour tomorrow, and the defense said that it could complete its redirect of Dr. Ellsberg by the end of the day.

The Government's rebuttal case would then start on Thursday morning.

During the morning session, Dr. Ellsberg insisted that he had not decided to copy the Pentagon papers until the morning of Sept. 30, 1969, when he called his co-defendant, Anthony J. Russo Jr., and asked him if he could find a Xerox machine on which to do the copying. That night

they started the Xeroxing.

He also testified that when he picked up courier passes in March and August of that year to transport, first 10 volumes of the papers and then eight volumes, to Rand's Santa Monica office from Rand's Washington office, he did so in good faith, agreeing not to copy the papers that he later did copy. His answers were designed to defeat the Government's conspiracy charge against the defendants.

Dr. Ellsberg and Mr. Russo are accused of six counts of espionage, six of theft and one count of conspiracy.

Under cross-examination, Dr. Ellsberg told how he scurried about the corridors of the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica in April with some of the volumes in a supermarket shopping cart to keep them from being discovered by Rand's security officers. The papers were in yellow envelopes with red borders, he said.

Inventory of Papers

It is the contention of the defense that one set of the Pentagon papers was purposely kept out of the Rand "top secret" security system because those papers were in fact the private papers of Defense Department officials, and that Dr. Ellsberg and Harry Rowen, then Rand's president, were the only ones who had access to them.

In April, 1969, Dr. Ellsberg said he was notified that the Rand security system was having an inventory of all its officially logged "top secret" papers. He asked Mr. Rowen what to do with the Pentagon papers that he had in his own "top secret" safe, he said, and Mr. Rowen told him to put them in the President's safe until the inventory was over.

Two of Mr. Rowen's secretaries were aware that he was transferring them to Mr. Rowen's safe, he said.

WASHINGTON POST
6 April 1973

U.S. Helped Beat Allende in 1964

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Major intervention by the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department helped to defeat Socialist Salvador Allende in the 1964 election for president of Chile, according to knowledgeable official sources.

American corporate and governmental involvement against Allende's successful candidacy in 1970 has been the controversial focus of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee investigation into the activities of U.S. multinational companies abroad.

But the previously undisclosed scale of American support for Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei against Allende six years earlier, makes the events of 1970 seem "like a tea party," according to one former intelligence official deeply involved in the 1964 effort. Up to \$20 million in U.S. funds reportedly were involved, and as many as 100 U.S. personnel.

The story of the American campaign, early in the Johnson administration, to prevent the first Marxist government from coming to power by constitutional means in the Western Hemisphere was pieced together from the accounts of officials who participated in the actions and policies of that period.

Cold war theology lingered, and the shock of Fidel Castro's seizure of power in Cuba was still reverberating in Washington. "No more Fidels" was the guidepost of American foreign policy in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress. Washington's romantic zest for political engagement in the Third World had not yet been dimmed by the inconclusive agonies of the Vietnamese war.

"U.S. government intervention in Chile in 1964 was blatant and almost obscene," said one strategically placed intelligence officer at the time. "We were shipping people off right and left, mainly State Department but also CIA with all sorts of covers."

One of the key figures in the 1964 intervention was Cord Meyer Jr., the redoubtable Cold War liberal. He directed the CIA's covert programs to neutralize Communist influence in important opinion-molding sectors such as trade unions, farmer and peasant organizations, student activists and communication media.

At least one conduit for CIA money, the International Development Foundation, was employed in the 1964 campaign to subsidize Chilean peasant organizations, according to a former official who was responsible for monitoring assistance to Chile from the Agency for International Development.

One former member of the IDF board, who quit when he discovered it was financed by the CIA, said: "Some of us had suspected for a long time that the foundation was subsidized

American intelligence and diplomatic establishments were divided from within over whether to support Frei or a more conservative candidate, Sen. Julio Duran.

CIA's traditional line organization, centered in the Western Hemisphere division and working through the traditional station chief structure, favored Duran initially. So did then Ambassador Charles Cole and the bulk of top State Department opinion. The remaining Kennedy administration policymakers, on the other hand, leaned toward Frei and the "democratic left" coalition he represented. So, reportedly, did the CIA's Cord Meyer.

"For a while, we were at war among ourselves on the question of who to support," recalled a participant in those events.

Duran dropped from consideration when he lost an important by-election to the Communists, and gradually the entire thrust of American support went to Frei.

"The State Department maintained a facade of neutrality and proclaimed it from time to time," according to one source who played an important Washington role in inter-American policy at the time of the election.

"Individual officers — an economic counselor or a political counselor — would look for opportunities. And where it was a question of passing money, forming a newspaper or community development program, the operational people would do the work."

"AID found itself suddenly overstaffed, looking around for peasant groups or projects for slum dwellers," he recalled. "Once you established a policy of building support among peasant

groups, government workers and trade unions, the strategies fell into place."

A former U.S. ambassador to Chile has privately estimated that the far-flung covert program in Frei's behalf cost about \$20 million. In contrast, the figure that emerged in Senate hearings as the amount ITT was willing to spend in 1970 to defeat Allende was \$1 million.

The number of "special personnel" dispatched at various stages of the campaign to Chile from Washington and other posts was calculated by one key Latin American policy maker at the time as being in the range of 100.

AID funds alone were substantially increased for the year of the crucial election. The first program loan in Latin America, a \$40 million general economic development grant, was approved to buoy the Chilean economy as the election approached.

"We did not want to have a condition of vast unemployment as Chile was going into the election," recalled the former AID official.

In addition to U.S. government assistance, Christian Democratic Party money was being funneled into Chile in Frei's behalf by the German and Italian Christian Democratic parties.

Among the important channels were the German Bishops Fund and the Adenauer Foundation, which were managed by a Belgian Jesuit priest, Roger Vekemans, who has long been a controversial figure in Chile and other Latin American countries.

Knowledgeable Americans believe that the European funds had no connection with the CIA programs. But Vekemans was a natural target of criticism by Frei's opponents in the superheated atmosphere of the time.

WASHINGTON POST

6 April 1973

LOS ANGELES TIMES

8 April 1973

Stephen S. Rosenfield

ITT in Chile: Sign of an End To Cold War?

Rather than just being unnerved by the revelations of ITT's misadventures in Chile, maybe we ought to go on to hail the case as the best real proof we've had so far of the end of the cold war.

For while the CIA was evidently dabbling with ITT on the theory that a Marxist government in Chile might pose some kind of political or strategic disadvantage to the United States, ITT saw the prospect of an Allende victory for what it was to ITT: a kick in the wallet.

Faithful old cold-warhorse John McCone, the former CIA director who'd signed on as a director to ITT, may have conceived of ITT's attempt to purchase a million dollars' worth of subversion from the CIA as an anti-Communist act tracing its lineage to the Berlin Airlift. That's what he told the Senate Foreign Relations multinational corporations subcommittee investigating the affair.

But Harold Geneen, president of ITT, seems to have had no similar illusions or divided loyalties. Not for him to make the claim that what's bad for ITT is bad for the country: he went to CIA as a businessman worried that Allende's election would hurt his firm.

In 1964 the CIA had played its part (still undetailed publicly) in a multifaceted American effort to help elect Eduardo Frei. Frei's Christian Democrats, who won, were then widely seen as the "last best hope" for setting a model of change for all of Latin America — an orderly reformist model congenial both to American political interests as then conceived and to American economic interests as still conceived.

In 1964, however, it seems fair to say in retrospect, the United States was still in the grip of two powerful ideas whose hold was to weaken through the decade to come. The first idea was that Fidel Castro—socialist, subversive, allied to Moscow—was a live menace requiring some response by Washington. The second was that it was within the capacities of the United States to steer events in a foreign country—in Chile no less than Vietnam—in a direction and pace of its own choosing.

Few would now argue that these two ideas have the same hold on policy. Cuba is not perceived as a menace (or testing ground) of the old dimensions. This country's confidence in its own special talent for controlling change elsewhere has diminished. This may help explain why, when the U.S. government contemplated the election of a Chilean Marxist in 1970, some of the old political-strategic juices may have flowed but finally what was done was demonstrably short of what was needed to keep Allende from power.

Did ITT sense the implications of the change even before the U.S. government? In 1964, by its own ac-

Claim of CIA Influence in Lib Movement Causes Furore

BY PATRICIA McCORMACK

NEW YORK (UPI)—Betty Friedan, a founder of the modern-day women's movement, is spreading word that the Central Intelligence Agency has infiltrated the women's movement.

What the CIA sees threatening about the women's movement is, anybody's guess. The spy agency can't be expected to confirm or deny Mrs. Friedan's allegation. Good spies don't tell.

The first report about the CIA and the women's movement was in a New York Times magazine article by Mrs. Friedan the first part of March. It was titled "Up From the Kitchen Floor." It is safe to say the article started a civil war within the movement.

In particular, it made Ti-Grace Atkinson, theoretician of the movement, see red. Miss Atkinson has announced she is going to sue for \$500,000 on account of libel and slander.

After the Friedan article came out, Miss Atkinson and representatives of various feminist groups, including the National Women's Political Caucus, the New York chapter of the National Organization for Women, held a press conference. They scored the Friedan article, especially the reference to the CIA being behind disruptive elements of the movement.

But that didn't stop Mrs. Friedan. About 10 days later, she showed up at a wine and cheese meeting at the New York apartment of Muriel Fox, chairman of the board of the National Organization for Women and an executive at a New York public relations agency.

The mother of the women's movement again told of alleged infiltration by the CIA—in particular, the theory goes, the radical feminists and other disrupters are a front behind which the CIA is operating—in a major effort to

discredit the entire women's movement.

In an interview, Miss Atkinson said, "Betty pushed the wrong button this time." And in a copyrighted article in Majority Report, a feminist newspaper serving the women of New York, Miss Atkinson replies to Mrs. Friedan. The article is titled: Betty Friedan, the CIA and Me, and in it Miss Atkinson says:

"Betty Friedan's article, 'Up From the Kitchen Floor' . . . is so riddled with lies that it is impossible for a feminist to make any sense out of it . . ."

She said the Friedan article boils down to this: "Betty Friedan is the leader of the women's movement. All those other disreputables—issues such as prostitution, men as the enemy, marriage, motherhood, class and class structures, lesbianism, sex, rape—are ideas planted by the CIA and promulgated by agents and dupes thereof."

count, ITT offered money to the CIA for the CIA's political purposes in Chile. In 1970, ITT offered money to the CIA for its own economic purposes. In the interval, the corporation perhaps thought, the world had been made safe for precisely the sort of old-fashioned economic imperialism—corporations expecting their government to help them make money—that had gone out of style in the decades of the cold war.

The very premise of the Church subcommittee's look at ITT-CIA was that there is no longer an overarching national security reason not to look. One cannot imagine, for instance, a Senate committee looking three years after 1964, or even now, at what the CIA may have been up to in Chile in 1964. Nor could one imagine, in an earlier period, that the CIA would let its director, plus its top hand for dirty tricks in Latin America, testify before a Senate committee.

I am familiar with the "revisionist"

argument that American foreign policy, not only before World War II, but afterwards, was dominated essentially by considerations of commerce: winning raw materials, markets, investment privileges, and the like. The argument seems to be persuasive only to people who are already socialists or Marxists. My own view is that "political" considerations of power, status and fear were the stuff of the cold war.

Granted, the notion that the world may now again be safe or ripe for old-fashioned economic imperialism is a rather inflated conclusion to draw from the relatively slender findings of the Senate Inquiry into ITT. Nor can it possibly be what everybody had in mind when they hoped that super-power relations would begin to mellow. It would seem to be, nonetheless, one of the possibilities deserving further scrutiny as we all strain to see what lies on the far side of the cold war.

GENERAL

Thursday, April 5, 1973

THE WASHINGTON POST

East, West Cooperate to Block Heroin Highway to U.S.

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Foreign Service

SOFIA—On New Year's Day this year, a Bulgarian customs officer stopped a west-bound Mercedes 250S automobile at the border crossing near the Yugoslav town of Dimitrovgrad for a routine check.

The driver presented a West German passport, but his name was more Greek, sounding than German. The customs agent became suspicious and searched the car. He found 5½ kilograms (12½ pounds) of morphine base, the white powdery substance derived from opium that is refined into heroin in France and West Germany for the American and European markets.

The seizure was a small coup for the Bulgarians. Most of the morphine base sent through the overland "heroin pipeline" from Turkey to France is never detected, slipping easily past inexperienced and overworked customs agents in the possession of tourists, Turkish and Arab truck drivers, foreign workers, Arab students and, occasionally, government officials.

The smugglers' route starts at the Golden Horn in Istanbul and often ends up on the autobahns of Austria or Germany. It is a route with as many striking political variations as physical ones, a stretch of highway that leads past the minarets of Islamic mosques, then through cities decked with the red banners of Communism and finally into the well-ordered cities of Western Europe.

In all those environments, smugglers operate with a surprisingly free hand. In some areas, including those under Communist control, they have their own surveillance and intelligence networks, which operate completely outside the purview of the local security police.

These routes from Istanbul to Munich have become an important target in the Nixon administration's program of cutting off drug supplies at or near the source. To help deal with the problem, the President increased the European staffs of the Bureau of

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the U.S. Customs Service.

At the start of 1973, American authorities in Western Europe began giving narcotics intelligence information to Bulgaria, the first pro-Soviet country with which such a direct exchange of information had been established. Nonaligned Yugoslavia has been getting such information for some time.

A high Bulgarian official said of the collaboration, "Social systems don't make any difference when it comes to the battle against narcotics. Humanitarian aspects transcend the differences between countries. We want to prevent the cancer that has grown in your country . . ."


Bulgaria is crucial to the effort to curb the illicit drug traffic: It sits squarely at the entrance of the main smuggling trunk line that leads through Yugoslavia and Austria. Greece, Romania and Hungary are other, lesser drug transit points.

In May, U.S. customs officers are to begin teaching seminars at the Black Sea city of Varna. About 10 per cent of Bulgaria's customs service will receive the lectures on detecting contraband, particularly drugs. Similar seminars are to be held in Yugoslavia this summer.

The United States allegedly has briefed local police and enforcement agencies on control techniques, including the use of eavesdropping devices in surveillance. Bulgarian Communists are said to be wary about cooperation with the Bureau of Narcotics because of that agency's undercover police work.

The American interest in the transit problem is based on a widespread feeling that the ban on the cultivation of opium poppies that Turkey put into effect this year will have only a minor impact for some time.

American sources estimate that the big Turkish smuggling syndicates may have as much as a three-year reserve supply hidden away. Some of these syndicate operations are linked with the Mafia, the sources



By Angela Robinson—The Washington Post

From the Golden Horn in Istanbul to the autobahns of West Germany, the drug smugglers' route winds its way—with a remarkable freedom—to U.S. markets.

say.

How much of the reserve supply gets through will depend largely on the skill of the authorities in the pipeline countries. The Nixon administration's program for curtailing the drugs at their source looks extremely doubtful for now.

Despite a spectacular seizure by the Bulgarians in 1971, the police and customs services of the area have been easily outwitted, and few officials even believed that there was a problem until very recently.

Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have been successful at apprehending hashish transporters, who tend to be amateurs such as West European and American students. Bulgaria confiscated five tons of hashish in 1971.

The record of morphine base captures is much less impressive. Morphine base is a smuggler's dream—odorless, compact and even impervious to water. Not a single kilogram was seized in Bulgaria or Yugoslavia in 1972, according to official sources in those countries. Yugoslavia has made only three seizures of base since 1970, accounting for only 61½ kilograms (135.3 pounds).

The professional smugglers have been aided by the political diversity and regional rivalries of southeastern Europe, which compli-

cate cooperation efforts.

For instance, pro-Soviet Bulgaria and NATO-allied Turkey do not exchange narcotics intelligence. Turkey is the main source of morphine base for illegal channels and the major transit country for Lebanese hashish that passes through the Balkans by the ton every year.

So, American officials are pleased and surprised by the Bulgarian cooperation. One reason may be Bulgaria's concern over local hashish smoking. Unlike morphine base, the Middle East hashish is ready for use. Some of it circulates among young people in Sofia, and it is also available at universities in Yugoslavia.

American officials say that Bulgarian enforcement authorities are also angry at Western news articles that have described Bulgaria as a "smugglers' paradise."

Top Bulgarian officials hotly deny these charges, and they seem ready to cooperate.

The United States already has provided local officials with names of possible narcotics contact men in Bulgaria, primarily Arab students living in Sofia.

The U.S. antinarcotics teams in Western Europe have also begun supplying Sofia with leads about shipments and identities of couriers. Bulgarian authorities

can also check whether suspects have a record of drug arrests in the West. Previously, communication was so poor that some persons who were arrested for drug offenses here were thought by relatives in the West to be missing.

The Bulgarian customs service is well-esteemed. It is headed by Lazar Bonev, a handsome, middle-aged man who is said to have excellent political connections in the Bulgarian government. American officials are convinced that Bonev's service is doing the best it can against tremendous odds.

"The smugglers we arrest in Germany tell us that if you make it through Bulgaria, you're clean," said one American source.

The fact that many do make it through attests to the baffling task of enforcement officials, which some consider virtually impossible. The volume of traffic in the heroin pipeline is overwhelming and growing.

In 1970, 658,937 motorists crossed the Bulgarian border in 162,138 vehicles. In the summer, the number of vehicles averages 8,000 to 10,000 a day. Many are driven by vacationers going to or coming from Black Sea resort areas, and strict controls could hurt vital tourist revenues.

Sources say that Austria is a favorite place for switching contraband from cars with Arab or Turkish license plates or drivers to ones with West German drivers and plates. This avoids suspicion at the West German border, where controls are said to be the toughest in Europe. Arabs and Turks are almost automatically searched carefully, sources connected with drug traffic controls say.

In 1972, 2,300 kilograms (5,060 pounds) of morphine base were confiscated in the Stuttgart area. In the West German state of Bavaria, 416 persons—including 216 Americans—were arrested for selling or transporting drugs. Southern Germany is a prime market for all kinds of drugs because the largest contingent of the 300,000 American troops stationed in Europe is there.

Some Western officials estimate that half the morphine base used in the heroin sold in American cities uses the main truck route from Istanbul, to Munich. This means that the bulk of it passes through the Turkish-Bulgarian border point at Kapikule.

Even in winter, traffic there is heavy and inspections on both sides of the border are necessarily cursory. West-bound lanes are crowded with trucks carrying

rying cargo to Western Europe and the east-bound ones with trucks piled high with washing machines and refrigerators that belong to Turkish workers returning from a tour in West Germany's booming industry.

Besides the truck traffic, there are vacationers, tourists and workers from Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and the Middle East. Some feel that the only way to stop the opium and drugs they carry would be by closing the border to all traffic.

Many of the trucks carry the emblem "TIR"—Transports Internationaux Routiers. The TIR marker is supposed to facilitate international transport. In fact, the TIR sign is a virtual safe-conduct pass through international checkpoints. Trucks bearing the label are sealed and bonded at the point of departure, and most border points forego inspections, leaving that for the point of destination.

According to customs officials, storage compartments of such vehicles can easily be entered without breaking the seal by removing the entire rear-door panel from its hinges. The 311 kilograms (684.2 pounds) seized in Bulgaria in 1971 were planted in a TIR-marked truck carrying spirits—the truck was searched because the seal appeared to have been tampered with.

Truck drivers who engage in the smuggling are said to earn \$100 to \$130 per kilo (2.2 pounds) of morphine

base transported. Penalties in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia tend to be light, never more than six years in prison. Neither country distinguishes between transporting hashish and morphine base.

Truckers have not been a very helpful source of information. "Whenever they are caught we hear the same story," complained a Yugoslav official. "The truck was stolen for a couple of hours earlier in the trip and the drugs must have been planted on the vehicle then."

If morphine base stocks start to run low because of higher border controls, authorities expect smugglers to become more subtle. Bulgarian customs officials plan to increase surveillance of Varna airport this summer to detect switching. Varna, a port on the Black Sea, is almost ideal for transfers because it brings together hundreds of tourists from Western Europe and students and visitors from the Middle East and Turkey. American instructors are soon to brief their Bulgarian counterparts techniques for searching vessels.

Yugoslavia, the only pipeline country where opium poppies are grown in quantity, has announced that it will tighten its controls on domestic poppy cultivation to prevent the Republic of Macedonia from becoming a target for operators driven out of business in Turkey.

A bill would forbid farmers from opening poppy heads, an operation that releases the opium gum that is refined into morphine base. Until now peasants have held back small quantities of the gum as a reserve against future crop failures. Yugoslav officials in Belgrade concede that small amounts of the raw opium have been smuggled.

About 5,000 acres are under poppy cultivation in Macedonia, but only about 40 per cent of the poppy area is directly farmed by peasants, with the rest under the control of cooperatives.

The only authorized buyer of Macedonian poppy heads is the chemical firm Alkaloid, which buys about 1,500 tons of the heads a year for medical purposes.

One incentive to sell legally is the price paid to the growers, which has been rising rapidly. A farmer can earn the equivalent of \$75 for heads harvested from a single acre.

Alkaloid officials assert that it would be impractical for private peasants to collect opium in Yugoslavia because laws limit how much land they can own, because controls are tight and because the labor needed to extract large quantities of opium gum is much more expensive than in Turkey.

"We have a different social system from Turkey," an official of Alkaloid said.

the U.S. government had about 40 Vietnamese-speaking officers, most of them only with a crude understanding of the language. None of the U.S. correspondents in Saigon at the time spoke Vietnamese. Not until 1967 was the Foreign Service Institute authorized to set up a Vietnam Training Center in Alexandria, Va., and to rush dozens of men through a 42-week course.

The war and its twisted history seem to have had a lasting impact on the bureaucracy. It has slowly recognized the need for language training as well as the importance of assessing future language needs for the Foreign Service.

According to officials, the State Department last year came up with its first, scientifically prepared projection of its language needs for the next five years. This five-year projection is to be updated every year.

Fifteen years ago, according to Sollenberger, the department did not know which of its officers possessed linguistic abilities.

Ambassador William O. Hall, director general of the Foreign Service, said most

WASHINGTON POST

16 April 1973

Language Barrier War Proved Training Essential

By Dusko Doder

Washington Post Staff Writer

At the height of the Vietnam war, an American television newsman visited a South Vietnamese village and interviewed its residents. After initial questions, the newsman, through his South Vietnamese interpreter, asked: "Do they have any faith in their present form of government?"

The interpreter translated into Vietnamese: "Was the crop good? Count up to 12." While one villager counted to 12, another said: "The crop was good. We live happily."

The interpreter translated into English: "We are confused. We do not understand."

Millions of Americans who saw the entire interview on a network news program were completely unaware of the interpreter's fraudulent translation. For most this was another news

item that made more inexcusable already unfathomable reasons for U.S. involvement in the war.

Since then, however, the interview has acquired a life of its own. A copy of it was obtained by the U.S. government which uses it to demonstrate the crucial importance of language training.

"We show it to all our students when they come in," says Howard Sollenberger, director of the U.S. Foreign Service Institute, the principal language training center for American diplomats.

Linguistic barriers and failure of the State Department's bureaucracy to quickly respond to them are now viewed as principal reasons for many American miscalculations in the war.

At the time of the 1968 Tet offensive, and with 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam,

embassies now have at least two officers who are "reasonably fluent" in the local language.

With its "ongoing process" of forecasting language requirements, Hall said, the department is able to maintain sufficient numbers of trained diplomats.

"The most desirable languages are those where there is some potential for advancement, rotation, movement," he said. "But if you are talking about a language used in a limited area, that is less attractive. Many of the African languages are a case in point."

The department tries to get volunteers for such marginal languages. "If there are no volunteers we can order someone to study a language," Hall said. "I'm reluctant to do that. In case of Vietnam, we did order some people to take up Vietnamese."

Just how the department's personnel office makes such decisions seems to be based on a complex formula that takes into account a number of bureaucratic details such as functional specialties, grades, rotation of positions and other personnel matters.

The Foreign Service has dropped altogether its language requirement (to speak at least one foreign language). This was done, Sollenberger said, when "we

realized we'd end up with a bunch of language majors who may be lacking other necessary qualifications."

Last year, for example, out of some 18,000 applicants the Foreign Service selected 200. Only 50 of those could meet the language requirements.

But a Foreign Service officer can receive only one promotion until he learns one foreign language. "The pressure is on the young FSO and he feels it," said Sollenberger.

During the past fiscal year, the Foreign Service Institute trained 7,429 persons from more than 30 U.S. government agencies. Of this number only 1,126 were full-time institute students, including 370 Foreign Service officers.

The institute, with an operating budget of \$6 million, offers training in 60 languages to government personnel. The Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency operate their own language training centers, however.

When major languages are in question, the Foreign Service was able to maintain a sufficient number of trained officers. Despite more than two decades of hostility between Peking and Washington, the department "without fail" assigned several officers each year to study Chinese.

"More people were

trained than we needed to man Taiwan and Hong Kong," Sollenberger said, "and we ended up with a good number of persons speaking Chinese, up to the career minister level."

It costs about \$50,000 to train an officer to speak Chinese. If he is to acquire interpreting skills, he has to supplement the 18-month basic course with an additional year of training at the institute's special training center on Taiwan.

The department has a sufficient number of officers speaking such key languages as Russian, Japanese and Arabic. The institute operates advanced training centers in Japan and Lebanon.

6-month Basic Study

But beyond these and other major world languages, the department's policy is based on the six-month training given to each young officer in the language of the country of his first post. Once they leave the post, the officers are offered financial incentives to maintain their linguistic abilities.

Just how effective these incentives are is not clear. But many senior officers contend that the department should be assessing its future needs at least 10 years in advance.

Earlier this month, for example, Under Secretary of State Kenneth Rush made

public overtures for establishment of relations with Albania. Yet there are no plans to offer Albanian language training despite the fact that only one U.S. diplomat speaks that language, according to personnel officials.

In the case of Mongolia, the administration gave Mongolian language training to two officers back in 1964 when Washington seriously contemplated establishment of relations with Ulan Bator. Again this year, the administration was reported to be seriously considering such a move and two officers were dispatched to England for a six-month Mongolian language training course.

Both these areas are regarded as marginal and officials said that the department was simply unable "to stockpile very much, except in the critical areas."

Moreover, according to some officials, cuts in federal support of various university foreign area programs will eventually affect the government's ability to draw on pools of highly trained specialists.

On the whole, however, the Foreign Service has been relying more and more on its own training program. "Our universities have not done a very good job," said Sollenberger. "Some of our best candidates now come from the Peace Corps."

WASHINGTON POST

9 April 1973

Joseph Alsop

Oil: The Vulnerable Jugular

This is an invitation to join a voyage of discovery. It has been a strange voyage, always enlightening, but always cruelly and bitterly enlightening. Those who wish to join had better know, too, that the end of the voyage will be unpicturesque—although it will tell volumes about the American future.

Hence the start of the voyage will be well to explain. Some weeks ago, the former Israeli ambassador, who was also one of the two chief minds behind Israel's victory in the Six-Day War, went home for good after a long experience in Washington. Itzhak Rabin is not merely a brave man, a good companion and a good friend. He also has one of the most far-thinking yet down-to-earth strategic minds this city has known in many years.

So it was a matter of pride that the house where these words are written was the last in Washington where he came to say goodbye and to have his final meal in America. In the talk at supper, the voyage in question really began with a fairly idle question:

"Now that it's all over, what impressions do you take home with you from your embassy here?"

Rabin answered that he had a wonderful time here, and in one way, was going home much encouraged. When he came to Washington, he had found the city wholly pre-occupied with Vietnam, and dealing with all the more important matters in the world by a me-

thod of fumble, muddle and last minute improvisation. Now, he added, "your policy has a clear, well thought out direction, and is bold and adroit, too. All that is very good."

Why then, he was asked, did he so carefully say, "in one way." Your oil problem, he answered shortly. You mean you think the Arabs will blackmail the United States into an anti-Israeli policy, was the natural reply. Not at all, he came back energetically. Israel can take care of herself "unless the United States joins with other nations to destroy Israel—and the United States will never do that."

"But why the oil problem, then?" was the next question.

"Because of its direct effects on you," he answered, "and because those direct effects will turn into indirect effects on Israel and so many other nations."

Begin with Israel and the other nations, he was asked. Oh, he replied a bit grimly, Israel is lucky. Israel has the will and wits to defend Israel. Besides China and one or two more, there are not many nations friendly to America that you can say so much about today. But neither Israel, nor China, nor any of the other nations now in the circle of America's friends can possibly achieve successful self-defense, in a new kind of world in which America has ceased to be a great

power.

"Ceased to be a great power! My God, I thought you were talking about the oil problem," was the fairly horrified comment.

It was a natural comment, too, for how do most of us, as yet, think about the oil problem? In terms of greater costs, of possible fuel shortages, of our current difficulties with the balance of payments, and also of the Arab political blackmail—which the departing ambassador had dismissed. That, surely, is an honest summary of the way we now think about the oil problem. Perhaps sensing all this, Rabin went on, much more sternly and more earnestly:

"You do not think enough about the oil problem. I have been looking into it for months. It is much worse than you suppose—10 times worse. Your jugular, Western Europe's jugular, Japan's jugular, all run through the Persian Gulf nowadays. Yet you have no means to defend your jugular."

"This is why your country must cease to be a great power, unless you can find means to solve this terrible problem, which everyone has overlooked for too long. No nation can remain a great power, that has a wholly

by anyone with a willing knife. No nation can be a great power, either, that has an ever more worthless currency—unless it is a totalitarian state like Hitler's Germany or the Soviet Union, which the United States will never be.

"Look into the facts that the future will force you to face. Look into what those facts will do to your dollar. Look into the new strategic situation those facts will do to your dollar, you. Then you will see that I am right."

The evening did not end there, but with affectionate farewells. Yet the terrible words thus spoken, by so wise and warm a friend of our country, could not be forgotten. So "looking into the facts" was the voyage of discovery, to be described in further reports in this space.

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NEW YORK TIMES
8 April 1973

The Decline Of Civility

By James Reston

WASHINGTON, April 7—There is a kind of spring madness in Washington these days. The President and his men seem to be threatening all kinds of dreadful things they have no intention of doing, and their political opponents are promising all sorts of sensational retaliations they have no power to carry out.

For example, President Nixon, who has taken all that credit for getting the country out of Vietnam, is now threatening to jump back in again if the North Vietnamese don't abide by the peace agreement, and the Democrats are threatening to cut him off without a penny if he tries it.

Now Mr. Nixon believes that unpredictability is a virtue in diplomacy, and after all his invasions and incursions and bombings and minings in Vietnam, officials in Hanoi, and even Washington, for that matter, can never be sure what he will do next.

That's the way he wants it and maybe his latest threat to re-enter the battle will eventually have some effect on Hanoi, but the truth is that he has no intention of getting back into that jungle and risking more prisoners of war and more demonstrations, and more trouble at home than he already has. He merely wants to talk about it.

The Democratic threats to cut off all funds if he started up the bombing in Vietnam again are equally meaningless, for Mr. Nixon regards this as an infringement of his rights as Com-

New York Times
31 March 1973

New Voice Scrambler on Market

By STACY V. JONES
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 30—

The Technical Communications Corporation, of Lexington, Mass., received a patent this week for a voice scrambler that can be used for privacy in radio or telephone conversations.

According to Patent 3,723,878, granted to Charles K. Miller, an engineer formerly on the company staff, the system first inverts the communication and then scrambles it with a complex code word. In inversion, high fre-

quencies are changed to low, and low frequencies to high. At the receiver, a decoder unscrambles the message. The company has

sold more than 150 of the machines, called Model 205 Voice Privacy Devices, to law enforcement agencies and some foreign governments. The scramblers are said to be much more economical than the elaborate equipment used by Federal agencies. The model for two-way radio and telephone use sells for about \$1,800.

WASHINGTON POST
1 April 1973

• Nobel Prize-winning German author Heinrich Böll accused Greek authorities of beating up Jean Coutsochêras, president of the Greek chapter of the international writers' organization PEN during recent student protests.

mander in Chief and he has enough bombs and planes at his disposal to carry on the bombing for years, even if Congress doesn't vote him another dollar for new adventures.

Nevertheless, both sides keep issuing provocative challenges to the other, like children playing chip-on-the-shoulder. It doesn't make sense, but it makes news, and the more outrageous the statement, the bigger the headline.

Almost every day now on the stroke of noon, Ron Ziegler, the President's designated pinch-hitter in the White

with Roger Mudd, and since this game requires more sensational charges as time goes on, he finally winds up by calling for the resignation of the President's chief of staff, Bob Haldeman, without providing any evidence to justify the demand.

Even Senator Philip Hart, the Michigan Democrat, normally an amiable and even sensible man, has apparently been smitten by the spring madness. Frustrated over the President's unexplained month-long bombing of Cambodia, the right honorable gentleman suggests vaguely that maybe the Congress ought to look into the possibility of impeaching Mr. Nixon.

Speaking as if he were the Chief Justice of the United States, the Senator hands down the judgment that "the violation of the Constitution is clear," and adds, almost casually, "We ought to get the books out and find the chapter on impeachment." Of course, he adds, his suggestion might be "harsh" and the chances of impeachment "zero," but at least they were enough to get him an interview with U.P.I.

This seems to be the object of the current spring frolic: catch a headline. Never mind if you have no evidence, or no chance of putting through what you propose, or who gets hurt in the scramble. In politics notoriety is almost as good as fame.

In the end, however, all this headline grabbing and posturing and talk of confrontations and constitutional crises is not going to change the fundamental fact. The executive and Congress are going to have to compromise on executive privilege, on the Watergate, on the control of inflation and the impoundment of funds and the conduct of the war. This bogus paper war is not going to settle anything, but a restoration of civil manners might help.

Russell Baker's Sunday "Observer" column now appears in The New York Times Magazine.

WASHINGTON

House, announces that Mr. Nixon wants nothing more than to get at the truth in the Watergate case, but defies the Senate investigating committee to try to get White House officials, past or present, to testify formally on Capitol Hill.

Whereupon, before you can say "executive privilege," Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina, the most vivid character on Capitol Hill since Everett McKinley Dirksen, quotes the Bible, Shakespeare and the Constitution to Mr. Ziegler and threatens to have his cops go downtown and drag the President's aides to the witness stand or clap them in jail.

What ever happened to the doctrine of Senatorial courtesy? Or to the assumption that a democratic government of separate and equal powers required the spirit of consultation, compromise and civility?

Take Senator Lowell P. Weicker of Connecticut. He has appointed himself top bull in the Watergate china shop, and charges around smashing up the crockery every day or so.

His technique is to imply that he knows a whole lot more about the dirty tricks in his own Republican party than anybody else, and this is enough to get him on "Face the Nation" and produce big TV interviews

Far East

BALTIMORE SUN
17 April 1973

Analysis

2d Vietnam starting in Cambodia

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Phnom Penh, Cambodia — The American air war in Cambodia, pictured by the Nixon administration as a short-term effort to tie up lingering loose ends in Indochina, is beginning to look more like the start of another indefinite Vietnam-style commitment with no end in sight.

Despite the heavy United States bombing, President Lon Nol's ramshackle Army has lost substantial territory and population to the Communist-led Cambodian insurgents in the last two months. Government troops, cheated of their pay by corrupt officers and often defeated on the battlefield through the incompetence of their commanders, are growing more demoralized.

Popular support for the government has melted away. There is no sign of peace negotiations or of the "de facto cease-fire" that the White House had predicted would follow the Vietnam peace agreement.

President Nixon's spokesmen say the bombing is designed to accomplish one of two purposes: to force the insurgents to negotiate a settlement, or to force the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops in Cambodia to withdraw. The withdrawal of foreign troops is required by the Vietnam peace agreement, but there is no deadline.

With no slackening on the battlefield and no negotiations in sight, diplomats in the Cambodian capital are beginning to wonder if either American objective is realistic — and what President Nixon's next step will be if the bombing fails.

"It looks to me as if Washington has said, 'My mind's made up, don't confuse me with the facts,'" said a senior diplomat.

The U.S. could not compel a North Vietnamese withdrawal from South Vietnam, where the American-backed government was in a far better military position than the inept Lon Nol regime. Over President Nguyen Van Thieu's furious objection, President Nixon ultimately accepted a peace agreement reflecting the

battlefield realities, and in Cambodia, the realities are much less favorable.

Though the Nixon administration does not often discuss the fact, it is not only the Vietnamese Communists who are waging war in Cambodia. Most of the combat is now carried out by Cambodian insurgents, whose strength has grown to about 40,000, stiffened with perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 Vietnamese advisers, artillerymen and logistical specialists.

With the government Army in a state of severe demoralization, it is by no means certain that Marshal Lon Nol could defeat the Cambodian rebels even if North Vietnamese cadres were reduced or withdrawn.

Another 30,000 to 35,000 North Vietnamese troops are in Cambodia but are assigned to the sanctuary areas along the South Vietnamese border and have nothing to do with the combat against Cambodian government troops.

The American attempt to force peace negotiations is no more successful. Although generally directed by the North Vietnamese, the Cambodian rebels are divided into several factions, and have no identifiable political leadership.

Though they often use the name of the deposed Prince Norodom Sihanouk to win support from royalist peasants, most observers do not believe that the prince, who now lives in Peking, really represents the insurgent forces.

Nor has the government shown any real willingness to negotiate. Nixon administration officials, justifying the continued U.S. bombing, often cite Marshal Lon Nol's offer of what was called a "unilateral cease-fire," but official American spokesmen generally do not explain that he announced at the same time that he planned to reoccupy rebel-held territory as soon as the fighting ended.

The "offer" was really a demand for surrender—hardly realistic in view of the fact that the government Army is being defeated all over the country.

Officially, the U.S. discloses no details on American air strikes in Cambodia. The only announcements come in the form of daily communiques

from Pacific Headquarters in Honolulu, saying that the raids are being conducted but without any indication of how many or where they are being carried out.

However, the sortie rate is a fairly open secret in Phnom Penh. According to military observers, though the number of missions varies widely from day to day, on the average there are about 40 sorties by heavy B-52 bombers (a sortie is one flight by one plane) and about 130 fighter-bomber strikes every day.

This is comparable to the American air effort in South Vietnam during all but the most intense bombing of the Vietnam war. It is by far the heaviest ever carried out in Cambodia, though American planes have been striking there since the Cambodian war broke out in 1970.

On some days, the rate is much higher. At the peak, two weeks ago, virtually every B-52 available in the Pacific, about 120 bombers, hit Cambodian targets on a single day.

The U.S. Embassy acknowledges that there is now an

American-staffed command center "somewhere in Cambodia"—almost certainly in or near the capital and operated by members of the 25-member defense attache's office—that controls U.S. air strikes.

The embassy spokesman would not say when the center began operating, but it is probable that it was after the Vietnam cease-fire and the American troop withdrawal, which removed the air control centers from South Vietnam. The bombers themselves fly from bases in Thailand or, in the case of some of the B-52's, from Guam.

American spotter planes refueling at Phnom Penh's Pochentong Airport have become a frequent sight. This treads close to the congressional ban on U.S. military personnel operating in Cambodia, and American spokesmen say it occurs only occasionally, but it seems to happen more often than is admitted.

Yesterday, for example, at one time there was one twin-engined OV-10 spotter plane taking off and three others parked near the runway, all with U.S. Air Force markings.

NEW YORK TIMES 13 April 1973 WEAK FIRE SUPPORT ASCRIBED TO SAIGON

Special to The New York Times

PHNOM PENH, April 12—The chief mate of a cargo vessel that got through a Communist ambush on the South Vietnamese side of the border and sailed up the Mekong River to Phnom Penh accuses the South Vietnamese armed forces of failing to provide promised protection.

Of 19 ships that set out, eight managed to get through on Sunday and Monday, and two were wrecked by Communist fire. The others turned back and are anchored on the South Vietnamese side of the border. United States planes have provided air cover on the

Cambodian side but do not do so on the South Vietnamese side, where a formal cease-fire is in effect.

The chief mate of the Philippine ship, the motor transport Mekong Trader, Melchor Gabunilas, said that "the Vietnamese navy commander at Tan Chau had given us firm assurances we would have air cover or helicopter gunships to escort us to the frontier."

But, he went on, the air cover never came, and the ships in the convoy were "like sitting ducks when the Vietcong opened up on us with rockets and machine gun fire."

Mr. Gabunilas said that unless the South Vietnamese started giving protection, "I don't think any of us would be willing to keep on with this work."

BALTIMORE SUN
18 April 1973

Analysis

War magnifies graft in Cambodia's regime

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Sun Staff Correspondent

Phnom Penh, Cambodia--The American-backed Cambodian government is losing its war not only on the battlefields but also on the home front.

Economic hardships are worsening, partly because of the war but also partly because of the overwhelming inefficiency and corruption of the government. President Lon Nol and his younger brother, Brig. Gen. Lon Non, who now wield absolute power, seem impervious to the rising popular dissatisfaction.

The rice market, which affects every Cambodian, offers a perfect example of how the hardships of war are magnified by government corruption.

Theoretically, rice sales are controlled by a government monopoly and the rice is sold in state stores at the official price of about \$8 for a 220-pound sack—about one month's supply or a little more for a large family.

In fact, the officers in charge of the distribution sell huge amounts to black marketers, who resell it to the public at nearly three times the legal price.

For weeks at a time there has been no rice at all in government stores in Phnom Penh, meaning the entire supply for more than a million people has been sold for the private profit of the government agents.

Large amounts of American aid dollars are involved, since the United States finances the import of about 130,000 tons a year, at a cost of more than \$25 million.

In recent months, with the Communist-led insurgent offensive that has closed or threatened all of the important supply routes into the capital, scarcity, hoarding and graft have driven the black-market price up to nearly double the price of six months ago. For the first time, refugees and others among Cambodia's very poor are finding it hard to get enough to eat.

"Some days we are very hungry," said a refugee mother living in the shell of an unfinished luxury hotel on Phnom Penh's waterfront. The government gives her only a week's ration every month,

and it is difficult in the refugee-swollen capital to earn enough to feed her four children the rest of the time.

When she finds a day's work, she is paid 100 riels, or about 40 cents.

She says it costs her twice that much for food.

Overall, according to American estimates, the average Cambodian's income now represents only one-third to one-half of his purchasing power before the war, with disastrous effects on his willingness to continue backing the inept Phnom Penh government.

The economic crisis is mirrored on the war fronts, where the Cambodian Army has suffered defeat after defeat despite unprecedented American air support.

There is no sign of peace negotiations or of the "de facto cease-fire" the White House predicted would follow the Vietnam peace agreement. Instead, the heaviest insurgent offensive of the war has closed or threatened every important highway and has slowed, though not entirely stopped, the flow of petroleum and other supplies up the Mekong River, the most vital supply route of all.

Though there are long lines at gas stations and the electricity and water supplies are even more erratic than usual, Phnom Penh does not have the atmosphere of a city under siege.

During the three-day Cambodian New Year, which ended Sunday, crowds of celebrants flocked to the pagodas and to the broad grassy malls that still give the capital an attractive look despite the shabbiness of war.

Fortune tellers, dancers, tightrope walkers and high-kicking Thai-style boxers entertained the crowds, and children and adults happily flung themselves into the light-hearted games that are a tradition of the New Year celebration. Despite the fuel shortage, civilian cars and motorbikes still swarmed along the broad avenues.

The surface normality, however, does not mean there is not a genuine crisis of spirit in the Cambodian capital.

Few Cambodians or foreign observers expect the current Communist offensive will end with a clear-cut military decision, World War II style,

with the victors marching into the capital from the countryside. But many are wondering how long Marshal Lon Nol and General Lon Nol can hold out against the internal decay of their regime and the steeply rising popular discontent.

A critical factor is the increasing disaffection in the Army. Never a good fighting force, in the last months its morale has plunged and its performance in the field seems more hapless than ever.

Units ranging in size up to entire brigades have refused to advance or have left their positions, sometimes holding their commanders at gunpoint. Most of the disputes have involved the government's failure to pay the troops, sometimes for three or four months at a stretch.

One military observer said he knew personally of more than a dozen incidents of mass indiscipline just in the weeks of the current offensive.

Cambodian officials and their American backers—who foot the bill for the Army, as they do for virtually the whole Cambodian budget—insist the pay situation has improved and that most of the troops have now been paid at least through March.

Still, two young soldiers encountered in an afternoon of random interviews in Phnom Penh reported they were paid this month—more than two weeks late—only after members of their battalion fired a fusillade of shots into the barracks housing the finance officer.

Military pay is part of the picture of corruption that pervades the entire government. While real soldiers go unpaid—and, since they are normally issued no rations but buy their food in the markets just as civilians do, this leaves their families in grave need—the government continues to pay an estimated 80,000 "phantom soldiers," who exist only on payroll records and whose salaries are pocketed by corrupt commanders.

Through payroll padding and other forms of graft, high-ranking officers are becoming wealthier and wealthier while their soldiers and their families suffer. "The military aristocracy is living at Hollywood heights," one diplomat remarked—and the evidence is plainly visible.

In the posh neighborhoods of Phnom Penh there are literally hundreds of elegant new villas, costing \$20,000 to \$40,000 and up, owned by colonels who officially earn only \$60 to \$70 a month.

Ultimately, the entire cost of this corruption is underwritten by American aid, which has been called sarcastically the world's largest upper-income housing program. Army payroll padding alone is estimated to cost more than \$2 million a month.

Direct U.S. military aid has reached a total of about \$500 million in three years of war. If large amounts have been lost through corruption, as much or more is wasted through sheer incompetence.

Two weeks ago, for example, the Cambodian 7th Division, ambushed after a highway-clearing operation near the provincial capital of Takeo, panicked and abandoned five of its eight 105-mm. howitzers and 40 truckloads of shells to the insurgents.

This was a division on which the 75-man U.S. military-equipment delivery team had lavished special attention and for which the Americans had very high hopes. Most other units are regarded as considerably worse.

Other factors affect military morale as well. One may be that in the last six or eight months the North Vietnamese, who had done most of the fighting in Cambodia since open warfare broke out after Prince Norodom Sihanouk's overthrow in March, 1970, have turned over the bulk of the combat to Cambodian recruits.

The North Vietnamese still advise and in some cases command insurgent units, and they supply heavy weapons units and logistical specialists. A cadre of 5,000 to 6,000 North Vietnamese stiffens an estimated 40,000 Khmer rebels.

While fighting the Vietnamese, government soldiers were bolstered by the deep ancestral hostility between the two peoples. They have far less appetite, military observers believe, for fighting fellow Khmers.

As the military and economic situations deteriorate, Marshal Lon Nol and General Lon Non have proved unable or unwilling to take any serious measures toward reforming their regime. Constant appeals by American officials for large and small reforms produce plenty of promises but little concrete action.

"The Cambodians agree with everything and promise to change," one observer commented. "Then when they've promised they think they've reformed, and everything goes on just as it was." New programs are announced, to the

NEW YORK TIMES
16 April 1973

High Civilian Toll Is Seen In Bombing of Cambodia

By JOSEPH B. TREASTER

Special to The New York Times

relief of the American Embassy, only to vanish in the fog of incompetence and venality that hangs over the regime.

While the United States was urging Marshal Lon Nol to "broaden his political base"—an appeal reportedly conveyed by Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., on his recent trip (which apparently led to the cabinet reshuffle reported yesterday) the partly paralyzed president in the last month has crushed the last open political dissent, closing down the opposition press and placing hundreds of real or imagined political opponents under arrest.

Lt. Gen. Sisowath Sirik Matak, the former deputy prime minister and the man backed by many Americans as a potential leader to bring Cambodia out of the morass, was one of those detained and has been under house arrest for a month.

The pretext for the crackdown was the March 17 attempt by a disaffected Air Force pilot to bomb Marshal Lon Nol's residence. The "state of emergency" afforded the government a fortuitous chance to prevent a planned mass protest by striking students and teachers, which would have represented, in the words of one diplomat, "a conspicuous demonstration of the government's unpopularity."

The very day of the bombing, a rally of teachers was broken up when grenades hurled into the crowd killed two persons. The government said the grenades were thrown by "terrorists," but most Cambodians and foreign diplomats believe they were the work of undercover agents of General Lon Non, the president's brother.

"Petit frere," (little brother) as General Lon Non is generally called, has become a target of widespread public hatred. The Americans have urged Marshal Lon Nol to curb his brother's powers, but the only result has been a typical Cambodian shadow-play in which General Lon Non gave up his ministerial title without surrendering any of his authority.

General Lon Non still heads the "coordinating committee," whose functions are as vague as its name and which essentially is able to step in and overrule any minister anytime General Lon Non or Marshal Lon Nol wants.

In view of the monumental incompetence of the Lon Nol regime, foreign diplomats in Phnom Penh have watched the unrelenting flow of American aid and the stepping-up of the U.S. bombing with growing disbelief.

"Frankly, we don't see what

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia, April 15—Knowledge Western diplomats here say that they believe that the heavy United States bombing campaign in Cambodia is being carried out on the basis of inadequate intelligence data and often with imprecise control, causing high civilian casualties.

"The Americans are throwing air support around like a mad woman," one diplomat said. "They don't know what effect it's having."

United States officials refuse to discuss any aspect of the bombing, which is directed from the embassy here. Instead, they refer all queries to the United States Pacific Command in Honolulu, which has consistently refused to go beyond its terse daily statement saying that the bombing is continuing at the request of the Cambodian Government.

Informed Western sources say, however, that American fighter-bomber pilots based in Thailand are flying an average of 250 strikes a day—almost as many in South Vietnam, which is much larger, during the heavy fighting there last year.

In addition, the sources say, Cambodia is being pounded by an average of 60 B-52's a day, each carrying up to 30 tons of bombs. One day recently, they say, the United States mounted an attack by 120 of the huge bombers.

Military experts say that the bombing has slowed the Cambodian insurgents but not stopped them. The experts add,

the Americans are hoping to accomplish," one ranking diplomat said, wondering out loud if the U.S. bombing were not the start of another endless, inconclusive air war in Indochina.

The U.S. Embassy itself has put strict controls on all discussions with newsmen. Top officials have been almost entirely unavailable, and section chiefs meet reporters only with a "monitor" from the public affairs office.

However, among other embassies it is common gossip that many U.S. Embassy officials assess the situation in far gloomier terms than apparently are prevalent in Washington. Dissenting U.S. officials are described as frustrated and bewildered by the policy of continued all-out support for

however, that the bombing has probably prevented the collapse of the Cambodian Army and, in turn, the fall of the Government of Marshal Lon Nol.

It is rare to find a high Government official critical of the bombing. One official said: "We know that some villagers have been hit by the bombs, but the other side has done worse. In a war like this some side effects are expected. So we consider it a side effect when bombs hit innocent civilians."

In an interview the other day, Brig. Gen. Lon Non, brother of the Chief of State, who is regarded as the most influential man in Cambodia, skirted most questions on the bombing. But at one point he said, "The Americans can use any means they like in order to get the North Vietnamese out of our territory."

Like most Cambodian officials, General Lon Nol does not publicly accept the assessment of Western intelligence sources that most of the fighting is now being done by Cambodian insurgents rather than the North Vietnamese.

Another Government official said: "We do worry about the effect of the bombing on the people, but when you have a cancer on your skin and you take out the bad cells, some good cells must go along and you will probably have a scar on your skin. It is the same with the bombing and we think we must accept this."

In the nearly 40 days that the heavy bombing has been under way in Cambodia it has been impossible to document independently the impact on the civilian population.

Fighting has sharply restricted travel outside the capital and, at any rate, much of the bombing has been carried out in the 70 per cent of the country controlled by the insurgents.

Most of the United States jet fighter-bombers are reported to be guided to their targets by American forward air controllers in slow, low-flying observation planes.

But often, Western sources say, there are more bombers than American controllers and the strikes are directed by Cambodian controllers. Sometimes there are language problems. Furthermore, men in the field say that the Cambodians have often shown little concern for the civilian population in cases in which Cambodian ground troops badly need air support.

Some American bombers also have reportedly been authorized to conduct armed reconnaissance missions in which two aircraft flying at several hun-

ing, without a forward air controller and attack when they find what looks like a suitable target.

In addition, there are said to be times when pilots are sent out to bomb "preplanned" targets—a set of map coordinates where enemy activity has been reported.

There have been delays ranging from several hours to a few days from the time the target is initially reported, approved, plotted and assigned; when the pilot finally arrives with his bombs the situation on the ground sometimes has changed drastically. All B-52 strikes are "preplanned."

While some of the bombing is ordered on the basis of aerial photography, there is also said to be heavy reliance on Cambodian intelligence, which is thought to be gravely inadequate.

Cambodia has very little of the electronic surveillance equipment that the United States dropped widely in South Vietnam, and few if any Cambodian agents venture into the territory held by the insurgents.

Some of the bombing in the insurgents' territory is planned with the use of large-scale maps showing hamlets and house locations. But authoritative Western sources say that there have been reports of major population shifts in these regions and that the maps cannot be relied upon.

In South Vietnam ground troops sometimes followed B-52 strikes to evaluate the damage. But that is almost never done here because so much of the country is in hostile hands.

One diplomat who has worked in Vietnam said: "I don't think the B-52's are worth a damn the way they're being used here. All we know is that they're blowing up the ground, and they're probably nailing a lot of civilians as well."

Intelligence analysts say that the bombing has almost certainly alienated some of the population. The insurgents have already begun telling people that the leaders of the Government in Phnom Penh have become the "slaves" of the Americans and that the fight now is to save the country from American domination. It is the same argument the Communists used effectively against American intervention in South Vietnam. While it may sound absurd to some Americans, it rings true in the countryside of Indochina.

"The question we ought to be asking ourselves right now," said one American privately, "is whether the military gains are worth the political costs."

Diplomats and educated Cambodians outside the Government say that the military situation has never looked worse and many strongly fear that no amount of bombing will turn the tide.

"You just cannot win a revolutionary war with air power," said one diplomat with considerable military experience. "With all due respect, you Americans lost the war in Vietnam because you insisted on fighting to the last B-52."

NEW YORK TIMES

6 April 1973

U.S. Anger Over P.O.W.'s Imperils Aid, Brooke Says

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, April 5—Senator Edward W. Brooke, who is on a tour of Indochina, said today that the anger in the United States over mistreatment of prisoners of war by the Communists could jeopardize future aid to North Vietnam and to other countries of Indochina.

Mr. Brooke, a Massachusetts Republican, is touring Indochina as a member of the foreign operations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee. He is trying to gather information on the area's reconstruction requirements. The Senator arrived here today from Cambodia for a three-day visit.

"I have no independent knowledge that the American prisoners of war were tortured," he said, "but I can certainly understand public feelings about this."

In deciding on aid to Hanoi, Mr. Brooke continued, "I would hope that success of the cease-fire and the generation of peace to which we are committed will also be considered."

Mr. Brooke was to dine tonight with the Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and was scheduled to tour Laotian refugee installations tomorrow.

He is also seeking to go to North Vietnam, and if a visa is granted he will fly to Hanoi Saturday.

NEW YORK TIMES

7 April 1973

HANOI TELLS BROOKE HE CAN'T VISIT NOW

Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, April 6—Senator Edward W. Brooke, who had hoped to make an assessment of North Vietnam's post-war reconstruction needs, was informed by Hanoi today that he could not visit for the time being.

Senator Brooke, the ranking Republican member of the subcommittee on foreign operations of the Appropriations Committee, said that the North Vietnamese had sent word that their leaders were "too busy at this time" to receive him and would remain too busy for the indefinite future.

The Massachusetts Republican said he was disappointed and afraid that Hanoi's action would hurt plans to aid Indochina in general and North Vietnam in particular.

Senator Brooke was received by Sot Petras, a representative of the Communist-led Pathet Lao here today, and he said the official expressed great interest in American aid.

"I spoke to him as one politician to another," Senator Brooke said, "pointing out that although I come from a liberal state I have had many letters from constituents asking why we were considering foreign aid to places like North Vietnam when aid is needed by communities like Pittsfield, New Bedford and Fall River."

NEW YORK TIMES

17 April 1973

The Missing Newsmen

By Richard Dudman

WASHINGTON—Among the 1,300 Americans still missing in Indochina, there are five who were not there to shoot anyone, drop bombs or napalm on anyone or help in any other way to carry on the U.S. military intervention.

Those five Americans—together with six Japanese, four Frenchmen, an Austrian, a German, a Swiss and an Australian—were serving neither side but were there simply to report to the rest of the world the facts of America's longest war.

Most of the nineteen newsmen were captured within a single two-month period. That was April and May 1970, the time of the U.S. and South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, when correspondents were risking their lives to learn and report the truth about the military operation that was later seen to have spread insurrection and civil war through most of the country—a civil war that is still going on.

The five missing Americans are Sean Flynn, son of the late actor Errol Flynn, a photographer and writer on assignment for Time magazine; Welles Hangen, a correspondent for N.B.C. News; Terry L. Reynolds of U.P.I.; Alex Shimkin of Newsweek, and Dana Stone, a cameraman on assignment for C.B.S. News. Shimkin was captured in South Vietnam, the others in Cambodia.

The odds are against their survival. No definite word has been heard about any of them. False rumors and false reports have caused confusion. Two Western journalists were reported crucified, but they turned out to be French priests. A Dutch journalist reported that he had heard some American newsmen had been killed, but when he later was killed and his diaries were examined, they failed to substantiate his story. The body of Kate Webb of U.P.I. was reported found near where she had been captured, but she walked out alive three weeks later. A Cambodian Army colonel said in late 1971 that he had discovered the graves of five of the newsmen, but his claim was found to be based on an old and discredited rumor.

Circumstances of most of the captures suggest that most of the men survived the risky first few minutes and hours and got into the hands of regular enemy military forces. For example, the Cambodian chauffeur for Hangen and his French sound technician, Roger Colne, and his Japanese cameraman, Yoshihiko Waku, escaped after two days and reported that the N.B.C. men and two Japanese C.B.S. technicians, Tomoharu Ishii and Kojiro Sakai, had been marched to a farmhouse by uniformed soldiers, fed a meal of meat and rice and driven off in a vehicle by an officer.

Fresh information gathered in February and March by a private investigator, although admittedly fragmentary and based on hearsay, provides striking new grounds for hope.

Zalin B. (Zip) Grant, assigned by the U.S. Committee to Free Journalists Held in Southeast Asia, headed by Walter Cronkite, interviewed South Vietnamese soldiers who had been prisoners of war held mostly in Cambodia by North Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam.

One of the prisoners told of having seen six Westerners riding in a wooden cart drawn by two motorbikes about seventeen miles south of Snoul in eastern Cambodia. He asked one of his North Vietnamese guards if they were American advisers. The guard replied, "No, they are correspondents of the imperialist side."

A second released prisoner reported that a Vietcong political indoctrination agent told a group of prisoners that "foreign journalists" captured in 1970 were being detained by the "liberation forces." The Vietcong agent added, in a mild complaint that gives credibility to the story, that the foreign journalists were getting larger food rations than the Vietnamese. The political cadre was said to have speculated that the journalists would be released ninety days after the effective date of the cease-fire in South Vietnam.

A third former prisoner said that a Vietcong captain at a prison camp near Mimot in eastern Cambodia had remarked casually that the Vietcong had captured and were holding American, French and Japanese journalists. The captain added that some of the journalists had cameras.

Three other returned prisoners provided news as recent as March 6, 1973. They said they were in a group of prisoners gathering manioc near Mimot on that date when their North Vietnamese guard said that "foreign journalists" were being held somewhere in the vicinity.

N.B.C. recently picked up a report that its missing German cameraman, Dieter Bellendorf, had been seen somewhere in northern Cambodia doing road work.

At least some of those nineteen men may well be still alive, and it is high time that the governments most involved do something about their situation.

It seems incredible that the leaders of the North Vietnamese Government and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam know nothing at all about these missing journalists.

As for the United States Government, the fact that some of these missing newsmen have been reported held in some of the very areas being bombed daily by American warplanes is one more reason to halt this continuation of a conflict that already is officially ended as far as the United States is concerned.

Richard Dudman, chief Washington correspondent of The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, was captured by Communist guerrillas in Cambodia in May 1970 and released after forty days.

THE EVENING STAR and DAILY NEWS
Washington, D. C., Friday, April 13, 1973

U.S. Promoting Sirik Matak in Cambodia

By GEORGE SHERMAN
Star-News Staff Writer

President Nixon, armed with a first-hand report from Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr. on the Hanoi buildup in Indochina, is believed pressuring a besieged government of Cambodia to give power to a man able to bargain with the insurgents.

According to informed sources, Haig recommended this week to ailing President Lon Nol that Sirik Matak, former comrade of Lon Nol but now on the sidelines, should be put into the vacant vice presidency.

In this Washington view, Sirik Matak, who lost out in a power struggle with Lon Non, younger brother of Lon Nol, has both the strength to mobilize the inert Cambodian army and the flexibility to negotiate a truce with the Communists and their allies.

LON NOL, WHO is still recovering from a stroke, would remain as a symbol of legitimacy. At the moment he wields all power, with the help of his brother, and the armed opposition has refused any compromise with him.

An official lid of secrecy has been clamped on other findings which Haig reported to Nixon yesterday after his five-day tour of Indochina. The President met with the Army vice chief of staff for 45 minutes in the afternoon — before which Haig briefed presidential aide Henry A. Kissinger for an hour at the White House.

According to informed sources, a main aim of Haig's trip was to assess whether the Lon Nol government can survive the siege of Phnom Penh. Officials make no secret that they are at least as worried about the corruption and incompetence of that government — dramatized by Lon Non — as they are about the military threat from the divided insurgents.

YESTERDAY, SENATE Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, a long-time student of Cambodian affairs and a friend of exiled ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk, seemed to echo this administration assessment in a special statement otherwise condemning U.S. involvement in the Cambodian civil war.

"There seems to be only one other possibility in Phnom Penh," said Mansfield, "and that would be the restoration to power of Sirik Matak who

at least seems to have some recognition of the facts of life concerning his country and hopefully the entering into negotiations with the other side to the end that a truce could be arranged and peace restored to this unhappy land and its peaceful people."

Administration officials are busy attacking press reports that the insurgents, supported by Hanoi, can take the capital at any time. State Department experts noted that the 100,000-man Cambodian army faces only 38,000 insurgents whose strength is their ability to cut supply routes to the capital — not to occupy and hold one major Cambodian city.

DEFENSE Secretary Elliot L. Richardson told newsmen, after a hearing before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, that he did not believe the Communists can take Phnom Penh any time they desire.

Richardson also batted down persistent reports that South Vietnamese forces would be sent into Cambodia.

"There are no proposals to do this," he said, echoing White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler in denial that Nixon and South Vietnam President Nguyen Van Thieu had discussed such a contingency at their San Clemente summit meeting.

The White House has gone to great lengths to deny also that Nixon himself is planning any immediate dramatic response to North Vietnamese violations of the Paris peace agreement. Spokesmen will go no farther than restating Nixon warnings and "grave concern" about Hanoi's infiltration into South Vietnam and refusal to withdraw forces from Cambodia.

DESPITE HAI'S rushed trip to Indochina and the evident concern over possible Hanoi preparations for new military action against the south, the White House insists that Nixon will not be forced into precipitate action which could shatter the fragile Paris agreement.

Behind the scenes, however, informed sources acknowledge that the President is studying "options" to give substance to his warnings to Hanoi.

These include intensified B52 bombings of the North Vietnamese sanctuaries on the Cambodian side of the South Vietnamese border,

bombing of the 8 to 10 missile sites the Pentagon says have been set up in northern South Vietnam, and expanded airlift of supplies to Phnom Penh, as well as new overtures to the Soviets and Chinese to restrain the North Vietnamese.

Nevertheless, a key issue remains whether the current Cambodian government can carry its share of the struggle. Officials reason that Hanoi will bring no pressure on its Cambodian insurgent allies to negotiate a truce until North Vietnam sees a viable opposition facing it in Cambodia. Sirik Matak is seen here as such a "worthy opponent."

IN PRIVATE, officials note that Lon Nol is dependent both on the American air strikes and on the flow of more than \$200 million a year in American economic and military aid, so that he must "listen carefully" to what Nixon suggests about widening the membership of his government.

Here at home, the adminis-

tration continues to defend the President's authority to bomb Cambodia. Yesterday, the State Department's top legal expert, Charles N. Brower, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "it is clear beyond a doubt" that the President could use his constitutional powers as commander-in-chief to wind up the war he inherited in Indochina.

So far, the critics appear to be having difficulty in mobilizing a Senate majority to oppose this view. Sen. Clifford Case, R-N.J., and Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, according to their staff aides, have decided to hold back for the time being their amendment to forbid use of any U.S. force in Indochina without prior congressional authority.

These aides say the lack of support is due to "euphoria" over the Vietnam settlement and reluctance of most senators to tie the hands of the President when "the battle is still raging" in Cambodia.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 April 1973

The Vietnam Pact Is Closing Sweden To U.S. Deserters

STOCKHOLM, April 1 (AP)—American military deserters can no longer expect automatic asylum in Sweden, a high Government official said today.

"Sweden has no reason to accept deserters now that the Vietnam war is over and the soldiers no longer risk being sent to a war scene," said Kjell Oeberg, general director of the Swedish Immigration Board.

The Swedish Government declared in February 1969 that deserters would be accepted as long as they were escaping a war. This became invalid the moment the Vietnam agreement was signed in Paris, Mr. Oeberg said.

The 450 or so American deserters and draft evaders now in Sweden may stay, but new deserters will be stopped at the borders. Since the United States draft has been suspended, there presumably will be no more draft evaders.

"Mere deserting is no longer reason enough to be granted asylum in Sweden," Mr. Oeberg said, adding, however, that "special weighty reasons could here for deserters."

WASHINGTON POST

19 April 1973

Hirohito's Planned U. S. Visit Sparks Tokyo Opposition

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Foreign Service

TOKYO, April 18 — The much-anticipated state visit of Emperor Hirohito to the United States this fall, which seemed to be a sure bet only a few days ago, is now a matter of contention and doubt.

The U.S. government, which considers an imperial visit an important prelude to any presidential trip to Japan, is hoping for and tentatively planning for a state visit by Hirohito around October. The Tanaka government, which expects such a visit to improve relations with Japan's postwar sponsor, is informally backing the idea.

Since the government's resolve was publicized in press leaks two weeks ago, the two largest opposition political parties have lined up on the other side. The Japan Socialist Party charged the government is trying to use Hirohito for its own political purposes, and the Communist Party said the trip would violate the 1946 constitution which stripped the emperor of all political power.

The government easily has the votes to sustain any legislative challenge. In this consensus-conscious country, however, that is not necessarily enough, particularly when it comes to sensitive questions involving the Chrysanthemum Throne.

The Imperial Household Agency, the highly conservative body which oversees the affairs of the royal family, is reported to be dragging its feet. The agency is said to fear that any touch of politics or controversy surrounding the emperor's actions could endanger the continued existence of the imperial system.

With both home and foreign pressures being exerted, the final decision may end up in the lap of the 71-year-old emperor himself. Because of his postwar insulation from affairs of state, this may be just about the first major decision of international importance in which he has been personally involved since the decision to surrender in August of 1945.

Hirohito and Empress Nagako visited Europe in the fall of 1971—the first time a reigning emperor had left Japan. There was virtually no controversy here about that trip, though the royal couple encountered some signs of coolness and even opposition

along the way.

It is generally believed that if he has a free choice about the matter, the emperor will go to the U.S. at an early date.

He has several times expressed a desire to visit the country.

At the moment, the decision seems much in the balance. Japanese government officials have suddenly clammed up about the subject. American officials are saying nothing at Japanese request.

The U.S. has three times conveyed an invitation for Hirohito to pay a state visit, and only last week President Nixon was quoted as telling Japanese guests at the White House that he was waiting to welcome the emperor. Should the decision be made against the trip at this time, therefore, one problem would be what to say to the Americans as well as to the Japanese public.

One likely solution, should the decision go against the trip, would be simply to say nothing for a while, until it was obvious that no imperial journey could be planned and carried out this fall.

Another potential justification and a real consideration

is the health of the royal family. Early this month, Hirohito suffered what his chamberlains described as "slight anemia" while attending a tree-planting ceremony, but doctors were quoted as saying it was nothing serious. He has continued normal activities since then.

Should the decision be made to push ahead with the trip, the emperor and the government would be staking their trust in the immediate future of Japanese-American relations. In the face of the publicly expressed opposition, any deterioration in relations between now and the time of the journey—or any unpleasantness during the journey itself—could bring about serious embarrassment.

Prime Minister Tanaka's senior aides believe the vast majority of the Japanese people would like to see the emperor go to America if he is received with honor and dignity there. But nobody is certain how the public really feels—nor the feelings of the quiet, bespectacled emperor who stands at the center of the approaching decision.

WASHINGTON POST

17 April 1973

Peking Hails Indians in S. Dakota

HONG KONG, April 18 (UPI)—China said today that the Indians occupying Wounded Knee "fought hard and heroically."

In a long evaluation of recent Indian protests in the United States, including the occupation at Wounded Knee and the Bureau of Indian Affairs in Washington, the official New China News Agency said Indians "live in the bottom of U.S. society."

"Longstanding national oppression has served to bring about the daily awakening of the American Indians," the agency said. "The mounting struggle of the Afro-Americans has encouraged the Indians in their struggle against racial discrimination and for national rights."

BALTIMORE SUN

18 April 1973

Nixon's War: Cambodia Phase

It is serious enough when the United States takes upon itself the unilateral decision and action of enforcing the Laos cease-fire, as it has done in new heavy air attacks there. But more serious still, and even more dubious, is our current conduct in Cambodia. To put it bluntly, we are acting in Cambodia much as we acted earlier in Vietnam, and with consequences similarly unforeseeable.

The official line is that in Cambodia the loose ends of the Indochina war are being tied up, in what Defense Secretary Richardson has chosen to call "a kind of residue" of a decade of conflict. Up to a point this seems reasonable, since nobody expected all fighting to cease at once. But the facts of Cambodia make the argument an extraordinarily thin one. What the administration is doing is to try to apply the Paris cease-fire agreement to Cambodia, to which it does not apply, and on that fragile, indeed non-existent, basis is resorting to heavy warfare on behalf of the Lon Nol government. The whole thing has a grimly reminiscent quality about it.

Arnold R. Isaacs, writing for *The Sun* from Phnom Penh, says that the American air war in Cambodia is beginning to look less like a vestigial tying-up and "more like the start of another indefinite Vietnamese commitment with no end in sight." He backs up that opinion: a "ramshackle"

Cambodian army which has lost substantial territory and population to the Communists in the past two months; troop demoralization because of army corruption and incompetent command; an erosion of public confidence in the government, which never enjoyed much confidence in any case; the lack of any signs that the "de facto" Cambodian cease-fire predicted by Washington after the signing of the Paris agreement is in prospect.

And who are the Communists that the government is so obviously unable to suppress, or for that matter to contain? Some are North Vietnamese, and the North Vietnamese of course have an intense interest in the course of events; but most current combat is waged for the enemy by Cambodian insurgents, and Mr. Isaacs judges that "it is by no means certain that Marshal Lon Nol could defeat the Cambodian rebels even if North Vietnamese cadres were reduced or withdrawn."

Is it simplifying too much to say that this seems to say that the war in Cambodia, if on a lesser scale than the Vietnamese war, is essentially a civil struggle? We think not. And into this struggle, in pursuit of a policy which to say the least of it is veiled, the United States, meaning in this case President Nixon, is flinging the massive weight of its air power. The questions are innumerable, and the answers few and evasive and unsatisfactory.

WASHINGTON POST
11 April 1973

U.S. Policy Team In Saigon Scatters

By Thomas W. Lippman
Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, April 10—As the United States enters a new phase of its relations with South Vietnam, the high-level policymaking team in Saigon that presided over the last years of the war and Vietnamization is rapidly being broken up.

One after another, ranking officials within the U.S. embassy and the chief of various government branches are moving on.

As with outgoing Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who resigned after six years here, these officials are not being ousted or shifted as part of any policy change directed by Washington. They have simply put in their time and finished their jobs and are leaving it for a new team to wage the peace.

Bunker's deputy, Charles S. Whitehouse, a dapper and gregarious career diplomat, is expected to stay on only long enough for the new ambassador, Graham Martin, to be confirmed by the U.S. Senate and take up his duties here.

After that, Whitehouse is expected to become ambassador to Laos. His job in Saigon, that of deputy ambassador, may not be filled, since it was created at the height of the U.S. involvement here as a reflection of the importance of a normal embassy setup.

The U.S. foreign aid mission here, USAID, is also without a director. John G. Mossler, who held the job until recently, has gone to Paris as part of the U.S. team engaged in economic consultations with the North Vietnamese. No successor has been named.

During Mossler's tenure, many of the AID programs were actually run by the military through the hybrid organization known as Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. CORDS, which was the umbrella organization for the pacification effort, no longer exists, and Mossler's successor will be running an aid mission organized more like those in other countries.

Also gone is Robert A. Lincoln, director of the United States Information Service in South Vietnam since 1970.

Lincoln, a career USIS official, was sent to Vietnam to preside over the disassembling of the public relations monolith that had been put together in the mid-1960s when the United States was still trying to sell the Vietnam war to the American press. That or-

ganization, was known as JUSPAO, for Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, and its role went far beyond the traditional USIS programs of libraries and radio broadcasts.

JUSPAO did everything from analyzing intelligence to arranging communications for the press corps. Lincoln was its last director, and by the time he resigned recently to go into private business, it no longer existed. The remaining USIS mission still publishes periodic analyses of North Vietnamese and Vietcong affairs, and conducts extensive propaganda broadcasts beamed into North Vietnam, but has long since ceased to have any military role.

Lincoln's successor, Marshal Brement, arrived only last week from Indonesia and it is not yet known what changes he will make if any.

Another USIS officer, Howard Kirchwehm, who was the embassy press officer, has also departed and his successor is not due for 60 days. Kirchwehm was better known for his tennis skill than for his information, but that was not necessarily by his own choice.

During most of his tenure, the United States was either trying to shift the information burden, like the burden of the fighting, to the Vietnamese, or was engaged in delicate negotiations that might have been jeopardized by leaks from the embassy, or both. The result was a policy of no information that left Kirchwehm and his assistant doing little more than organizing bus trips to the airport to see people like Henry Kissinger come and go.

The latest to go will be Charles A. Cooper, the minister-counselor for economic affairs since July 1970, one of the most influential men in the embassy.

With his unusual height, prematurely gray hair and blue eyes, Cooper is highly visible, and he has played a prominent and visible role in shaping Vietnamese economic policy. He has won the respect of the South Vietnamese officials with whom he has worked closely in trying to control the country's tottering economy and emerged from his tour here, at least in public, as a confirmed optimist about the country's economic future.

Cooper is going back to Washington as director of international economic affairs for the National Security Council.

WASHINGTON STAR
11 April 1973

Pardoned CIA Spy Released by China

HONG KONG (UPI) — Trutz Ritter Von Xylander, 41, a West German jailed since 1967 on a charge of spying for the United States, crossed the border into Hong Kong today.

Von Xylander was convicted Oct. 22, 1969, of spying for the Central Intelligence Agency and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He was arrested Nov. 17, 1967, while working as an equipment inspector and plant site clerk for the Lurgi Co., which was erecting a petrochemical plant in the northwestern Chinese province of Kansu.

The West German Embassy in Peking announced Monday that China had pardoned Von Xylander and would release him. He was the last West

German known to be held in China.

Peking Radio reported on the day of his conviction that Von Xylander was photographing restricted areas in Lanchow, the provincial capital of Kansu, and collecting important military, political and economic information on behalf of the United States. He was recruited by U.S. agents in West Germany before he went to China in October 1965, the report said.

Lanchow is known to be one of the key industrial support bases for China's nuclear and missile programs.

The German is scheduled to return to Frankfurt in the company of his brother, Horst Von Xylander, who had come to Hong Kong to meet him.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
13 April 1973

CAMBODIAN STORM-CONE

WISH IT AS HE MAY, President Nixon still cannot get his fingers clear of the Indo-China gluepot. All the familiar storm-signals of crisis are being hoisted once again. Gen. HAIG, who was Dr KISSINGER's special assistant during the negotiations with Hanoi, before being promoted to his present post of Deputy Chief of Army Staff, has reported to the President on his recent sudden visit to the area, which included two visits to Phnom Penh, the besieged Cambodian capital. The National Security Council has met in Washington. Mr Nixon has retired to the seclusion of Camp David, where he often goes before making important decisions. Dr KISSINGER is reported to be standing by to wish off on another of his missions.

Cambodia, of course, is the main trouble-spot and source of worry (though not the only one). Cambodia was not covered by the Paris cease-fire agreement, except for the clause providing that all foreign troops (i.e. mainly the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong) were to be withdrawn. This provision has not been carried out. The Vietnamese Communists, with the indigenous Khmer Rouge operating under their control, have isolated Phnom Penh, despite very heavy American bombing from Thailand, and control about 70 per cent. of the country. "Cease-fire" agreements have been signed for both South Vietnam and Laos, but not for Cambodia.

For some time now, Washington, which pays the bills in Phnom Penh, has been trying to persuade the Government of President Lon Nol to broaden its base with a view to negotiating a cease-fire—so far without any success. The Lon Nol Government can fairly be described as a pathetic mess. In this situation, eyes are being cast at the enigmatic figure of Prince Sihanouk, the exiled former "neutralist" leader, who was received with demonstrative ceremony on his return to Peking on Wednesday by Chou EN-LAI himself. China has an interest in keeping Russian influence away from her southern flank. Sihanouk and Russia are cool to each other. The implications of the complete seizure of Cambodia, by forces loyal to Hanoi alone, are serious enough to merit a joint political effort by Washington and Peking to avoid it.

Eastern Europe

BALTIMORE SUN
19 April 1973

Soviet Jews reported still facing exit barriers

By MICHAEL PARKS
Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—Jewish activists here said last night that the Kremlin's promise to suspend the so-called education tax on emigrants will still leave a large number of Jewish intellectuals barred from leaving because of asserted reasons of national security.

The Jewish leaders acknowledged that an end to the requirement that emigrants repay the state for the cost of their higher education will permit a larger number of Jews to emigrate, but they said this does not amount to free emigration.

Several hundred Jewish scientists, university teachers and other intellectuals are barred from emigrating now, according to Jewish sources, on grounds they have had access to classified or strategically sensitive material.

But in many cases, according to Jewish activists, they have done no classified work in years. Moreover, the definition of what is a state secret in the Soviet Union is such that important terms in the definition are themselves secret.

Several of the activists expressed bitterness over what one called "a morally wrong,

out-and-out political deal" between the Kremlin and the Nixon administration to ease congressional opposition to American trade concessions to the Soviet Union by a moderate relaxation of Soviet emigration policy.

"We do not think Nixon is being misled," said one young Jewish scientist. "He has made a deal. He knows he is engaging in a deception, that he is only aiding the government here in limiting human rights—but, never mind, he has made his deal."

Only a week ago, more than 100 Soviet Jews who have been refused exit visas on security grounds appealed to the United States Congress in an open letter not to be misled by the lifting of the emigration taxes, which ranged up to about \$35,000.

This and earlier letters have made it clear that the only effective lever Jewish intellectuals feel they have is the American congressional anger over Soviet emigration policies.

A majority of both the Senate and the House of Representatives has co-sponsored legislation that would deny trade concessions, such as lower tariffs and government credits to countries not permit-

ting free emigration—a term that presumably encompasses restrictions for reasons of national security and is not limited to Jews but includes other Soviet minorities.

There is recurrent speculation that the Kremlin will make another major concession when the trade legislation comes before Congress for a final vote by permitting most of the intellectuals now barred on security grounds to leave in a dramatic exodus.

The Kremlin decided to suspend the tax, formally imposed last August when emigration was running about 3,000 persons a month compared to the present 2,600, after frank talks here last month between George P. Shultz, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Soviet Communist party.

Although there were unverified reports of the suspension immediately following Mr. Shultz's visit, the first concrete sign came in the \$8 billion deal Moscow signed last week with the Occidental Petroleum Corporation to exchange American technology, equipment and chemicals for Soviet minerals and chemicals over the next 20 years.

The decision to proceed with the barter deal, probably the largest single trade deal in history, apparently was taken at the same time as the decision to suspend the migration tax.

The leading government newspaper, *Izvestia*, called the Occidental deal a "tangible blow" to congressional opposition to expanded trade in a warmly worded commentary last night.

Soviet officials have also hinted in the last few days that the dampening of the trade-and-emigration crisis will clear the way for a visit by Mr. Brezhnev to the United States this summer, perhaps in June.

The visit had been put off—at least publicly—in December because of renewed American bombing of North Vietnam and the emigration controversy.

Soviet-American relations and the Kremlin's foreign policy in general are expected to be principal topics at a meeting of the Soviet Communist party's Central Committee, expected here Monday. The committee, the country's political establishment, is also expected to take up the troubled Soviet economy once again.

NEW YORK TIMES
15 April 1973

ADVANCE IN ARMS BY SOVIET FEARED

WASHINGTON, April 14 (AP) — The Pentagon's research chief, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., says he fears that the Soviet Union could make a weapons breakthrough in the next several years.

Dr. Foster told the House Armed Services Committee this week that a Soviet weapons breakthrough would not be "simply another beeping basketball in space."

"What happens if the Soviet Union is first to succeed in developing a laser system which can knock our airplanes out of the sky?" he asked. "What would happen if they were able to find most of our submarines at sea? What if they can supply their blue states with aircraft superior to those of our allies?"

Dr. Foster, director of defense research and planning, made the comments in seeking Congressional approval of the Pentagon's \$8.7-billion weapons research and development request for the fiscal year starting next July 1.

BALTIMORE SUN
16 April 1973

Smile, if Wryly

If there is any humor left in the Kremlin, it must show up in ironic smiles. And it is for Westerners, among whom humor is perhaps a more congenial quality, to smile a little on their own part, though they may be forgiven a certain wryness.

For consider that while the capitalists were holding their grain acreages down, they still piled up surpluses which were available for the Communists whose production efforts, under all-out totalitarian compulsion, still failed to yield enough. Yet Russian grain purchases in the hundreds of million bushels are part of the reason our national leader sprinted the other day to catch up to his protesting followers by clamping a new price ceiling on meat cuts from grain-fed livestock.

Or again consider the exuberant dairy farmers of the European community who turned out butter in excess of normal market demand by some 400,-

000 tons. The Russians, whose dairy herds seem as unpersuaded by Marxist production theory as their grain, want to buy about half the butter mountain, and the baffled Common Market management is willing to sell. But the price quoted is roughly one-sixth of what the Common Market housewife pays. And she doesn't like it, and is saying so with a vim which makes even male chauvinists pay attention. The short of it is that in the very process of out-producing and then supplying the adversary who bases all his thought on the primacy of production, the out-producer opens his home front to just the kind of internal dissension the adversary ceaselessly attempts to promote. See how the Commies in the very hour of their humiliation can turn peaceful coexistence into a cramp for the other side, and as we propose above, smile, if wryly.

Near East

BALTIMORE SUN
16 April 1973

America-baiting part of India's life

By JOHN E. WOODRUFF
Sun Staff Correspondent

New Delhi—The renewed effort to repair Indian-American relations will have to overcome a residue of anti-Americanism that has now worked itself deeply into India's political reflexes.

Practiced by radical politicians here for decades, and actively encouraged by the government during the bitter months of American support for Pakistan in the Bangladesh crisis and India-Pakistan war of 1971, America-baiting has become nothing less than a life-style for many Indian politicians.

Radicals of both the Socialist left and the Hindu right accuse the government of regularly missing opportunities to flout American imperialism. The government, in turn, often protects its flanks by looking for ways to blame Washington when trouble arises.

Even after making an apparently firm decision to explore President Nixon's overtures for better relations, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was not quite able to restrain the old reflex only days later during a national meeting of her ruling Congress party. She warned darkly that "the foreign threat" to India needed to be more widely understood and that troubles ranging from food shortages to separatism in some Indian states are related to it.

The tendency to find a foreigner behind every misfortune is not unique to India, but it is more intense here right now than even in most countries of Southeast Asia.

Neither are the Americans the only ones against whom the Indians complain.

A movie reviewer for a New Delhi newspaper complained at some length recently that the Soviet Union is sending only second-best movies to India and remarked bitterly that this is hardly the way for India's great-power allies to win enduring friendship.

But no one has seen fit to mention the fact that the very high prices India is finding in the world grain market, as it tries to keep its national larder stocked during the current drought, trace directly back to the very closely held Soviet

bargaining that won Moscow a big chunk of the world's grain reserves before other deficit countries—India very notably among them—could mobilize.

And sending second-best movies will not be remembered so long as sending the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, if only because bad movies tend mainly to be ignored, while bad military maneuvers, especially futile ones, make exquisite jeering material for the anti-American radicals of both extremes.

The Enterprise does not show up so often in public print now as it did when it was still in the Bay of Bengal witnessing the crumbling of Pakistani forces before Indian advances in Bangladesh, though it enters into every conversation with Indian officials on Indian-American relations.

But the indelible impression left by the Enterprise adventure is something separate from the monotonous carping at Washington that pervades all levels of Indian political debate, as some Indian intellectuals are beginning to realize.

"United States policy in Asia in the past and without doubt in the future cannot possibly avoid criticism," a columnist recently wrote in the *Statesman*, New Delhi's most respected daily newspaper, "but this is not the same thing as a kind of professional baiting of the U.S. as an offshoot of radicalism at home."

"For this climate of opinion in which postures hostile to Washington win instant acclaim, the Congress [party] is primarily responsible."

"It is now necessary to create conditions in which Indo-U.S. relations can be more objectively considered without the necessity of criticizing the U.S. because of domestic political considerations."

Those conditions, however desirable they might be, do not appear to be at hand, and so far both governments show some inclination to proceed to the first stages of repairing their relations without waiting for such conditions to develop.

The Indian government has gone lightly in its response to

NEW YORK TIMES
18 April 1973

Fulbright Praised by Press In Egypt as Voice of Truth

CAIRO, April 17 (AP) — Egypt's press today hailed Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman of the United States Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, as a courageous voice of truth on the Middle East.

The Arabic language paper Al Akhbar, printing Senator Fulbright's name and Washington address in English on its front page, urged Arabs to write him expressing appreciation to "this bold man, to make him realize that we respect and uphold the supporters of right and justice."

Mr. Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas on a television program Sunday in the United States criticized heavy support of Israel, saying that the Senate was "subservient" to Israel.

The authoritative daily Al Ahrām said they both Senator Fulbright and President Tito of Yugoslavia, who also spoke Sunday, agree "that America is the main factor in all the crimes that Israel commits."

Al Gomhouriya, the newspaper of the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's sole political party, praised the Senator for "talking sense."

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
31 March 1973

U.N. OFFICIAL CHARGED WITH SMUGGLING

By Our Cairo Correspondent — Egyptian state security officials have arrested a member of the United Nations truce supervisory commission in the Middle East on charges of "participating in an international network smuggling large amounts of gold from Egypt to Israel under cover of the United Nations mission."

Mok Tung Than, a Malaysian, was seized yesterday after he arrived in Cairo from Jerusalem via Nicosia, the security statement said.

A bag with 44lbs of worked 24 carat gold was found on him and he confessed he was smuggling it to Israel, the statement added.

President Nixon's decision to deliver the remaining items of military equipment on the list it once suspended for Pakistan and has decided to accept Washington's offer to resume the flow of economic aid already obligated to India.

The Americans, for their part, say that for the moment they will be content with a situation in which Indian Cabinet ministers refrain from offering the U.S. as their explanation of problems that are often mainly local in origin and in which both countries look about the international horizon for issues on which to co-operate.

NEW YORK TIMES
12 April 1973

BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL LAID TO JAPANESE

Toyota, Nissan and Hitachi
Accused of Backing Arabs

Three leading Japanese manufacturers of automobiles and electronics equipment—Toyota, Nissan and Hitachi—were accused yesterday of refusing to do business with Israel because of the Arab economic boycott.

The charges were lodged by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, which said that the companies were "concealing their long-term participation in the Arab economic boycott of Israel from American consumers because they fear the effect of the truth on their sales."

The Toyota Motor Company manufactures automobiles, the Nissan Motor Company makes Datsun cars and trucks, and Hitachi, Ltd., produces electronic and industrial items.

The three companies, which have largest export sales in the United States, denied the accusation in statements from their home offices.

The Nissan Motor Company said that it "is undertaking exports of its products strictly on a commercial basis and its export principle has never been swayed by any political consideration."

Denials Called False

But the Anti-Defamation League said that, based on an investigation dating back to 1964 and on documentation from the manufacturers or their agents, the companies "have given in to the boycott."

Lawrence Peirez, chairman of the league's national civil rights committee, charged that the three companies were answering American inquiries with "patently false" statements denying their participation in the Arab effort to strangle Israel economically.

"They are obviously afraid of American reaction," he declared.

The league official said that the three companies had engaged in "misrepresentation and doubletalk for years." He traced Toyota's compliance with the boycott to 1964, Hitachi's to 1965, and Nissan's to 1967.

Spokesmen for Toyota and Nissan asserted that their companies had declined Israeli requests for car shipments because of a "shortage of production." The two companies have each exported 20,000 to 30,000 automobiles a year to the Arab nations in the last 15 years.

Hitachi also denied the accusation, but did not comment on it.



BALTIMORE SUN
13 April 1973

Possible Trip in May

President Nixon and Africa

By RUSSELL WARREN-HOWE

Washington. Is President Nixon putting Addis Ababa on his May travel roster? Could be.

The President has let it be known that he plans to visit Europe, Latin America and Africa during the next twelve months or so. The European trip, planned for March, has been postponed until the trade and monetary conflicts between the United States and its western allies are closer to solution. Latin America would be as timely now as later, but security problems are considerable. Africa, which White House planners had vaguely scheduled for early 1974, may be brought forward.

Even if Mr. Nixon spends a week on the continent (which he has visited four times before, as congressman, Vice President and private citizen) he could respond to very few of the invitations he has received—from virtually all African states except Algeria, Egypt and Congo-Brazzaville, with which countries Washington has no official relations. If he could only find time for one capital, aides say, it would be Addis Ababa, the diplomatic capital of Africa.

It just so happens that the Organization of African Unity is holding its tenth anniversary meeting in the Ethiopian city in May. Being there would excuse the President from calling in at other countries, since most heads of state and government would

be in Addis Ababa, and would present the best opportunity to meet the most African leaders in one place, informed sources note. The implication is that Mr. Nixon wouldn't mind getting an invitation to address the meeting, even if the OAU had to give the nod to Mr. Brezhnev next year to even things out. Although attracting a major-power leader would help refurbish the annual African summit's fading star, invitations to non-Africans have been limited in the past to Secretaries-General of the United Nations.

Mr. Nixon would be the first serving American President to visit Africa since Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944. Theodore Roosevelt hunted there as a private citizen and his daughter Alice later received a proposal of marriage by mail from an Ethiopian dignitary.

On the assumption that Mr. Nixon may visit more countries than Ethiopia, the more active African ambassadors have been pressing for meetings with Dr. Kissinger; but the President's itinerary is unlikely to diverge much from the obvious.

White House sources say he will visit no Arab African states, for security reasons and also to distinguish between Near East and black African affairs. Southern Africa is also out: Mr. Nixon has particularly high regard for President Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, but the airport at the capital, Gaborone, cannot accom-

modate Air Force One or the other big jets that habitually accompany it on foreign policy safaris.

Kenya would have a good chance of seeing Mr. Nixon briefly. Nigeria and Baire would be top-priority, plus possibly the Ivory Coast: Mrs. Nixon apparently enjoyed her visit there last year, and when her husband and President Felix Houphouet-Boigny inaugurated a satellite telephone link shortly afterward, an Ivorian invitation was extended and publicly accepted. The first or last stop on any extended tour would almost certainly be Liberia.

Mr. Nixon apparently hopes that trade might follow his presidential flag (the U.S. had its first trade deficit with Africa for decades in 1972). If he goes to Africa he would outline U.S. policy but make no dramatic announcements. A point that he would emphasize, White House sources say, is that the U.S. has no intention of recognizing the settler regime in Rhodesia: one reason is that Washington would not precede London in such a step; another is that America has no political or economic reason to make such a step anyway.

Despite Mr. Nixon's reputation for aloofness, he apparently likes ebullient Africa, although his political interest in the continent is small. He is assured of tumultuous welcomes by the "rent a crowd" system: presidents truck

in rural peasants to greet distinguished visitors, and pay for their cheers with beer.

The proposed Nixon safari comes at a time when Africa has little weight in official U.S. concerns. The present African affairs adviser on Dr. Kissinger's staff, Fernando (Fred) Rondon, is due to resume his normal rank as a senior second secretary when he joins the U.S. embassy in Lima, Peru, in June. His replacement—who will have higher rank—has not been chosen.

The post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs will also become vacant shortly. The incumbent, David Newsom, is to take another embassy. A former envoy to Libya, there is speculation that he may go to Cairo or Algiers if relations are restored. Ambassador Robinson McIlvaine in Nairobi has declined an offer to succeed Mr. Newsom. Superbly qualified—four recent posts in Africa, three as ambassador—he is to retire. Also under consideration, informed sources say, are Ambassador Anthony Marshall, and four blacks: Republican newspaper publisher Beverley Carter, who became ambassador to Tanzania last year; ex-envoy to Uganda Clarence Ferguson; Lagos ambassador John Reinhardt, a Mid-East specialist, and Fredrick Morrow, whose brother John was President Eisenhower's envoy to Guinea. Mr. Marshall's appointment would be seen as reflecting a more active administration interest in Africa.

Western Hemisphere

LOS ANGELES TIMES
8 April 1973

ITT Inquiry Polarizes Chile's Political Forces

Allende and His Opposition Each Seeking Ammunition to Damage the Other Side

BY DAVID F. BELNAP

Times Staff Writer

SANTIAGO — The efforts of International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. to protect its investments here by influencing the outcome of Chile's presidential election of 1970 have become a catalyst in the overheated, highly frenetic, local political situation of today.

Political forces polarized into camps for and against the Marxist-oriented regime of President Salvador Allende each seek political ammunition against the other from the ITT case.

This has been true ever since charges that ITT tried to meddle in local politics were first aired more than a year ago by Washington columnist Jack Anderson, and both sides followed a recent U.S. Senate subcommittee's investigation of ITT with microscopic attention.

Supporters of Allende, whom ITT feared to the extent of being willing to give \$1 million toward the financing of any plan to defeat him, seek a firm link between ITT and their local opponents. So far they haven't found it.

Transition Cited

Allende's opponents, led by the Christian Democrats whose votes in Congress made him president after he failed to win more than half of the popular ballot in a three-way contest, cited the Senate hearings as one more proof that no such link existed.

From the moment of Anderson's charges, the Christian Democrats have maintained that the orderly transfer of the presidency from their hands to those of Allende's People's Union coalition furnished the best evidence of their

lack of ties with any move to achieve a different result.

But the People's Union and especially its media backers have not given up. Despite the absence of any provable connection between the Christian Democrats and what Allende's forces call "the ITT plot," they have attempted to imply one.

The chief target of these attempts is former President Eduardo Frei, the most dangerous adversary of the People's Union because of his tremendous popularity with Chile's public.

Frei proved his personal clout once again in recent congressional elections, winning back the Senate seat he held before becoming president with a vote more than half again as high as any other candidate in the country.

Branded a Fascist

During the congressional campaign, pro-administration cartoonists often depicted Frei with the initials "ITT" emblazoned across his chest. He is the constant object of attacks by People's Union orators, writers and broadcast commentators who often brand him as a fascist and servant of Yanqui imperialism.

The current issue of a local Marxist magazine carries a cartoon cover of Frei, wearing a U.S. flag as a hat. Inside is an article entitled: "Frei Moves His Pawns: The Autumn Offensive to Overthrow Allende." (It is now fall in the Southern Hemisphere.)

It's unlikely these attacks will cease on the man who in 1964 became the new world's first Christian Democratic chief of state. Frei is today's odds-in choice to head an opposition slate in

elections scheduled for 1976.

Allende, another man with a large personal following, cannot legally be a candidate to succeed himself, and the People's Union has no one else at this moment who could match Frei's standing with the public.

As part of the internal political debate, Allende's supporters contend that "imperialist plotting" against Chile continues undiminished.

The official newspaper of the Communist Party, one of the administration's two main elements, said, "Although ITT's confessions were clearly and categorically spouted before the U.S. Senate, maneuvers continue, and frankly we don't believe the Senate investigation will have a moderating effect."

A newspaper of the Socialist Party, the People's Union's other key pillar, editorialized that "ITT and similar enterprises have not ended intervention in Chile. In practice it continues vigorously through an economic blockade imposed by Washington against our people."

No Report Made

Both newspapers criticized Chile's opposition-dominated Congress for

not proceeding with its own investigation.

After Anderson's original allegations were made public, this country's Chamber of Deputies formed a special committee assigned to investigate his charges and make a report within 60 days. But the inquiry never really got started and no report was ever made, a result the People's Union blamed on the committee's opposition majority.

Less partisan observers said that Chilean congressional investigations are usually only sterile "show-piece" affairs in any event. Congressional investigating committees here lack many of the attributes of their U.S. counterparts, among them the power of subpoena.

Demands for the formation of a new parliamentary investigating committee came from the government-owned newspaper La Nacion which proclaimed:

"Very soon enough light will have emerged to start public trials in Chile against the handful of traitors who have played with the country's freedom and sovereignty. If Chile's Congress, itself does not decide to start an investigation, the Chilean people should erect a public tribunal where proofs can be presented and depositions made."

NEW YORK TIMES
16 April 1973

RIO PUBLISHER HELD FOR DEFYING CENSOR

RIO DE JANEIRO, April 15 (AP)—Brazilian federal police today arrested a publisher who defied censorship orders.

Fernando Gasparian, publisher of the weekly Opinião, was arrested in a raid at the printing plant where the latest issue of his newspaper was coming off the presses. Police men armed with submachine guns also arrested two Opinião editors and confiscated 17,000 copies of the newspaper. "You're trying to make a fool of me," a federal police inspector screamed as he and his men rushed into the building. Mr. Gasparian had re-

ceived orders earlier in the week not to print Opinião without the clearance of special censors assigned by Justice Minister Alfredo Buzaid.

"We had to start the press at 5 A.M. Saturday to get the paper on the newsstands throughout the country by Monday morning," said Mr. Gasparian, 43, a businessman and former Oxford University professor.

He explained that censors approved 15 pages by 8:30 o'clock but never returned the last eight pages of the issue.

Mr. Gasparian and the two editors were held for seven hours at the federal police headquarters here, then were released.

THE GUARDIAN MANCHESTER
30 March 1973

Bolivia's wholehearted return to the American fold appears remarkably secure. RICHARD GOTT reports from La Paz

How Banzer keeps the 'haves' happy

When you enter Bolivia two familiar tinted portraits stare down from the wall of the Customs shed — Simon Bolívar and Marshall Sucre, the founders of the country. It is as well they are there to remind you which country you are in, since the man whose photograph hangs between them is rather less familiar. Two years ago he was not there, and it is a fairly safe guess that he will not be there two years hence, either: such is the unstable nature of Bolivian politics.

Colonel Hugo Banzer Suarez, the man in question, is the kind of model American soldier that policy-makers in Washington used to dream about, before their dreams turned to nightmares in Peru in 1968. Trained at the "School of the Americas" in the Panama Canal Zone, and in the United States itself, Colonel Banzer also had a spell as military attaché in the Bolivian Embassy in Washington.

His views are impeccably conservative and anti-Communist, and he has none of those unfortunate prejudices against foreign capital, international financial organisations, and American companies, which do so much to hinder the efforts of the United States to develop Latin America.

Indeed, so delighted were the Americans with their friendly colonel that on the morrow of the unusually bloody coup that brought him to power in August, 1971, they gave him an outright grant of \$2 millions.

President Banzer has done nothing since then to lose the support of the International Monetary Fund, and has skillfully navigated the shoals and shallows occasioned by the fund's demand last year that the Bolivian peso should be substantially devalued.

The United States, of course, has interested itself in the affairs of Bolivia for more than twenty years for the same geopolitical reason that made Che Guevara set up his continental operations there in 1966. Bordering five countries, Bolivia occupies a crucial position in Latin America. It is so poor, and its politicians and soldiers so corrupt, that a small sum invested can reap a large political dividend for any outside power that wishes to intervene. And in 1971 the United States had several pertinent reasons for renewed intervention.

Since 1968 Peru had been lost to the imperialist cause and had become an ideological centre of subversion affecting to a greater or lesser extent the armed forces of the entire continent. This major defection was followed in 1970 by that of America's favourite son, Chile,

where millions of dollars had been spent to inoculate the country against communism all to no avail.

The same year a nationalist military Government in Bolivia expropriated the installations of the Gulf Oil Company, and it was succeeded by the overtly left-wing Government of General Juan Jose Torres which allowed free rein to Trotskyists and other assorted revolutionaries in a political process that was completely open-ended.

To the most insensitive observer in the Pentagon or the State Department, there was clearly a grave danger of the whole of Latin America's "southern cone" slipping from the United States' grip in these circumstances, if Banzer had not existed, plotting away in Buenos Aires, it would have been necessary to invent him.

It would be wrong, however, to believe that President Banzer is simply America's puppet, or even, as some would prefer, the puppet of the sub-imperialism of Brazil. He is in power as a result of a curious correlation of forces, which are by no means all external to the country. Although in the last resort he is propped up by readily available finance from outside, his Government relies principally on the support of two significant political parties — the MNR, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement led by former President Victor Paz Estenssoro, and the FSB, the Bolivian Socialist Falange. It is the political underpinning from these two wildly disparate parties that has given Banzer's regime its extraordinary air of stability.

Both have their own good reasons for supporting Banzer — chiefly the opportunity it gives them to enjoy the perks of office and to organise politically in the open. They are supposed to operate within the framework that Banzer has imposed upon them of the so-called Frente Popular Nacionalista, but neither party seems to find this a hindrance to their proselytisation campaigns. Banzer has promised elections, at some future undetermined date, but the big parties are united in their agreement that they are neither necessary nor desirable at the moment. For the MNR, which introduced universal suffrage to Bolivia, this is a notable diminution of its programme.

Banzer's political philosophy is contained in his slogan, "To give to those who have not, without taking away from those who have." In a country as poor as Bolivia this can be translated as, "To leave the poor in the state of abject misery to which they have grown accustomed, and to ensure that the rich con-

tinue indefinitely to enjoy the fruits of their ill-gotten gains."

For Bolivia constitutes a classic case of a country where the activity of the State is designed primarily and almost exclusively to satisfy the needs and desires of private enterprise. In Bolivian terms this means that the Government's head and heart is situated in Santa Cruz and not in La Paz. In the geographical balance of the country between the high altiplano in the West and the tropical lowlands of Santa Cruz in the East, it is, Santa Cruz that currently dominates.

Santa Cruz is frontier territory, headquarters of the Fascist Falange, and booming with oil, cotton, sugar, and beef at the same rate as neighbouring Brazil. Years ago, in the heyday of the MNR, the development of Santa Cruz was planned as a way of diversifying the country's economy away from its total dependence on the tin mines of the altiplano. Now

BALTIMORE SUN
5 April 1973

OAS displeased over U.S. role

Washington (AP)—The General Assembly of the Organization of American States convened yesterday in a spirit of growing Latin American combativeness over the United States role in the 23-nation body.

The OAS secretary general, Galo Plaza, gave expression to this sentiment when he declared in a welcoming address that "serious and deep concern" pervades the OAS in the area of joint action for development.

Although he did not mention the U.S. by name, Mr. Plaza's remarks were interpreted as a message to the Nixon administration that the hemispheric community is unhappy with its performance in promoting Latin American social and economic development.

WASHINGTON POST
3 April 1973

• Brazilian authorities confirmed the arrest on subversion charges of Wlacyra Maria Wagner, the Brazilian wife of a U. S. foreign aid adviser.

Santa Cruz has grown into a monster that overshadows the rest of the country. It develops itself, and virtually none of its wealth percolates through to the poorer, densely populated altiplano.

It is the pressure of Santa Cruz on the Government that has brought Brazil firmly into the Bolivian picture. Banzer's regime believes in following the Brazilian road to development — hellbent on economic growth whatever the social cost. The Brazilians are now well installed in Bolivia, both ideologically and practically. They are helping with roadbuilding — capital intensive, naturally

— and are also financing the projected rail link between Santa Cruz and Cochabamba. This railway will join the two halves of Bolivia, but more significantly it will provide Brazil with its first rail link to the Pacific.

The interesting question now is what effect the new revolutionary nationalist Government in Argentina — due to take office on May 25 — will have on the internal politics in Bolivia. Everyone in La Paz agrees that events in Argentina will have some effect, but few are prepared to guess what it will be.

The present alliance supporting Banzer looks remarkably stable, but as always a question mark hangs over the future attitude of the armed forces.

NEW YORK TIMES
8 April 1973

PRESS REVENUE CUT PROTESTED IN BRAZIL

RIO DE JANEIRO, April 7—A new, economic threat to journalistic independence in Brazil has stirred widespread protest. The Governor of the state of São Paulo, Laudo Natel, cut off state advertising this week from two leading newspapers, O Estado de São Paulo and Jornal da Tarde.

The newspapers recently published articles critical of the São Paulo state administration. The withdrawal of state advertising follows a report that an insurance company, in which one of the Governor's brothers is an official, has been given a monopoly on insurance policies for São Paulo railroad employees. This business had previously been shared by a number of insurance companies.

The president of the Brazilian Press Association has denounced the Governor's action as "an attack on press freedom" and "economic reprisal."

The chairman of the Freedom of the Press Committee of the Inter-American Press Association, now holding a board meeting at Montego Bay, Jamaica, has sent a telegram of protest to the Governor of São Paulo, also denouncing his action as "reprisals."

The two São Paulo newspapers are owned by the prominent Mesquita family, which has taken the lead in resisting official curbs on the press in this country.